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ABSTRACT 
Gödel showed that formal systems that discuss natural numbers cannot be 
complete or prove their own consistency.  Incompleteness in this sense is limited to 
formal systems, and so is not applicable to law by it own terms.  
Looking to the philosophy behind the Incompleteness Theorem, Gödel 
intended to show that positivism was a bankrupt world-view, and this resonates 
strongly with Lon Fuller. Fuller is analogous to Gödel in his condemnation of the 
positivist philosophy because he showed that a system of rules, by itself, was not 
capable of rendering judgments. A legal system is dependent upon an external 
morality, but a close inspection reveals that Fuller’s own natural law view was 
positivistic in its denial of substantive natural law.  A legal system consistent with 
Gödel’s philosophy would seek justice in an objective and non-arbitrary sense, and 
would rely on a natural law system akin to that described by Aquinas. 
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One of them a prophet of their own, said, The Cretians are always liars… 
         -- Titus 1:12 
 
Chapter I: Introduction: Gödel and Natural Law 
1. Law and Morals: Is Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem an analogous case of Lon 
Fuller’s statements concerning the natural law? 
 My thesis will explore the purpose and structure of the law and legal 
reasoning.  More specifically, I will argue that the proposition that positive law 
cannot exist without the infusion of morality from the natural law is correct.  
 This exploration emerges from the following inquiry:  “Whether Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem is an analogous case of Lon Fuller’s statements concerning 
the natural law?” The very brief answer to that question is, “Yes.”  The longer answer 
is that both Fuller and Gödel showed that the positivist philosophy was an incomplete 
account of how we come to know things.  There is some slight confusion on this point 
because Fuller is largely associated with a stance that is antithetical to the positivist 
view, but as I shall show, Fuller’s natural law system is, in some ways, positivistic. 
My thesis question was inspired by Desmond Manderson’s book, Songs 
Without Music, which seeks to show that the legal aesthetic “suggests very strongly a 
particularly normative dimension in the pursuit of justice.”1  It would be difficult to 
dispute the goal of “justice” as the proper ends of a legal system, but many will 
quibble over its exact meaning.  Although justice can be described by a wide variety 
of frameworks -- procedure, content, or fairness – Manderson maintains that its 
                                                
1 Desmond Manderson, Songs Without Music: Aesthetic Dimensions of Law and Justice, (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2000) at 191.   
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precise meaning escapes definition because justice is accepted in our lives 
axiomatically: justice is self-evident.2   
 In contrast to the normative dimension, Manderson holds out positivism as a 
conception of a purely algorithmic system: “some system of formalized procedures 
for which it is possible to check, entirely computationally, in any particular case, 
whether or not the rules have been correctly applied.”3  
Manderson claims that the human awareness of the nature of justice is not 
admissible to the legal system in a manner that is analogous to Gödel’s Theorem: 
“Gödel’s theorem proves, from within the logic of the mathematical system, 
that certain things which are true according to its premises nevertheless cannot 
be logically derived from it…. Our knowledge of these truths, then, stems 
from some understanding of the system of rules and axioms which the system 
does not itself replicate and cannot either manufacture or comprehend.  It 
relates to an awareness of the “why” of the system to which the system itself – 
mute sequence of rule-following algorithms—has no access….  The most 
rigorous and analytic theory or system requires a supplement which is both 
necessary to its functioning and yet cannot be admitted by its structure. 
This supplement is an awareness of the “purposes” which motivate the 
system, an argument most closely associated with Lon Fuller. Fuller’s point is 
nothing but an analogous case of Gödel’s theorem and vise versa.4  
                                                
2 Ibid at 192.  Note: To accept something axiomatically means to admit it without proof.  This process 
of admitting axiomatic statements will be discussed more fully in the section on Gödel.  Something 
that is self-evident means that it is so obvious that it cannot be explained.  
3 Ibid at 194, citing Roger Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of 
Consciousness, (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1996) [Shadows] at 72. cf Fuller’s 
description of Hart’s positivism as viewing law “entirely in terms of its formal source rather than as a 
complex undertaking capable of various degrees of success.” Lon Fuller, Morality of Law (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) at 157.   
4 Manderson, supra note 1 at 194-5. [Italics added for emphasis.] “Positivism conceives of specific 
rules or a whole legal system as an algorithm and nothing but an algorithm: “some system of 
formalized procedures for which it is possible to check, entirely computationally, in any particular 
case, whether or not the rules have been correctly applied.”[Citing Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3, at 
72.]  “But well before CLS [the Critical Legal Studies movement] Fuller insisted that the process of 
interpretation always requires an understanding of the reasons we are engaged in interpretation. For 
Gödel and Fuller alike, the “is” and the “ought,” the how and the why, of legal interpretation are 
inextricably linked: “Human lawyers are not using a knowably sound legal rule in order to ascertain 
legal truth.” [This is a paraphrase of Penrose, Shadows, supra note 1, at 76.]  “Gödel’s theorem 
demonstrates that legal meaning exceeds rule following. Even from the point of view of law as a 
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Gödel’s Theorem is a formal math theorem, so how can it be said that Gödel 
is analogous or even relevant to law?  Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem talks about 
format math systems, which were invented in order to talk about number systems 
without any ambiguity. There is perhaps no more complete sense of ‘proving’ 
something than how this is done in a formal logic system.  Gödel was able to show 
that there are statements that are recognized as true within a formal system but cannot 
be proved within that system.  A shorthand way of expressing this is to say that 
“[T]ruth is not reducible to (formal…) proof.”5   
 The analogous instance in legal theory is the Hart-Fuller debate, which 
concerns the proper place of morality within the law. Professor Hart minimized the 
place of morality in law, stating that the law is what is written in the properly 
promulgated legal code, i.e. the “positive law”.  Professor Fuller represented the 
natural law view, and said that it was not possible to understand the meaning of a 
legal rule without understanding its purpose.  
Bringing these two ideas together, the legal theorist is tempted to ask: “Does 
Gödel’s Theorem prove that the positivists are wrong and that the natural law 
                                                                                                                                      
system of rules itself, legal meaning requires another element which, by definition, cannot be defined 
in terms of those rules and systems and remains an indigestible supplement or remainder to them. 
 Justice is one name for this supplement, something both utterly apart from and yet embodied in the 
operation of law.  It is a mistake (nonetheless frequently made) to conflate the two, as if an exacerbated 
quantity of the latter could somehow accelerate the former.  Neither the rote application of law nor the 
random exercise of mercy constitutes justice.”   
“Justice can never be found through the application of an abstract rule.  It is understood as the 
application of general principles, but at the same time -- and especially within the common-law 
system-- it demands an acknowledgment of the "irreducible singularity" of each individual context…” 
5 Palle Yourgrau, A World Without Time: The Forgotten Legacy of Godel and Einstein (New York: 
Basic Books, 2005) at 57. 
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theorists are right? Or vice versa?” And if you ask a lawyer, the answer, of course, 
will be: “It depends.”  It would of course be super keen if there could be a cut and 
dried answer to this endless legal debate, but Gödel’s Theorem, by its own terms 
limits itself to the realm of formal systems discussing natural numbers, and that 
definition does not include legal systems.  Some would interpret Gödel’s Theorem 
broadly to show that the positive law cannot interpret itself, but many would question 
whether non-math analogies based on Gödel have any meaning.  Drawing 
conclusions from such analogies are held to scorn as being tendentious: the rhetorical 
equivalent of smoke and mirrors.  In exploring the Gödel-Fuller analogy, I avoid this 
criticism by basing my analogy upon their similar philosophies: both Gödel and 
Fuller rejected positivism as being a bankrupt world-view. 
Looking deeper into the philosophy behind Gödel’s Theorem is where things 
get interesting. By establishing that the system of natural numbers cannot be proven 
within a formal system, Gödel meant to show that the positivist philosophy is 
similarly incomplete, and cannot account for how we make decisions about things. 
The philosophy of positivism is similar to empiricism, and holds that all true 
knowledge is derived from observable phenomena.6 This philosophy is not a 
complete or ‘true’ account of how people come to know things because positivists 
rely on concepts that are not admitted to their system.  
The philosophy of legal positivism has essentially the same meaning, and 
proposes that legal rules are valid because the political authority enacted them, and 
                                                
6 See “positivism”, Blacks Law Dictionary, 3d ed. Cf empirical: “Of, relating to, or based on 
experience, experiment, or observation”.  
 5 
not because of any natural law morality.7 Fuller’s point, that the meanings of all legal 
rules are dependent upon the purpose of the rule, is analogous to Gödel’s proof that 
true statements cannot be proven within the formal system.  It is in this context of 
disproving positivism that Gödel is most relevant to Fuller.  
To be honest, I cannot wholly recommend Lon Fuller’s theory of law.  When I 
looked closely at his representation of this external morality of law, I found that it 
was, in its own way, positivistic.  Fuller’s theory of natural law is subjective, and 
does not accurately describe the operation of law.  Fuller’s theory of natural law is 
inherently weak due to logical fallacies, and it does not accurately describe the nature 
of human rights.  As I shall show in section IV, the more classical theory, as 
described by Aquinas, shows how the natural law can render an objective judgment, 
and is not subject to the naturalist fallacy.  I therefore concluded that Aquinas’ theory 
was a more accurate description of natural law that is analogous to Gödel.  
2. General Summary of Thesis Sections 
In order to make comparisons between Fuller’s and Gödel’s theories, I will 
provide a brief overview of their respective writings.  In Section II I explore the 
natural law system of Lon Fuller. Fuller’s writings are broad in scope, but I have 
selected the topics that I felt were most relevant to the topic of Gödel.  One major 
theme of Fuller’s was Polarity: he would examine antinomies that were intrinsic to 
law, such as logic and policy, and find some means of relation rather than show how 
one should triumph over the other. Much of the discussion in this section is carried on 
                                                
7 See “legal positivism”, Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed.  
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against the background the Hart/Fuller debate, which discussed the conflicting ideas 
of legal positivism and natural law. Fuller’s main point in this debate was that 
morality was always a necessary component in the law.  
In Section III I discuss formal logic and describe the meaning and the ordinary 
application of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem. Many writers are mistaken as to the 
applicability of the Theorem in other contexts, such as legal systems, and wrongly use 
common terms like “completeness” and “consistency”, which have very specific 
meanings within the formal context.  By its own terms, the Incompleteness Theorem 
is applicable only to formal logic systems, which does not include the legal system.  
Rather than leave Gödel and legal systems as hopelessly irreconcilable, in Part 
IIIa I discuss Penrose’s interpretation of Gödel, which leaves the possibility open for 
alternative applications of the Incompleteness Theorem. It is this interpretation that 
Manderson invokes to find Gödel’s applicability to the law: “Conclusion G” states 
that Gödel’s Theorem shows that any system of rules can never show that these rules 
are being exactly followed.8   I don’t consider this as complete “proof”, but Penrose 
certainly bolsters the argument of relevance. I am continuing to look at the 
Incompleteness Theorem as an analogy. In this section I lay out a rough framework of 
how Gödel is relevant to Fuller’s theory of natural law. I show how Gödel’s theorem 
demonstrates a type of vagueness that is unavoidable in formal systems. 
In Section IV I will provide a more detailed discussion of the classical theory 
of natural law. Although Lon Fuller is generally held up as an example of natural law, 
                                                
8 Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3 at 72. 
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in many ways his theories were in conflict with the classical ideas of natural law.  
Fuller’s emphasis on procedural aspects of natural law, rather than the ordering of its 
substantive aims, leaves his natural law theory open to charges of moral relativism.  
In a related sense, Fuller is an instrumentalist because he emphasizes the purposive 
view of rules without previously restraining those rules within the context of 
necessary human goods.  Finally I will show how the natural law is necessary to 
provide consistency to the positive law.  This  demonstration is necessary not only to 
show how this abstract argument is relevant to the operation of law, but also to 
complete the analogy comparing the Incompleteness System to the natural law.  
A common misunderstanding of Gödel’s Theorem is to say that the system of 
numbers is somehow incomplete.  But Gödel did not prove this. Rather he showed 
that the system of natural numbers was not provable within the formal system. 
Likewise, the natural law is not provable within the positive law. Yet both natural 
numbers and natural law are essential to their respective systems: formal logic 
systems are trying to describe the operation of natural numbers; positive law is trying 
to accomplish natural law justice.  
 
 
 8 
“Whatever changeable thing you may look at, you could not grasp it at all, either by 
the sense of the body or by the contemplation of the mind, unless it had some form 
composed of numbers, without which it would sink into nothing.”1 St. Augustine 
 
Chapter II: The Hart/Fuller Debate 
1. Introduction 
The main question that this thesis will answer is whether Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorem is an analogous case of Lon Fuller’s statements concerning 
the natural law. Although these theories are from entirely different disciplines, the 
relation between Gödel’s formal math theorem and Fuller’s natural law will give the 
reader a better understanding of the form and purpose of the law. 
Of course, when presenting an argument, the first matter should always be to 
define our terms.  This section will give a basic overview of Fuller’s natural law 
thesis, which says that legal systems are essentially based on an internal morality of 
aspiration, and a morality of duty that is informed by values external to the legal 
system.2 I will also give some background to the statements Manderson made 
concerning the Hart/Fuller debate and how this is related to Gödel. 
Much of my description of Fuller will be focused on the conflict between Hart 
and Fuller, which embodies the classic conflict between positivism and natural law 
theories, and which lays out some of the main issues that this thesis will explore. 
Fuller argued that a system of positive law was always dependent upon norms that 
were external to it.  Later sections of this thesis will demonstrate that this external 
                                                
1 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, trans Thomas Williams, (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co, 1993) 
Bk II, ch 16 section 171. [Augustine, Free Choice] 
2 Lon Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 3-32. 
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morality is analogous to what Gödel’s Theorem proved in formal math systems. In 
addition, this section will show how Fuller’s natural law theory deviates from the 
classical theory of natural law.  
2. Polarity 
 Before I discuss natural law directly, I will explain “the principle of polarity”, 
which is perhaps the most singular, overarching concept in Fuller’s philosophy; 
Otherwise, Fuller’s theories seem “reluctant to yield” any “comprehensive 
statement”.3  Fuller spoke of polarity as an “unresolved state of tension” which exists 
between “apparently contradictory” notions that “form indispensable complements 
for one another.”4 Polarity is important to Fuller’s philosophy because it changes the 
way we look at legal philosophy: 
“[Polarity] is a perspective-transforming concept in the sense that it moves us 
from a perspective from which we regard the contrary tendencies that form 
human experience in terms of simplistic opposition toward an alternative 
perspective from which we can see the same tendencies in terms of more 
complex relationships of opposition and interdependency. Polarity in this 
sense bears a great affinity to Keats's notion of "negative capability": the 
capability… of holding two conflicting ideas in the mind at the same time 
without an undue striving after one or the other.”5  
 
 Fuller described legal antinomies, e.g. realism versus formalism, as “the two 
blades of a pair of scissors.  If we watch only one blade we may conclude it does all 
                                                
3 Peter Read Teachout, “The Soul of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller”(1985-86) 70 Minn L 
Rev 1073 at 1075, 1105: “If there is any single impulse that gives shape and meaning to Fuller's 
jurisprudence, it is that embodied in what he referred to as "the principle of polarity.”  
4 Lon Fuller, “Reason and Fiat in Case Law” (1945-46) 59 Harv L Rev 376 at 381. [Fuller, “Reason 
and Fiat”]  
5 Teachout, supra note 3 at 1106-7. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
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the cutting.”6 But we avoid the confusion involved in eliminating or denying one 
legal school of thought “by the simple expedient of recognizing that both blades cut, 
and that neither can cut without the other.”7  
Reading Professor Fuller’s law review articles with an awareness of this 
principle of polarity will reveal that many, if not most, of Fuller’s articles display this 
determined effort “to free us from the phony oppositions” between antinomies: “law 
versus morality, reason versus fiat, formalism versus realism, logic versus policy, 
justice versus efficiency, substance versus procedure, means versus ends….”8 
More will be said on polarity later on, but I am stating this at the outset 
because this polarity principle could easily be interpreted as part of Fuller’s theory of 
natural law.9  The reader should note that this paper deals with various antinomies 
without reckoning them as indispensable complements. I do not consider this to be a 
large issue, and I shall endeavor to be clear about which classifications are from 
Fuller. 
3. Lon Fuller’s Natural Law 
The concept of “natural law” has been around for thousands of years, 
beginning with the ancient Greeks.10  There are many different theories of natural law, 
                                                
6 Lon Fuller, “American Legal Realism”, (1934) 82 U PA L Rev 429  at 452. [Fuller, “Legal 
Realism”.] 
7 Ibid.   
8 Teachout, supra note 3 at 1078-79.  
9 Note that Manderson represents this polarity principle as a representative part of Fuller’s natural law: 
e.g.  Manderson supra note 1, section I at 194: “For Gödel and Fuller alike, the “is” and “ought,” the 
how and the why, of legal interpretation are inextricably linked…” Manderson cites Teachout, “Soul of 
the Fugue”, supra note 3, for this understanding.  
10 Brendan F Brown, “Natural Law and The Law-Making Function In American Jurisprudence” (1939-
1940) 15 Notre Dame L 9.   
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some of which go by other labels, but all evincing some “requirement of an extralegal 
criterion-the constitutive of an apparatus allowing a process of intelligent change in 
the juristic regime.”11 Generally, natural law is seen in juxtaposition with “human 
law” or “positive law”,12 and refers to the use of reason in the guidance of ultimate 
determinations of right and wrong.13 Classical theories of natural law seek to establish 
basic forms of human “goods” to be pursued, a set of basic “requirements of practical 
reasonableness”, and “a set of general moral standards”.14 
 Although it is difficult to extract a comprehensive statement of a theory of law 
from Fuller’s writings15, Fuller dissociated his natural law theory from what are 
commonly understood to be the classical forms of natural law.16 Fuller’s theory of 
natural law is mostly based on aspects that he termed “procedural” rather than 
“substantive”: it generally does not delimit explicit positive law aspects of the natural 
law, but instead posits that the essence of law is bound up in its own “internal 
morality”.17  
3.a. Morality of Aspiration and Morality of Duty 
 
 Fuller embraces the strong resemblance between morality and law, the 
                                                
11 Ibid at 10-11.   
12 Ibid at 9. 
13 Charles Grove Haines, “The Law Of Nature In State And Federal Judicial Decisions” (1915-1916) 
25 Yale L J 617 at 618, citing Grotius.   
14 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980) at 23.  
[Finnis, Natural Law.] 
15 Teachout, supra note 3 at 1075. 
16 Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14 at 18.   
17 Fuller, Morality of Law,  supra note 3, section I at 96-98. At 97: “The term “procedural” is … 
appropriate as indicating that we are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with 
the ways in which a system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and 
administered if it is to be efficacious….” Fuller does discern one principle of substantive natural law: 
“Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which men 
convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire.” (at 186)  
 12 
essential difference being that law is an “enterprise”, which Fuller describes as “a 
direction of purposive human effort”:18 Law is “the enterprise of subjecting human 
conduct to the governance of rules.”19 There are two sorts of morality that give 
authority to law: a system of morals that is external to the law, and an internal 
morality.20 The life of a nation’s legal system is found in a reciprocal influence 
between this external and internal morality: “a deterioration of the one will almost 
inevitably produce a deterioration in the other.”21   
 The external morality is the morality of duty: it starts at the bottom of human 
achievement and describes “the basic rules without which an ordered society is 
impossible, or without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals 
must fail of its mark.”22 The external morality of duty “finds its closest cousin in the 
law”, while the internal morality of aspiration is more closely related to aesthetics.23  
The evaluation of aesthetics is “essentially subjective and intuitive”, but in order to 
have “workable standards of judgment the law must turn to…the morality of duty.” 24  
“[O]ur common sense tells us that we can apply more objective standards to 
departures from satisfactory performance than we can to performances 
reaching toward perfection.”25  
 
Fuller’s “secular”26 natural law did not attempt to describe those substantive 
                                                
18 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 130.   
19 Ibid at 106.   
20  Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law – A Reply to Professor Hart” (1957) 71 Harv L Rev 
630 at 645. [Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law”]  
21 Ibid.   
22 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 5-6.   
23 Ibid at 15.   
24 Ibid at 9, 30-31.   
25 Ibid at 32. 
26 Teachout, supra note 3 at 1076.   
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laws that are necessary to achieve or maintain universal “goods” that are natural to all 
human beings, but rather rejected this approach as another form of positivism.27 
Instead, Fuller’s theory focuses on the procedural aspects of natural law, the “inner 
morality” that is necessary to law.28  
3.b. Inner Morality 
Fuller’s natural law system is essentially based on an “inner morality” of 
“aspiration”: it is “affirmative in nature”, “demand[s] more than forbearances”, and is 
“directed towards specific kinds of achievement”.29 
The inner morality of aspiration is essentially a “procedural version of natural 
                                                
27 Anthony D'Amato, “Lon Fuller And Substantive Natural Law” (1981) 26 Am J Juris 202 [D’Amato, 
“Substantive Natural Law”] at 209-10: “Fuller's very use of the term "morality" in his concept of the 
"internal morality of law" tends to throw us off, because he seems to be pitting one kind of morality 
(procedural) against another (substantive). We begin to suspect that Fuller has used the term "morality" 
the way I have defined M-2, as an honorific title and not really a matter of morality at all.”  See also 
Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20 at 660: “This identification of natural law 
with a law that is above human laws seems in fact to be demanded by any doctrine that asserts the 
possibility of an authoritative pronouncement of the demands of natural law. In those areas affected by 
such pronouncements as have so far been issued, the conflict between Roman Catholic doctrine and 
opposing views seems to me to be a conflict between two forms of positivism.”  See also Lon L. 
Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy At Mid-Century: A Review of Edwin W Patterson's 
Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the Law” (1953-1954) 6 J Legal Educ 457 [Fuller, “American Legal 
Philosophy”] at 477: “Because of the confusions invited by the term "natural law," I believe we need a 
new name for the field of study I am here recommending. I suggest the term "eunomics," which may 
be defined as the science, theory or study of good order and workable arrangements. Eunomics 
involves no commitment to "ultimate ends."” See also Matthew Kramer, “Scrupulousness Without 
Scruples: A Critique Of Lon Fuller And His Defenders” (1998) 18 Oxford J Legal Stud 235 at 256: 
“Like The Proposition 'I Ought To Stop Smoking', the Fullerian principles are not in themselves 
morally pregnant. Their moral status varies with the circumstances in which they are operative.” 
28 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3 section I at 96. See Fuller’s discussion of the “Substantive 
Aims of Law” at 152-186.  At 184, 186: “But can we derive from the morality of aspiration itself any 
proposition of law that is substantive, rather than procedural, in quality?…. If I were asked…to discern 
on central …principle of what may be called substantive natural law… I would find it in the 
injunction: Open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels of communication by which 
men convey to one another what they perceive, feel, and desire.” 
29 Ibid at 42-3. 
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law”.30 In contrast to traditional natural law theories that have more “substantive 
aims” of describing “the proper ends to be sought through legal rules”, Fuller’s 
natural law is more concerned with “the ways in which a system of rules for 
governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be 
efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be.”31 Fuller has broken 
his natural law down into “eight kinds of legal excellence towards which a system of 
rules may strive.”32 
3.c. Eight Guiding Principles of Law 
 Using the example of a misguided King Rex who is an incompetent ruler, 
Fuller demonstrates how legal systems are dependent upon an inner morality, without 
which the system of law will break down.33 The Eight Principles can be 
summarized:34 
(1) there must be general rules;35  
(2) the rules must be promulgated to the people who are required to obey 
them;36 
                                                
30 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 96-7. “[T]he word “procedural” should be assigned 
a special and expanded sense so that it would include, for example, a substantive accord between 
official action and enacted law.”  
31 Ibid at 97-8.   
32 Ibid at 41.   
33 Ibid at 33-49.   
34 Kramer supra note 27 at 236. 
35 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 46-9. The principle of generality is the 
acknowledgment that legal systems must have rules, and this requires that the rules must be capable of 
some general applicability to like cases. 
36 Ibid at 49-51. Promulgation concerns the necessity that people be informed of what the law is, and 
its importance is underlined by Fuller’s naming it his only substantive natural law rule. Although 
Fuller normally says that substantive laws are subject to organization much like a system of exchange, 
this rule of promulgation, like all of the morality of aspiration, is regulated along the lines of marginal 
utility.  All the laws will not be understood or ever read by all the people, but laws should be generally 
available and adequately published so that they may be subject to public criticism. Note that this is 
Fuller’s own distinction.  Other aspects of Fuller’s natural law that might possibly be called 
“substantive” can be found at 152-186.  
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(3) the rules must not be retroactive;37 
(4) the rules must be understandable;38 
(5) the duties imposed by the rules must not conflict;39 
(6) compliance with the rules must be possible;40 
(7) the rules must not be changed with disorienting frequency;41 and 
(8) there must be a congruence between the rules as formulated and their 
implementation.42 
 Fuller’s natural law theories have been appreciated and recommended by 
classical law scholars, but it is difficult to reconcile Fuller’s conception of polarity 
                                                
37 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 51-62. Laws should be generally prospective, so 
that people are on notice of what is prohibited before they are punished for their actions. But Fuller 
recognizes that a functioning legal system must occasionally employ retrospective laws as corrective 
measures; e.g. to make up for poorly drafted legislation.  Overruling a precedent can also be a form of 
retrospective rule.     
38 Ibid at 63 FN 21. Fuller says that the necessity of legal clarity underlines one of the weaknesses in 
positivist theory: “recognizing that laws may vary in legal clarity would entail a further recognition 
that laws can have varying degrees of efficacy” and “that the unclear statute is, in a real sense, less a 
law than the clear one.” See also at 64: One of the best ways to achieve clarity is through common 
sense standards of judgments that we use in ordinary life. 
39 Ibid at 65-70. It is obvious that laws should not contradict one another, but it can be challenging to 
define a contradiction in law and to provide some resolution. See at 69: Fuller’s demonstration of how 
judges might resolve contradictions in law reveals yet another example of how legal systems are reliant 
upon “a host of considerations extrinsic to the language of the rules themselves.”  
40 Ibid at 70-79. The principle of impossibility takes on more than the idea that people cannot be 
compelled to do that which they cannot. It is into this category that Fuller stows the principles which 
guide lawmakers as they tread the difficult course between harsh justice and one that fails to be 
evenhanded. The category of impossibility recognizes the extreme difficulties involved in “tempering 
the standard of the reasonable man in favor of certain obvious deficiencies” and “formalizing 
definitions of these.” (at 72). Fuller also includes under this heading the adjunct system of rules that 
are meant to heal the effects of inadvertence; e.g. unjust enrichment. 
41 Ibid at 79. Although people desire constancy in the law, so that our system of rules do not change too 
frequently, this concept is perhaps the “least suited to formalization in a constitutional restriction.” 
Retrospective legislation and frequent changes in the law are both caused by legislative inconstancy. 
(at 79-81). The category of constancy charts the course between never allowing for changes, and 
making changes too often.  
42 Ibid at 81-91. This last of the “desiderata” is one that Fuller describes as “the most complex of all” 
the principles laid out thus far: the congruence between the official actions of the state and its declared 
rules. Just as there are many types of error or corruption that can disrupt this congruity, so there are 
many procedural devices to maintain it; e.g. habeas corpus and the right of appeal. Once again we are 
confronted with the limits of formality when we attempt to create rules about rules: how may courts be 
permitted to discover legislative intent? At 91, Fuller states: “With all of its subtleties, the problem of 
interpretation occupies a sensitive, central position in the internal morality of the law.” 
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and his theories of natural law.43  While Fuller acknowledges the place of the external 
morality of law, his theory of natural law concerns only the inner morality, and is 
largely neglectful of that substantive portion.  Does this set of scissors cut with only 
one blade? 
4. Hart/Fuller Debate 
Although it is this concept of “inner morality” that distinguishes Professor 
Fuller’s natural law theory, Fuller is perhaps best known for taking part in the 
Hart/Fuller debate, in which he argued that the law is dependent upon external norms, 
or the “external morality”, for its own interpretation.44 
Hardly a discussion of Fuller goes by without a mention of the famous 
Hart/Fuller debate. This “debate” began with a pair of articles which proposed 
antithetical views on the philosophy of law, and which were published simultaneously 
in the Harvard Law Review contrasting Fuller’s theory of natural law to Hart’s theory 
of positivism.45 This debate is variously described as a distinction between what the 
                                                
43 See John Finnis, “The “Natural Law Tradition” (1986) 36 J Legal Educ 492 at 494. [Finnis, “Natural 
Law Tradition”.] See also D’Amato, “Substantive Natural Law”, supra note 27.  
44 Frederick Schauer, “A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park” (2008) 83 NYU L Rev 1109 [Schauer, 
“Critical Guide”]. “It is the most famous hypothetical in the common law world.” Teachout, supra note 
3 at 1076-77 posits: "[Fuller] had a significant impact … on the thought and writing of … H.L.A. Hart, 
the great English positivist with whom Fuller engaged in famous debates over the relationship of 
morality and law." Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity To Law” supra note 20 at 663: “It is rather because, 
for example, whether the rule be intended to preserve quiet in the park, or to save carefree strollers 
from injury, we know, "without thinking," that a noisy automobile must be excluded.” 
45 Positivism: “The doctrine that all true knowledge is derived from observable phenomena, rather than 
speculation or reasoning.” Legal positivism: “The theory that legal rules are valid only because they 
are enacted by an existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because 
they are grounded in morality or in natural law.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed. The principle articles 
are: Fuller, “Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20, and HLA Hart, “Positivism And The Separation Of Law 
And Morals”  (1957) 71 Harv L Rev 593.  [Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”] Note: Technically 
the Hart/Fuller debate only started with these two articles, but it did not end there. After the exchange 
was published in 1958, Hart published his book, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 
[Hart, Concept of Law], in which he criticized Fuller’s position. Fuller replied to Hart in The Morality 
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law is (positivism) and what the law ought to be (natural law), and similar divides 
between the text of a rule and its purpose, or the letter of the law and its spirit.46 
4.a. Positivism 
Professor Hart’s essay, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” as 
the title suggests, presents the positivist argument that law should not be confused 
with morality; i.e. that there is a need to distinguish law as it ‘is’ from the law as it 
‘ought’ to be.  An issue that is central to Hart’s analysis deals with the problem of the 
“penumbra”, which is when a judge is asked to decide whether a word is to be given a 
meaning that is within the rule or statute.47  Hart describes this problem using the 
astronomical analogy48 of penumbral meanings lying outside of the “core” meaning of 
the word in the rule: 
“There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a 
penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable 
nor obviously ruled out.”49 
 
The initial target of Hart’s essay was not natural law, but rather the school of 
“legal realists”50, who had over-represented the indeterminacy of law by stressing the 
                                                                                                                                      
of Law  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) [Note that I am using the 1969 version, infra] in a 
chapter called “The Concept of Law”. Hart reviewed Fuller’s book in 1965 HLA Hart, “Lon L Fuller: 
The Morality of Law” (1965) 78 Harvard L Rev 1281). Finally, in 1969 Fuller published a revised 
edition of Morality of Law, supra, note 3, section I, which contained a new chapter “Reply to Critics”, 
and which contained a detailed response to Hart’s review. 
46 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1115.   
47 Penumbra: “A surrounding area or periphery of uncertain extent.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed. 
[See HLA Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”, supra note 45 at 606-615.  
48  The term “penumbra” was coined in 1604 by Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), referring to the "partial 
shadow outside the complete shadow of an eclipse," from L. pæne "almost" + umbra "shadow".    
49 Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”, supra note 45 at 607.   
50 Legal realism is “[t]he theory that law is based, not on formal rules or principles, but instead on 
judicial decisions that should derive from social interests and public policy Blacks’ Law Dictionary.”, 
3d ed.   
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“difficult appellate cases at the edges of the law”.51 These cases at the edges, or 
“penumbral” cases, “necessarily involve determinations of what the law ought to 
be”.52 The realist view of law was an invitation for judges to include, within their 
conception of legal rules, the purpose, i.e. the morality, that lies behind the rule.  
4.a.1. Vehicles in the Park 
In contrast, Hart said that a word must have a “core of settled 
meaning”…“some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its 
application”.53  Hart insisted that “the hard core of settled meaning is law in some 
centrally important sense” that was distinct from those penumbral meanings.54 No one 
could doubt that these core meanings are what the law ‘is’55, and Hart believed that 
there is something about the nature of law that is inconsistent with leaving these core 
cases open to evaluation in the light of purported morals: 
                                                
51 Schauer, “Critical Guide” supra note 44 at 1109. Note: Some of the difficulty in following the 
Hart/Fuller debate comes from the many legal schools of thought that are juxtaposed, sometimes 
without a clear representation of whose ideas are being defended and whose are being criticized.  I 
have already noted that Fuller is representing his natural law theory in response to Hart’s essay, which 
was meant to critique the school of legal realism. In addition, Hart, himself a positivist, is defending 
the views of the “Utilitarians”, who just happen to share, with the positivists, the “same insistence on 
the separation of law and morals”. (Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals” supra note 45 at 601.)  Hart 
describes the Utilitarian doctrine as emphasizing the "purely analytical study of legal concepts" and of 
law's "distinctive vocabulary"; and the famous “imperative theory…that law is essentially a 
command.” 
 Ostensibly, Hart’s point is to show how criticism of the Utilitarians does not implicate the 
positivist view, but Hart spends a lot of time defending the Utilitarians. Another twist is thrown into 
Hart’s commentary when he defends Utilitarian judges against charges of “formalism”. (at 610-12.)  
52 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1110. 
53 Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”, supra note 45 at 607.   
54 Ibid at 614.   
55 Ibid at 612: “[N]o one who wished to use these vices of formalism as proof that the distinction 
between what is and what ought to be is mistaken would deny that the decisions stigmatized 
as automatic are law; nor would he deny that the system in which such automatic decisions are made is 
a legal system. Surely he would say that they are law, but they are bad law, they ought not to be law. 
But this would be to use the distinction, not to refute it….” 
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“[T]o assert mysteriously that there is some fused identity between law as it is 
and as it ought to be, is to suggest that all legal questions are fundamentally 
like those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no central element of 
actual law to be seen in the core of central meaning which rules have, that 
there is nothing in the nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions 
being open to reconsideration in the light of social policy.”56 
 
  Hart’s unfortunate example of a core meaning was the word “vehicle”:57 
“A legal rule forbids you to take a vehicle into the public park. Plainly this 
forbids an automobile, but what about bicycles, roller skates, toy 
automobiles? What about airplanes? Are these, as we say, to be called 
"vehicles" for the purpose of the rule or not?58 
 
This example was meant to demonstrate an instance when it was impermissible for a 
judge to resort to morality in order to interpret law.59  
4.a.2. Memorials in the Park 
In his “Reply to Professor Hart”, Fuller pointed out that, in order to know 
whether a bicycle is a “vehicle” within the ordinary meaning of a statute and thus is 
prohibited from the park, first it is necessary for the judge to know the purpose 
behind the statute: i.e. what “ought” to be prohibited from the park.60  Hart’s reliance 
upon the core meaning as that which jumps to the mind of the ordinary man is very 
much dependnt upon what the purpose of the rule is.  
“If the rule excluding vehicles from parks seems easy to apply in some cases, 
I submit this is because we can see clearly enough what the rule "is aiming at 
in general”…”61 
 
                                                
56 Ibid at 615.   
57 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1119. 
58 Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”, supra note 45 at 607. [Italicized for emphasis.] 
59 Schauer, “Crtical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1114. “The rule excluding vehicles from the park was just 
that example, and the application of that rule to clear cases in the core was for Hart just that morality-
free legal act.” 
60 Fuller, “Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20 at 662-667.   
61 Ibid at 663. 
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As a counter-example, Fuller proposed that a veteran’s memorial was to be 
built in the park, which consisted of a truck, in perfect working order, which had been 
used in World War II.62 Would such a vehicle be permitted within the park?  Or was 
this a vehicle a “standard instance”, within the core, and thus plainly forbidden?63   
 The flaw in the positivist argument is demonstrated in the most ‘crisp’ manner 
when following the letter of the law produces a poor outcome, forcing the judge to 
choose between a straightforward reading and justice.64 Fuller provides this crisp 
example in the hypothetical where a statute makes it a misdemeanor to sleep in the 
train station.65  Two men are brought before the judge: one is a passenger who was 
waiting for a train, which was much delayed, and who fell asleep; the second is an 
obvious ‘forgotten man’ of no means and no home, who has settled in at the station, 
with a pillow and blanket, but was arrested before he had actually fallen asleep.   
 Fuller proposes that the “obvious instance” that this rule is supposed to 
prevent is that of a homeless man sleeping on a station bench, and forcing passengers 
to stand while they wait for their trains.66 But following the letter of the law would 
give the result that the sleeping passenger is in violation of the statute; whereas the 
homeless man, though plainly evincing an intention to sleep, was not asleep and thus 
not subject to the fine.   
 Both the war memorial and sleeping-in-the-station examples demonstrate that 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid at 662-663 
64 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1116.   
65 Fuller, “Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20 at 664. 
66 Ibid. 
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“there are no purpose-independent, clear, easy, or core cases.”67 The strength of these 
examples comes from the obvious contradiction between what the law is intended to 
do, and the result when the letter of the law is followed: what the law ‘is’ does not 
deliver the ‘just’ result.  In order for the law to accomplish its intended task, the judge 
must look to what the law ‘ought’ to be.   
5. Vagueness 
 Hart’s example of core and penumbra was borrowed from an article called 
“Vagueness”, by Bertrand Russell, whom we shall meet again in the section where 
we discuss formal systems.68 “Vagueness” offers many insights into the philosophy 
that lies behind the is/ought distinction, and perhaps the whole Hart/Fuller debate 
could be avoided by reading Russell instead. It is curious to find that Russell inspired 
Hart, because a careful reading of “Vagueness” renders a result that supports Fuller: 
“Someone might seek to obtain precision in the use of words by saying that no 
word is to be applied in the penumbra, but fortunately the penumbra itself is 
not accurately definable, and all the vaguenesses which apply to the primary 
use of words apply also when we try to fix a limit to their indubitable 
applicability.”69 
 
6. Riggs v Palmer: Law or Justice? 
 Riggs v Palmer provides a very crisp ‘real-world’ example of a court that was 
forced to choose between following the letter of the law and the interests of 
“justice”.70 In Riggs, 16 year-old Elmer Palmer poisoned his grandfather, Francis, 
                                                
67 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44 at 1128. 
68 Ibid at 1125. Bertrand Russell, “Vagueness” (1923) 1 Australasian J Phil 84. [Russell, “Vagueness”] 
69 Russell, “Vagueness”, ibid at 87.  [Italics added for emphasis.] 
70 Riggs v Palmer, (1889) 115 NY 506, 22 NE 188 (CA) [Riggs]. (Note that the Court of Appeals in 
NY is that state’s highest court, whereas other states usually designate their highest court as the 
‘supreme’ court. The Supreme Court of NY is that state’s court of appeals.) 
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after Francis had manifested some intent to change those provisions in his will that 
were favorable to Elmer. The other beneficiaries sued when convicted murderer 
Elmer Palmer tried to claim the property left to him under the will.   
The relevant statutes had prescribed all the ways that a will could be altered or 
revoked, prohibiting inheritance in cases of fraud, duress or incapacity, but the 
legislature had neglected to write a law prohibiting a man from inheriting after killing 
the testator.71 There was no positive law that would prevent defendant Palmer from 
coming into his ill-gotten gains, and Palmer had the plaintiff’s complaint dismissed in 
the lower court and on appeal. Both the majority and dissent in Riggs had this same 
understanding of the statute of wills.72 There was even prior case law where a widow 
had been allowed to keep her dower, which she had come into after murdering her 
husband.73  
Fortunately, or unfortunately for the positivists, “justice” prevailed, and the 
high court decided that the devise in the will should be declared ineffective to pass 
title to the enterprising young poisoner.  The court based its reasoning on the 
“universal law”, “the general principles of natural law and justice”, and on the 
                                                
71 Ibid at 517: “The words of the section of the statute are: "No will in writing, except in the cases 
hereinafter mentioned, nor any part thereof, shall be revoked or altered otherwise," etc. Where, 
therefore, none of the cases mentioned are met by the facts, and the revocation is not in the way 
described in the section, the will of the testator is unalterable. I think that a valid will must continue as 
a will always, unless revoked in the manner provided by the statutes." See Schauer, “Critical Guide”, 
supra note 44 at 1118. 
72 Riggs, supra note 70 section II, Justice Earl at 509: “It is quite true that statutes regulating the 
making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their 
force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this 
property to the murderer.” And Justice Gray at 517:“The statutes of this state have prescribed various 
ways in which a will may be altered or revoked; but the very provision, defining the modes of 
alteration and revocation, implies a prohibition of alteration or revocation in any other way.” 
73 Ibid at 514, referring to Owens v Owens 100 (1988) NC 240, 6 SE 794. 
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common law maxim that no one should be permitted “to acquire property by his own 
crime”.74 
Although positivists dislike speaking of “justice” because of its moral 
implications, it is hard to imagine what courts are supposed to be accomplishing when 
they enforce laws by rote.  Surely it is wrong that a murderer should profit from his 
crime. But if justice is done outside of the positive law, how can this be discerned 
without recourse to morals? 
7. Law and Logic 
 Along with the Is/Ought dispute, another key distinction between the 
positivist view and Fuller’s natural law theory is the place of logic in law.  Hart’s 
discussion of logic comes in the context of a defense against charges that positivism 
imagines that “a legal system “is a closed logical system” in which correct legal 
decisions can be deduced by logical means … without reference to … moral 
standards…”75 Hart says that this description of positivist theorists was misconceived 
because it ignored those penumbral situations where the law was unclear, and when 
judges could properly shape their decisions to meet the “growing needs of 
society…”76 But in making his defense against taking things to “a dryly logical 
extreme” and being excessively analytical, Hart minimizes the place of logic as a 
means of shaping legal theory:  
“But logic does not prescribe interpretation of terms; it dictates neither the 
stupid nor intelligent interpretation of any expression. Logic only tells you 
                                                
74 Riggs, supra note 70 at 511-13. 
75 Hart, “Separation of Law and Morals”, supra note 45 at 602.   
76 Ibid at 608-9. 
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hypothetically that if you give a certain term a certain interpretation then a 
certain conclusion follows. Logic is silent on how to classify particulars - and 
this is the heart of a judicial decision.”77 
 
7.a. Practical Reason 
In contrast to positivism, logic takes a very central role in natural law.  Indeed, 
practical reason is the hallmark of natural law:  
“A sound theory of natural law is one that undertakes a critique of practical 
viewpoints, in order to distinguish the practically unreasonable from the 
practically reasonable…. A theory of natural law claims to be able to identify 
conditions and principles of practical right-mindedness, of good and proper 
order among men and in individual conduct.” 78   
  
Natural law theory “is the result of a disciplined effort to clarify the meaning of 
ethical concepts in terms of the ultimate ontological structures which they 
exemplify… In light of such analysis, universal moral principles may be rationally 
justified as founded on real facts…”:79  
“Norms are founded on facts.  The good for any entity depends upon the 
nature of that entity…. Hence, the natural end of any process or tendency can 
be adequately determined only by a comprehensive knowledge of the nature 
to be realized and completed.  Norms are not purely arbitrary and preferential.  
They are grounded on nature.”80 
 
Fuller’s natural law theory also recognizes the importance of logic: the 
opportunity for reasoned argument is the “distinguishing characteristic” of 
                                                
77 Ibid at 610. 
78 Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14 at 18.  cf John Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of 
Natural Law  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953) at 83: Practical reason attempts to 
determine the proper norms for conduct—not merely what is, but also what ought to be. [Italics added 
for emphasis.] 
79 Wild, ibid at 81.  
80 Ibid at 83. 
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adjudication.81 Also Fuller’s “inner morality” of law is largely based on the idea that 
logical coherence is infused within the fabric of the law.82 But in section IV I will 
show how Fuller’s treatment of reason differs sharply from the classical theory.   
Fuller did not refute Hart on this point by an extended lecture on the 
epistemology of ethics, but rested primarily in his own assertion:  
“Professor Hart seems to assume that evil aims may have as much coherence 
and inner logic as good ones. I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption….  I 
shall have to rest on the assertion of a belief that may seem naive, namely, that 
coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and evil.” 83  
 
Fuller believed that actors within a logical system would pull their actions toward 
“goodness” when they are forced to explain their decisions rationally.84  To Fuller it 
seemed incongruous to say that the rational process of the common law "work[ing] 
itself pure from case to case" was headed toward a future legal system that was “a 
more perfect realization of iniquity.”85  
7.b. Russell, Whitehead and the Meanings of Words 
 Fuller invokes both Russell and Whitehead in philosophical support of the 
prominent place of logic in law.86 Russell’s article on “The Cult of Common Usage” 
                                                
81 Lon L Fuller and Kenneth I Winston, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv Law 
Rev 353 at 364. [Fuller, “Forms and Limits”] 
82 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 100.  
83 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20 at 636. 
84 Ibid. Finnis validates this claim: “A tyranny devoted to pernicious ends has no self-sufficient reason 
to submit itself to the discipline of operating consistently through the demanding processes of law, 
granted that the rational point of such self-discipline is the very value of reciprocity, fairness, and 
respect for persons which the tyrant, ex hypothesi, holds in contempt.” Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 
14 at 273. 
85 Fuller, “Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20 at 636.  Fuller is citing Lord Mansfield, from Ochymund v 
Barker (1744) 26 ER 15; 1 Atk 21 [Ochymund]; at 33: “a statute very seldom can take in all cases, 
therefore the common law, that works itself pure by rules drawn from the fountain of justice, is for this 
reason superior to an act of parliament.” 
86 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20 at 669. 
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pointed out the futility of relying on “words used in their ordinary meanings” as a 
substitute for philosophy.87 Russell said that even the simplest words, e.g. ‘cat’ or 
even ‘word’ itself, could not be defined without “(a) a logical theory of classes, and 
(b) a psychological understanding of intention.”88   
 Whitehead’s sentiments took a similar stance, and showed how our human 
ability to reason and to create arguments is dependent upon the “repeated word” 
within the argument having some invariable meaning.89 In order to remedy our 
“defective language”, we invent logical methods, such as algebra, but our insight is 
still shrouded in vagueness.90 We attempt to find “meaningful relations amid the 
accidents of history”, and use inventions of necessity, numbers for example, to 
describe our notion of things.91 It is through the concurrence of our “necessary” 
formal mathematical principles or symbolic logic with the “accidental factors” that 
we derive meaningful composition.92 
 In addition to providing these frameworks for discerning meaning out of the 
vagueness of the penumbra, logical words themselves are less vague than those 
                                                
87 Bertrand Russell, “The Cult of Common Usage” (1953) 3 Brit J Phil Sci 303. [Russell, “Common 
Usage”] 
88 Ibid at 306-7.  
89 Fuller “Positivism and Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20 at 669, citing Alfred North Whitehead, 
“Analysis Of Meaning”, in Essays In Science And Philosophy (New York: Greenwood Press, 1947), 
122, 127.  Whitehead’s essay was originally published under the title, “Remarks”, (1937) 46 
Philosophical Review 178. [Whitehead, “Remarks”] See the quoted passage at 183.   
90 Whitehead, “Remarks”, supra note 90 at 183.   
91 Ibid at 179-80. “And yet there is no necessity that any special relationship of numbers be in any one 
instance exemplified. In this way we can observe the curious interweaving of accident and necessity. 
[para] The notion of 'many things' is a slippery one. There are these ten fingers and there are the ten 
commandments. In what sense do these fingers and the ten commandments together constitute twenty 
things? We are here brought up against the difficulty of the subtle change of meaning in familiar 
notions according to the context in which they occur.” Ibid at 180. 
92 Ibid at 183-4. “And apart from composition there is no meaning, that is to say, there is nothing.” 
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“words which apply to all parts of time and space”:93  
“There is… less vagueness about logical words than about the words of daily 
life, because logical words apply essentially to symbols, and may be 
conceived as applying rather to possible than to actual symbols.”94 
 
8. Conclusion 
 I have given a very brief description of Fuller’s system of natural law: chiefly 
the notion of polarity, morality within the law, and the role of logic.  Polarity 
describes Fuller’s method of examining those necessary antinomies of law, and trying 
to achieve some sort of reconciliation between them. 
 The Hart/Fuller debate was the context for the discussion of positivism and 
natural law, and the example of the memorial in the park demonstrated how the moral 
purpose of law was necessary to determining its meaning. 
 Fuller’s view of logic carries on the natural law tradition as practical reason, 
and shows how logic is necessary to have a basic understanding of language. Fuller 
also demonstrated the necessity of a purposive view of law in order to make a proper 
evaluation of a legal judgment.  But as I shall show later, Fuller’s view of logic was 
not internally consistent. Further, despite this requirement of a cohesive legal 
purpose, Fuller’s view of natural law is very different in some respects from the 
classical theory. Fuller’s theory lacks an explanation of substantive natural law, and 
this will be shown to lead to moral relativism.  
In the next section I will explain Gödel’s theorem and briefly describe the 
attributes that are relevant to law.  Gödel’s Theorem, by its own terms is limited to 
                                                
93 Russell, “Vagueness”, supra note 68 at 87.   
94 Ibid at 88. 
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the realm of natural numbers, and therefore doesn’t actually prove anything about 
Hart or Fuller or law, and so the next section will highlight the fact that Manderson’s 
claim is made only in analogy.  In order to fully understand this analogy it is 
important to pay close attention to both the major elements of Gödel’s Theorem and 
also to Gödel’s method.  
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“[I]t can be proved rigorously that in every consistent formal system that contains a 
certain amount of finitary number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic 
propositions and that, moreover, the consistency of any such system cannot be proved 
in the system.”       -- Kurt Gödel 
 
Chapter III: Gödel’s Theorem 
 
1. Introduction: History of Gödel’s Theorem 
 Although the main question this paper asks is whether Gödel’s Theorem is 
analogous to Fuller’s statements concerning the natural law, this section will show 
that the Incompleteness Theorem does not envision a legal system at all.  This can be 
easily demonstrated by discussing the history of Gödel’s Theorem and providing a 
brief description of what Incompleteness actually means.  The history of the Theorem 
can be summarized through three major advancements in mathematics:  
1) demonstration through axioms; 2) axiomization of mathematics; and 3) the 
development of formal logic. 
1.a. Axioms 
The first advancement underlying the development of Gödel’s Theorem was 
the axiomatic method. This was demonstrated by the Greek philosopher Euclid in 
Elements of Geometry.1 The axiomatic method in Elements involves proving 
geometric equivalences through logical deduction: “Axioms”, or “postulates”, are 
accepted without proof, and from these other sentences are deduced.2 Axioms are 
“general propositions, the truths of which are self-evident, and which are so 
fundamental, that they cannot be inferred from any propositions which are more 
                                                
1 Berto, Francesco, There’s Something About Gödel: The Complete Guide To The 
 Incompleteness Theorem, (Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009) at 13.  
2 Ibid at 13.   
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elementary; in other words, they are incapable of demonstration.”3 The deductive 
chains of inference are called “proofs”4; and the resulting sentences, or logical 
deductions, are called “theorems”.5 
The next step in this chain was the axiomization of arithmetic, credited to 
Dedekind and Peano.6 This involved the phrasing of the natural numbers, and the 
operating rules, i.e. addition and multiplication, in the form of axioms.7  For example, 
Peano used just five axioms to describe the set of natural numbers.8   
1.b. Formal Logic 
The last advancement linked to the historic underpinnings of Gödel’s theorem 
was the development of the modern formal logic system by Frege.9 Formal language 
systems were envisaged by philosophers to be “antidotes to the deficiencies of natural 
language”, which was often vague or equivocal, and which lacked the rigor necessary 
                                                
3 John Casey, The First Six Books of the Elements of Euclid (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co, 1885) at 
12. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
4 Ibid at 13: “The Demonstration is the proof, in the case of a theorem, that the conclusion follows 
from the hypothesis; and in the case of a problem, that the construction accomplishes the object 
proposed.” [Italics added for emphasis.] 
5 Berto, supra note 1 at 13.  Also see Casey, supra note 3 at 12: “Propositions which are not axioms are 
properties of figures obtained by processes of reasoning. They are divided into theorems and problems.  
A Theorem is the formal statement of a property that may be demonstrated from known propositions. 
These propositions may themselves be theorems or axioms. A theorem consists of two parts, the 
hypothesis, or that which is assumed, and the conclusion, or that which is asserted to follow therefrom. 
Thus, in the typical theorem, If X is Y, then Z is W, … the hypothesis is that X is Y , and the 
conclusion is that Z is W .” [Italics added for emphasis.] 
6 Berto, supra note 1 at 14.  
7 Ibid at 15: Peano’s five axioms of Natural numbers are rendered as the following: “(P1) Zero is a 
number. (P2) The successor of any number is a number. (P3) Zero is not the successor of any number. 
(P4) Any two numbers with the same successor are the same number. (P5) Any property of zero that is 
also a property of the successor of any number having it is a property of all numbers.” 
8 Ibid at 15: “(P1) Zero is a number. (P2) The successor of any number is a number.  
 (P3) Zero is not the successor of any number. (P4) Any two numbers with the same successor are the 
same number. (P5) Any property of zero that is also a property of the successor of any number it is a 
property of all numbers.”   
9 Ibid at 16. 
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to avoid a false deduction – from a true premise to a false conclusion.10 Another 
related problem with natural language was that of paradox: an argument starts with 
rational principles and proceeds through valid reasoning to a contradictory 
conclusion.11  As shall be shown later, many paradoxes are the result of a natural 
language’s limited ability to refer to itself in a meaningful way.12   
The ideal formal language is one “where rigorous science could be 
formulated: languages whose syntax was to be absolutely precise, and whose 
expressions were to have completely precise and univocal meanings.”13 Through the 
use of formal languages, logicians and mathematicians can make statements about 
systems, and offer logical proofs by translating sequences into an artificial symbolic 
language.  An example of a formal expression can be seen in the statement of the 
Russell Set, R:  
R = {x! x " x} 
 
which translates into English: “R is the set of all and only those things x that are not 
members of themselves.”14 
1.c. Formal Systems 
 Combining all of these advancements brings us to the concept of a formal 
system: an axiomatic system, whose axioms are expressed in a formally defined 
                                                
10 Ibid at 15-16. 
11 Ibid at 4.  
12 Ibid at 10-13. 
13 Ibid at 16.   
14 Ibid at 31.  Note: There is a paradox contained within this expression. Can you see it?  Answer: “R # 
R $ R " R, that is R belongs to itself if and only if it doesn’t.” Ibid at 32. 
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language, and rules of reasoning that are used to derive the theorems of the system.15 
Along these lines, axioms such as those created by Peano could be then translated 
into a formal language.  Thus, the axiomatic statement: “Any two numbers with the 
same successor are the same number”; becomes: “%x%y(x’ = y’ & x = y)”.16   
After the development of this formal method, mathematicians were expressing 
an ambition to provide a purely logical foundation for arithmetic, which Bertrand 
Russell termed “Logicism”.17  Various longstanding conjectures, such as those posed 
by Fermat18 and Goldbach19, had caused some to wonder “whether there is any 
guarantee that all arithmetical problems posed by mathematicians can be solved….”20  
In 1900, the greatest mathematician of the age, David Hilbert, gave a talk that 
outlined the state of mathematics at that time.21 Hilbert pointed out that many of the 
notions commonly taught in math actually lead to paradox, and complained that this 
was intolerable for mathematics, which he saw as the “paragon of reliability and 
truth”.22  Hilbert proposed to address this crisis by producing a complete 
                                                
15 Torkel Franzén, Gödel’s  Theorem: An Incomplete Guide to Its Use and Abuse (Wellesley, MA: A K 
Peters, Ltd. 2005)  at 16.  [Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem] 
16 Berto, supra note 1 at 58-60.  It should be noted that the term “axiom” has a slightly different 
understanding than that which is used in everyday language. Axioms in formal systems are not 
assumed to be irreducible, but strictly relative to a formal system.  “Any sentence A in a formal 
language can be chosen as an axiom in a formal system.” Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 12, 
section I, at 19.   Note: Here the example is in predicate logic, while in a later section I describe the 
basic constructions of law as an example of propositional logic. For the purposes of this paper it will 
not be necessary to describe all of formal logic in detail. 
17 Berto, supra note 1 at 16-17. 
18 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 11: Femat’s conjecture “states that no equation of the 
form 
! 
xn  + 
! 
yn  = 
! 
zn  with n greater than 2 has any solution in positive integers.” 
19 Ibid  at 10: “Godbach’s conjecture, “Every even number greater than 2 is the sum of two primes,” 
has not yet been either proved or disproved.” 
20 Ibid  at 15.   
21 Berto, supra note 1 at 39.   
22 Ibid at 39; See David Hilbert, “On the Infinite”, translation by van Heijenoort, From Frege to 
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formalization of arithmetic: all logical and arithmetical principles of mathematics 
would be translated into a formal system. 23 
At last I can introduce Kurt Gödel, who in 1931 was working to help complete 
Hilbert’s formalization program.24 Gödel presented his Incompleteness Theorem in a 
paper titled “On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and 
related systems I” which showed that Hilbert’s program could not be justified within 
any single formal system.25 
2. 1st Incompleteness Theorem 
 There are actually two Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems.26 Gödel’s 1st 
Incompleteness Theorem can be phrased semantically27 as:  
“Any consistent formal system S within which a certain amount of elementary 
arithmetic can be carried out is incomplete with regard to statements of 
elementary arithmetic: there are such statements which can neither be proved, 
nor disproved in S.”28 
                                                                                                                                      
Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1967) at 375.   
23 Berto, supra note 1 at 39-40. One notable effort towards this end was the publication of Russell and 
Whitehead’s three-volume Principia Mathematica (PM) in 1910-1913, which proposed a “system of 
axioms and rules of reasoning within which all of the mathematics known at the time could be 
formulated and proved.” Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, Vols 
1-3, Cambridge: University Press, (1910-1913). [Russell and Whitehead, Principia Mathematica] See 
Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 2. Note: I use the term “crisis” to describe a situation 
where a field of study can no longer explain its own findings within the existing paradigm. 
24 Berto, supra note 1, at 46.   
25 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, at 2, 16.   
26 Ibid at 2-3.    
27 Note: “[S]emantics has to do with the relationship between the linguistic signs (words, noun phrases, 
sentences) and their meanings, the things those signs are supposed to signify or stand for.  Syntax, on 
the other hand, has to do with the symbols themselves, with how they can be manipulated and 
combined to form complex expressions without taking into account their (intended) meanings.” [Italics 
added for emphasis.] Berto, supra note 1 at 4. 
28 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 16.  Note: This is actually a restatement of Gödel’s 1st 
Incompleteness Theorem in conjuction with Rosser’s subsequent proof.  Originally, Gödel had stated 
that the 1st Theorem  be '-consistent.  (Omega consistency).  '- consistency is a stronger property than 
plain consistency.  In 1936, Rosser showed that the 1st Incompleteness Theorem could be strengthened 
so that it was only necessary to show ordinary consistency. See: Franzén, supra note 15 at 3. See also 
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2.a. Consistent 
To explain the meaning of this theorem, it is necessary to define the italicized 
terms.29  “Consistent”, as might be expected, has a technical and precise meaning in 
the terminology of formal systems.30 A formal system S is consistent if, for any 
formula of the formal language L it is built on, the system does not prove both the 
formula and its opposite: that is, it does not prove a contradiction.31  
Consistency was a key element in Hilbert’s metamathematic scheme.  
“Metamathematics” is the study of what can and cannot be proved in mathematics, 
and is also referred to as proof theory.32 Hilberg’s proposal was to solve the problems 
of mathematical paradox by “proving metamthematically the consistency of 
formalized arithmetic via purely finitary methods.”33 Thus, consistency is vital to the 
Hilbert scheme because a system that does not prove any contradictions would 
therefore be free from paradox. 
                                                                                                                                      
Kurt Gödel, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems 
I”, translated by Jean van Heijenoort, Frege and Gödel: Two Fundamental Texts in Mathematical 
Logic, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) at 98: “Theorem VI. For every !-consistent 
recursive class ( of FORMULAS there are recursive CLASS SIGNS r such that neither v Gen r nor Neg(v 
Gen r) belongs to Fig(() (where v is the FREE VARIABLE of r).”  [Gödel, “Formally Undecidable 
Propositions”] 
29 A “formal system” was already described supra at note 15. 
30 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 4, 77. Berto, supra note 1 at 136. 
31 Berto, supra note 1 at 43.  
32 Ibid at 42-3.   
33 Ibid at 43. [Italics in original.] See an explanation of “finitary” at 44: “Hilbert was never totally 
explicit in defining what was meant by “finitary methods”.  The German word used by Hilbert was 
finit…. Undoubtedly Hilbert wanted these methods for proving the consistency of formalized 
arithmetic to be absolutely safe….such methods should not involve in any way the concept of actual 
infinity….[U]nreliable Cantorian infinite sets were indeed at the heart of the set-theoretic 
paradoxes….” [Italics in original.] 
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2.b. Certain Amount 
I have already described the concept of a formal system, but how much 
arithmetic is the “certain amount” to which Gödel refers?  For purposes of the Gödel 
theorem, a system S needs to be capable of proving “all arithmetical statements that 
can [be] established by means of a more or less lengthy mechanical computation.”34 
The theory of numbers to which Gödel’s Theorem most classically applies is the 
axiomatized system of natural numbers, Peano Arithmetic.35 
2.c. Completeness 
 As with consistency, there is an understanding of completeness in a natural 
language sense, but in formal systems, completeness has a very specific and technical 
meaning.36A formal system S is said to be syntactically complete when, for any given 
formula, S either proves the formula or proves its negation; i.e. it either proves or 
refutes the formula.37 “A syntactically complete formal system…is a system that can 
“make up its mind” on any formula of its underlying formal language.”38An 
incomplete system would be one where some sentence, A, which is in the language of 
the system, is not formally decidable in the system.39  
2.d. The Gödel Sentence 
 There are types of statements that Gödel says cannot be either proven or 
disproven in these types of formal systems.  Returning once more to the idea of 
                                                
34 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 23.  
35 Berto, supra note 1 at 55.  See also Gödel, “Formal Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 91: 
“P is essentially the system obtained when the logic of PM is superposed upon the Peano axioms.” 
36 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 4, 77. Berto, supra note 1 at 136. 
37 Berto, supra note 1 at 48.   
38 Ibid at 48. 
39 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 28; Berto, supra note 1 at 48. 
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paradox, I will introduce the Liar of Epimenides: It seems that the philosopher 
Epimenides was a Cretan who was famous for saying that Cretans always lie.40 The 
paradox is that, if Cretans always lie, and Epimenides is a Cretan, then Epimenides is 
lying.  But if Epimenides is lying, then it can’t be true that Cretans always lie…  
 The sentence that Gödel says cannot either be proven or disproven is closely 
related to the liar41, but with one important difference.  Instead of making a claim on 
truth, the “Gödel sentence” – “
! 
Gs” says, about itself, that it is not “provable”: i.e. The 
Gödel sentence “
! 
Gs” says “
! 
Gs is not provable in S.”42 Attempting to prove this 
sentence will result in problems: If 
! 
Gs is provable in S, then S is not a sound43 system 
because it proves a false sentence: 
! 
Gs; If 
! 
Gs is not provable, then 
! 
Gs is true because 
! 
Gs asserts it is not provable. However since 
! 
Gs is a true sentence that is in the 
language of the system S, and 
! 
Gs is not provable, then S is a semantically incomplete 
formal system.44  
3. 2nd Incompleteness Theorem 
 The 2nd Incompleteness Theorem is closely related45 to the 1st, and can be 
semantically rendered:  
                                                
40 Berto, supra note 1 at 6. “Although [this] is not a real paradox in the strict sense of a sentence which, 
on the basis of our bona fide intuitions, would entail a violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction, [i]t 
is a sentence that, on the basis of those intuitions, cannot be true.” 
41 Gödel, “Formal Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 89. 
42 Berto, supra note 1 at 50.  See Gödel, “Formal Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 89: “We 
therefore have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable [in PM]….” 
43 Note: A semantically sound system is a formal system that proves only truths. Berto, supra note 1 at 
49. 
44 Ibid at 50. 
45 Note: The 2nd Incompleteness Theorem is a corollary of the 1st Incompleteness Theorem; that is, the 
2nd can be deduced from the 1st.  See Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 6.  
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“For any consistent formal system S within which a certain amount of 
elementary arithmetic can be carried out, the consistency of S cannot be 
proved in S itself.”46 
 
The explanation of the 2nd Incompleteness Theorem can be quickly derived 
from the first. We have already shown that if 
! 
Gs is provable, then S is not sound. 
Therefore if S is sound, then 
! 
Gs is not provable.  We can weaken that statement to 
one concerning consistency because soundness entails consistency.47 Thus the 
conditional statement: “If S is consistent, then 
! 
Gs is not provable in S.”48 Since that 
statement is provable in S, the consequent of this conditional is 
! 
Gs itself. (
! 
Gs, as you 
will recall, states that 
! 
Gs is not provable.) Therefore the phrase can be shortened to: 
“If S is consistent, then 
! 
Gs.”49  
Now if we were to suppose that S could prove its own consistency, then 
within the system S would be proof of the claim that “S is consistent.”50 That phrase 
would in turn be proof of the antecedent of the aforementioned conditional statement: 
“If S is consistent, then 
! 
Gs.” The application of modus ponens51 would then prove 
! 
Gs; but the 1st Theorem has already shown that 
! 
Gs is not provable in S.52 Therefore if 
S is consistent, then S cannot prove its own consistency.   
                                                
46 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 34.  
47 Berto, supra note 1 at 49. 
48 Ibid at 51. [Italics in original] 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Note: Modus ponens is a rule of inference following the form: If Shelley teaches at Osgoode, then 
Shelley must be a lawyer. Shelley teaches at Osgoode. Therefore Shelley is a lawyer.  In this case: If S 
is consistent, then 
! 
Gs. S is Consistent. Therefore 
! 
Gs .  
52 Berto, supra note 1 at 51. 
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Gödel summarizes the two theorems as follows: “[I]t can be proved rigorously 
that in every consistent formal system that contains a certain amount of finitary 
number theory there exist undecidable arithmetic propositions and that, moreover, the 
consistency of any such system cannot be proved in the system.”53 Understanding the 
1st and 2nd Incompleteness Theorems as this conjunction might be helpful because the 
legal literature does not make any distinction between them.54 Therefore, this paper 
will adopt Franzén ’s convention of using “Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem” to refer 
to “the conjunction of these two theorems, or to either separately.”55 
4. Application of Gödel’s Theorem to the Law 
Gödel’s Theorem is not directly applicable to legal systems.56 This can be 
clearly shown by breaking the definition of the theorem down into its constituent 
elements and showing that the common law does not meet any of them.57 The 
overarching proof here is that, while there may be similarities in the law to those 
terms used in the Incompleteness Theorem, the ordinary meaning of the terms is not 
applicable to how they are understood within a formal system.58   
 
 
                                                
53 Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 107.   
54 For example, see Mark Brown and Andrew Greenberg, “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of 
Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics” (1992) 43 Hastings LJ 1439, 
which commonly refers to “Gödel’s Theorem”, without explaining that there are two incompleteness 
theorems. 
55 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 2-3.   
56 See Berto, supra note 1 at 134: “[T]here exists no connection whatsoever between Gödel’s Theorem 
and social organizations. The same holds for similar attempts to extend incompleteness to 
juridical…contexts.” 
57 An element is a constituent part of a claim that must be proved for the claim to succeed. Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 7th Ed.  
58 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, at 77.   
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4.a. The Common Law is Not a Formal System 
First, it can be shown that law is not a formal system.59 It is nothing like a 
formal system.  The law is written in natural language and not in a formal language.60 
While it may seem that the law contains a great deal of formal language, “nobody 
would seriously claim that there is any such thing as the formally defined language, 
the axioms, and the rules of inference of [the law].”61  
Since the law is written in a natural language, it would still be prone to all of 
the errors that the formal languages sought to avoid.62  The law retains all the 
“inherent fuzziness” of natural language, and will never have the complete precision 
of a formal language.63 “[N]o expression will ever fully capture the essence, let alone 
the penumbra, of a right or rule.”64  
The need for a formal system is intrinsic to the Incompleteness Theorem. 
“Gödel never wanted [the Incompleteness Theorem] to apply to anything but formal 
systems, that is, formal theories satisfying the Fundamental Property”65 of formal 
systems: “S is a formal system only if the set of its theorems is (computably) 
enumerable.”66  In the introduction to his proof, Gödel describes a formal system: 
                                                
59 Ibid  at 78. 
60 Ibid.   
61 Ibid.   
62 Berto, supra note 1 at 15-16.   
63 Steven D Jamar, “This Article Has No Footnotes n1: An Essay On RFRA n2 and the 
 Limits Of Logic in the Law” (1997) 27 Stetson L Rev 559 at 560.  
64 Ibid. 
65 Berto, supra note 1 at 136.  
66 Ibid at 64. See also Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at FN 70 on 107, “In 
my opinion the term “formal system” or “formalism” should never be used for anything but [Turing’s 
definition of the general notion of a formal system]….[The] characteristic property [of a formal 
system] is that reasoning in them, in principle, can be completely replaced by mechanical devices.” 
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“The formulas of a formal system…in outward appearance are finite 
sequences of primitives signs (variables, logical constants, and parentheses or 
punctuation dots), and it is easy to state with complete precision which 
sequences of primitive signs are meaningful formulas and which are not. 
Similarly, proofs, from a formal point of view are nothing but finite sequences 
of formulas (with certain specifiable properties.)…In particular, it can be 
shown that the notions “formula”, “proof array”, and “provable formula” can 
be defined in the system…”67 
 
The law has its own particular understanding of formalism that is 
incompatible with the meaning understood within the Incompleteness Theorem.68 In 
short, the mathematical definitions of formal systems and formalism do not take in 
the law, and the legal definition of formalism does not describe mathematics.   
The startling discovery of the Incompleteness Theorem was that certain 
formal systems could never be complete: there was always going to be one sentence 
that was not provable within the system.69 If the same were asserted about a legal 
system, i.e. that there is one sentence that is not provable, even the most casual legal 
scholar would reckon that this statement vastly underestimates the number of 
                                                
67 Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 88. [Italics in original; citations 
omitted.]  
68 Legal formalism: The theory that law is a set of rules and principles independent of other political 
and social institutions.” Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Ed. cf Legal Realism: The theory that law is based, 
not on formal rules or principles, but instead on judical decisions that should derive from social 
interests and public policy. See also Gödel, “Formal Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at FN 
70 on 107. Similarly, Professor Weinrib presents formalism as the separation between the juridical and 
the social/political realms: “The formalist understanding of the juridical, as opposed to the political, 
centers on the immanence of the legal forms to the intelligibility of the interactions that they order…. 
The judge is prohibited from orienting the juridical relationship to some external goal of the judge’s 
choosing.” Ernest J Weinrib,  “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law” (1988) 97 
Yale L J 949 at 987.  See also at 971: “Formalism insists on the integrity of the law’s justification.” At 
965: “The formalist separation of law from politics reflects this distinction between immanent and 
instrumental understandings. Politics is differentiated from law to the extent that politics is the domain 
of collective instrumentalist purposes.” [Italics added for emphasis.] Also, Oakeshott, “The 
Vocabulary of a Modern European State” (1975) 23 Pol Stud 409 at 412 : “To call a court ‘political’ is 
merely to deny it the character of a court of law.” 
69 See Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 90: “The precise analysis of this 
curious situation leads to surprising results concerning consistency proofs for formal systems…” 
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unprovable sentences:70 No one could seriously argue that a legal system is anywhere 
near as rigorous as a formal system.  If the law were expressed within a formal 
system, and only susceptible to Gödelian Incompleteness, it would necessarily be 
more precise than it is currently.  To say that the law is flawed because of Gödel’s 
Theorem would be to strain out a gnat and swallow a camel.    
4.b. Common Law Systems Lack Formal Consistency 
 When we speak of the property of consistency, we are once again confronted 
with the conflict between the common understanding of the term within a legal 
context and its specific, technical meaning within the Incompleteness Theorem.  In 
addition, there is also a difference between how judgments are made within these two 
systems.  
To review, “[a] formal system S is said to be consistent if, for any formula ) 
of the formal language L it is built on, the system does not allow one to prove both ) 
and ¬).”71 The casual reader might be taken aback to see Greek letters72 and the odd 
hook figure73, but these are the primitive symbols that are the tools of formal logic.74  
In order to understand this definition more fully, we must look into the 
distinction between syntax and semantics.  Semantics talks about the relationship 
between linguistic signs -- words, phrases and sentences; and their meanings – the 
                                                
70 “Suffice it to suggest here that the number (or more appropriately the density) of Godelian 
undecidable propositions in law may vastly exceed the number in mathematics.” Anthony D'Amato, 
“Pragmatic Indeterminacy” (1990-1991) 85 Nw UL Rev 148  at 172-173. 
71 Berto, supra note 1, at 43.   
72 ) = alpha 
73 ¬ is the negative 
74 Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 88.   
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things that the signs are supposed to stand for.75 Syntax refers to “the symbols 
themselves, and how they can be manipulated and combined to form complex 
expressions, without taking into account their intended meanings.”76 Where the 
common law is more often engaged in a semantic inquiry77, formal logic systems deal 
primarily with syntax.78 A purely syntactic concept is one that refers “only to the 
formal rules of constructing proofs” and makes no reference to “the truth or falsity of 
statements in the language” or “the meaning or interpretation of a language”.79 
We already know that a formal system consists of a formal language, a set of 
axioms and a set of rules of inference.80 When we speak of a “formula” within a 
formal system, we refer to a finite string of symbols that can be joined with other 
strings according to the well-defined rules of the system.81 A formula, which can be 
either a theorem or an axiom, has been translated into a formal language and thus 
deprived of any reference to meaning or truth.82 Deductions in the formal system “are 
just the manipulations of strings of symbols that begin with the axioms and, via the 
transformations allowed by the rules of inference, produce the theorems.”83 The 
                                                
75 Berto, supra note 1 at 4.  
76 Ibid at 4.  
77 See Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law”, supra note 20, section II at 662: “The task of 
interpretation is commonly that of determining the meaning of the individual words of a legal rule, like 
“vehicle” in a rule excluding vehicles from a park.” 
78 Berto, supra note 1 at 55.  See also J Lacy O’Byrne Croke, Logic (London: Robert Sutton, 1906) at 
3, 6-7: “Formal Logic is the science of the necessary laws of thought”; it is “concerned only with that 
which is essential to and distinctive the thinking process.” Formal logic “is so far indifferent about the 
matter of a concept…so that a purely symbolical expression, in which the particular nature of the 
material elements is kept altogether out of sight, may be made to serve its purpose….” 
79 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section I at 28.   
80 Ibid  at 72.   
81 Berto, supra note 1 at 41.  
82 Ibid at 40-1.  
83 Ibid at 41.   
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axioms are accepted without proof, and the theorems are provable within the 
system.84  The relations of dependence between the axioms and the theorems are fully 
“visible”: “their properties can be read off from the purely syntactic and structural 
connections between the … strings.”85  
4.c. Example of a Formal Theorem  
Let’s make an example for the “formula )”.  If we want to say “Vehicles are 
not permitted in the park,”86 then we can use the formal expression,   
%x [V(x) & ¬P(x)] 
Rendered semantically: “For every object in the universe (%x), if it is a 
vehicle (V(x)), then it is not permitted in the park, (¬P(x)).” 
When we say that a system cannot prove both ) and ¬) in L, this means that 
it cannot happen that the final lines in two formal proofs in L will contain both the 
string just given and an occurrence of the string, 
¬%x [V(x) & ¬P(x)].   
Nor will the proofs contain a similar contradiction,  
* x [V(x) & P(x)],  
which says that some object in the universe (* x) is a vehicle that may be permitted in 
the park.    
Note that the consistency of a given system L, is mathematically provable:87  
                                                
84 Ibid at 13, 41. 
85 Ibid at 41.   
86 See the discussion of vehicles in the park in section II at 4.a.1. 
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“Thus, in a general characterization of formal systems, we need to make use 
of the general notion of a mechanically computable property…[which] applies 
equally to properties of sentences and finite sequences of sentences in a 
formal language.” 
  
4.d. Contrasting Formal and Legal Consistency 
The formal idea of consistency may be contrasted with the common legal 
understanding.  The most obvious application of consistency to a legal system would 
probably be most apropos to the concept of stare decisis.88 Certainly the law aspires 
to consistency: “it is built into the very nature of the way we think about the law.”89  
“[T]he very word “law” implies a requirement of consistency.”90 But the law might 
change over time, and thus give a different result at a later date.91  Also there may be 
different interpretations of the law for different jurisdictions.  While these differences 
may be the result of the consistency of higher laws, (i.e. a parliament’s ability to 
change its laws, or a government institution being able to create laws within its own 
sphere), the resulting consistency at the level of case history still falls short of that 
within a formal system.92   
                                                                                                                                      
87 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section I at 37-8, 133-4. Note: Remember that while the 
2nd Incompleteness Theorem states that a formal system expressing Peano Arithmetic cannot prove its 
own consistency, such a formal system may be provable in another formal system.  In fact PA is 
provable in other set theories! Ibid at 37-8; 109.   
88 John M Rogers and Robert E Molzon, “Some Lessons About The Law From Self-Referential 
Problems In Mathematics” (1992) 90 Mich L Rev 992 at 999-1000.  Stare decisis   [Latin “to stand by 
things decided”] The doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier 
judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed.   
89 Rogers and Molzon,  ibid at 1000. 
90 Ibid at 1016.   
91 Ibid at 1001. 
92 Ibid: “In the case of the different jurisdictions, the different results are but consistent applications of 
the higher rule (metarule) that a state through its governmental institutions should be able to determine 
its own…law.  In the case of the different points in time, the different results are but consistent 
applications of the higher law (metarule) that Congress can modify income tax liability from year to 
year.” 
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4.e. Judgment 
Another major difference between the formal and legal interpretation pertains 
to how consistency is met within the legal framework, namely judgment.93 All 
humans are prone to error, and it may be presumed that a mathematician can make a 
mistake as often as a judge.  But a formal system is mathematically provably 
consistent or inconsistent, whereas the legal system is limited by its natural language, 
and lacks mathematical rigor.94 The judgments handed down by courts are not called 
“proofs” but rather “opinions”.95  If wrong opinions could be corrected by merely 
showing where a trial judge added wrongly, it hardly seems that there would be any 
need for an appellate court.  The system of appellate courts is based on the idea of 
maintaining consistency by correcting the errors in the judgments of the lower 
courts.96    
In a related vein, another difference can be easily made out that legal 
judgments are capable of proving their own consistency.  If a party to a lower court 
decision feels that the court did not follow precedent, he can appeal that judgment to 
the higher court.97 The higher court will then determine whether precedent has been 
followed, i.e. whether there is consistency in the judgments.  Thus the legal system 
                                                
93 Ibid at 1000-1001. 
94 Ibid at 1016: [S]ystems or bodies of law…contain rules of law that cannot be derived within the 
system.  
95 An opinion is a court’s written statement explaining its decision in a given case…  Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 3d ed.   
96 Rogers and Molzon, supra note 88 at 1000.   
97 A precedent is a decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts 
or issues.  A binding precedent is a precedent that a court must follow.  Black’s Law Dictionary, 3d ed.  
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determines its own consistency.  The 2nd Incompleteness Theorem is plainly not 
applicable to the legal system then, because it states that those formal systems, which 
fit within the Theorem’s definition, cannot determine their own consistency.   
4.f. Discretion 
Another related subject is that of discretion. Judges have the discretion to fill 
the gaps when it is necessary for the decision and the previous decision leaves room.98 
The resulting decision is still consistent within the meaning of the law, but far short of 
the formal meaning.   
Yet another, less-often discussed matter of discretion, is the common law 
practice of jury nullification.99A sovereign jury can decide not to uphold the law if 
following the settled law would offend the jury’s sense of justice.  This type of jury 
decision is protected by the Constitution and cannot be overruled on appeal in the 
United States.100 But while jury nullification may strike a blow for liberty, it is also 
contrary to the goals of consistency in rules.   
In summary, the formal term “consistent” is not applicable to the legal system. 
The formal understanding is not attainable within a system using a natural language, 
and it is contrary to the legal decision-making framework.        
                                                
98 Rogers and Molzon, supra note 88 at 1001-2.  See also Farago, John, “Intractable Cases: The Role of 
Uncertainty in the Concept of Law” (1980) 55 NYU L Rev 195 at 207.  
99 Jury nullification is a jury’s knowing and deliberate rejection of the evidence or refusal to apply the 
law either because the jury wants to send a message about some social issue that is larger than the case 
itself or because the result dictated by law is contrary to the jury’s sense of justice, morality, or 
fairness.  Black’s Law 7th Ed.   
100 Georgia v Brailsford (1794) 3 US 1 [Brailsford];US Constitution, 5th Am: “nor shall any person be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb…” cf R v Krieger, [2006] 2 
S.C.R. 501, 2006 SCC 47 at para 27: “It has since then been well established that under the system of 
justice we have inherited from England juries are not entitled as a matter of right to refuse to apply the 
law — but they do have the power to do so when their consciences permit of no other course.”  
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4.g. Completeness Does Not Apply to the Legal System in the Sense That It is Used 
in the Incompleteness Theorem 
 The formal understanding of “completeness” has no counterpart in law.  Even 
if its ordinary meaning were applied to the legal system, it can be seen to have a 
different meaning from what is found in the formal system.  
To review, a formal system S is said to be syntactically complete when, for 
any given formula, S either proves or refutes the formula.101 An incomplete system 
would be one where some sentence A, which is in the language of the system, is not 
formally decidable in the system.102  
Although the Incompleteness Theorem talks about incompleteness in formal 
systems using Peano arithmetic, it does not imply that every formal system is 
incomplete.103  There are also complete formal systems: Euclidean geometry is a 
complete system in the sense of the Incompleteness theorem, as is the elementary 
theory of real numbers.104   
As was shown with consistency, completeness is a formal concept that is 
mathematically provable.105  Another aspect of the proof of completeness is 
decidability, which necessitates that every theorem of the system is computably 
                                                
101 Berto, supra note 1 at 48.   
102 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, at 28; Berto, supra note 1 at 48. 
103 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 25. 
104 Ibid  at 25, 127.   
105 Ibid  at 98. “Central to the proof of the second incompleteness theorem is the notion of an ordinary 
mathematical proof being formalizable in a certain formal system. This means that for every step in the 
proof there is a corresponding series of applications of formal rules of inference in the system, so that 
the conclusion of the proof, when expressed in the language of the system, is also a theorem of the 
system.”  
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enumerable:106 “This basic property implies that it is always possible to search for a 
proof of a given sentence A in a mechanical way, and if there is any such proof, it 
will eventually be found.”107 
This idea of completeness is a foreign one to the law.  This can be clearly 
demonstrated by showing analogues of the formal notion of completeness.108 For the 
legal system to be complete in the formal sense, that would mean that every statement 
that makes sense in a legal system could be held to be decidable by that system, “in 
the sense that either that statement or its negation can be held to be explicitly or 
implicitly asserted” in that legal system.109 “[T]he Constitution is incomplete, since it 
does not tell us whether or not wearing a polka dot suit is allowed in Congress…. We 
do not need Gödel to tell us that [the law in] in this sense incomplete.  Trivially, any 
doctrine, theory, or canon is incomplete in this analogical sense.”110    
Testing the law’s completeness would also be a more difficult matter.  As 
would be expected, there is no “basic property” that allows every law, or whatever 
would be the counterpart to the formal system’s “theorem” to be computably 
enumerable.111 
                                                
106 Ibid  at 72. Note: This is known as the “Basic property of formal systems”: The set of theorems of a 
formal system is computably enumerable.   
107 Ibid at 72. 
108 Ibid at 78-9. 
109 Ibid at 79.   
110 Ibid at 79. 
111 Rogers and Molzon, supra note 88 at 1016: “Our proposition is thus that systems or bodies of law 
are inherently incomplete in the sense that they contain rules of law that cannot be derived within the 
system.” 
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4.h. There is No Arithmetic Element in the Common Law 
 This element seems the most trivial and obvious, but perhaps the most often 
overlooked in popular comparisons to Gödel’s Theorem. The Incompleteness 
Theorem is describing formal systems that can “carry out” “a certain amount of 
arithmetic”.112 We have already shown that the theorem is referring to formal systems 
containing Peano Arithmetic.113 
 Although there are legal scholars who might claim to invent clever legal 
analogies that they liken to the Incompleteness Theorem,114 the legal system does not 
talk about arithmetic in this formal sense.115 “The incompleteness theorem is a 
mathematical theorem precisely because the relevant notions of truth and provability 
are mathematically definable.”116  
 Legal systems only deal with numbers in an ancillary fashion; e.g. delimiting 
penalties for driving infractions117, providing sentencing guidelines118, or statutes of 
limitations.119 No legal system attempts to break down the theory of natural numbers 
                                                
112 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 16, 34.  
113 Ibid  at 23, Berto, supra note 1, at 55. Gödel, “Formally Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28 at 
91. 
114 Brown and Greenberg, supra note 54 at 1477-79.  
115 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15 at 85-6.   
116 Ibid  at 86.  
117 For example: California Vehicle Code Section 23103 Reckless Driving. (a) A person who drives a 
vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of 
reckless driving. 
118 For example: California Penal Code Section 245(a) (1) Any person who commits an assault upon 
the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of 
force likely to produce great bodily injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 
two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten 
thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment.  
119 For example: California Code of Civil Procedure Section 335. The periods prescribed for the 
commencement of actions other than for the recovery of real property, are as follows:… 335.1.  Within 
two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the death of, an individual caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another. 
 50 
into a formal set of axioms, but this is precisely the type of formal system that the 
Incompleteness Theorem describes.   
5. Conclusion: The Incompleteness Theorem is Not Applicable to the Legal System 
 Generally the terms used in the Incompleteness Theorem have common 
definitions that are quite different from their formal meaning, and many writers who 
lack a background in formal logic take the Incompleteness Theorem to have a much 
broader application.  The meanings of the terms within the Incompleteness Theorem 
are incongruous to how they are understood within the legal system.   
The Incompleteness Theorem, by its own definition, is plainly not applicable 
to the legal system.  Any comparisons are therefore based on interpretations of the 
Theorem or upon some analogy, but not upon the Theorem itself.  This is an 
important distinction because the Incompleteness Theorem is based upon a rigorous 
standard of proof.  By invoking the Theorem, many attempt to clothe their opinion in 
the authority of that rigorous standard of logic, but in this instance their reliance can 
be plainly shown to be illogical.  
 In the next section I will examine Roger Penrose’s broader interpretation of 
Gödel’s Theorem, which claims that it is impossible to check computationally 
whether any formalized procedure has been correctly applied.  Penrose is important to 
this thesis because his interpretation was referenced by Manderson as the basis for 
relating Gödel to the natural law.   
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“We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in 
part; but then I shall know even as I am known.” -- I Corinthians 13:12 
 
Chapter IIIa: Penrose, Platonism and Positivism 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous section, I showed why Gödel’s Theorem does not talk about 
the law.  This section will make an argument for the wider application of Gödel by 
analogy to Penrose’s theory of the Incompleteness Theorem, and also by reason of the 
Platonist philosophy behind the Theorem.  
The first portion deals with Penrose’s interpretation of Gödel’s Theorem, 
which says that systems of rules can never be sufficient to show that they have been 
properly applied.  Penrose is important because Manderson relied on this authority for 
the link between this Theorem and Fuller’s ideas concerning the natural law.1  
Although Penrose’s Argument captures the spirit of Gödel’s philosophy, many 
believe that his case cannot be proven because it is too broadly stated.   
Next I will discuss how the Incompleteness Theorem was envisioned by 
Gödel as a Platonist proof, and show that Gödel himself was a Platonist. Although 
there are many mathematical arguments that claim to refute the Platonist view, these 
arguments are logically flawed.   
The Incompleteness Theorem supports the Platonist view because it shows 
that true statements about natural numbers cannot be proven within a formal system.  
While this dos not completely prove the Platonist theory, the inability of to prove the 
                                                
1 See Manderson, supra note 1, section I at 194, FN 15 and FN 19; citing Penrose, Shadows, supra 
note 3, section I, Shadows of the Mind.  
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truth of the natural number system based solely on symbols representing space-time 
elements can be seen as evidence that these numbers exist in a higher, more 
substantive reality. This view is analogous to Fuller’s natural law arguments that a 
mute system of rules cannot accomplish justice without some infusion of morals. 
Similarly, Fuller and Gödel are seen to be most relevant to one another in their 
condemnation of positivism, which is antithetical to Platonism.  
2. Penrose’s Conclusion G 2 
  One major theory promoting the wider application of Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem is an interpretation by Roger Penrose. Penrose’s “Conclusion G” states that, 
“Human mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to 
ascertain mathematical truth.”3 Although it is a broader statement of Gödel’s findings, 
it is easy to see how this is related to Gödel.  Gödel’s Theorem, as you will 
remember, had a statement that was true within the formal system, but could not be 
proven by the system: 
“Gödel indisputably established … that no formal system of sound 
mathematical rules of proof can ever suffice, even in principle, to establish all 
the true propositions of ordinary arithmetic.”4 
 
Penrose goes on to make the case that Gödel’s results are applicable to human 
understanding generally:  
“[H]uman understanding and insight cannot be reduced to any set of 
computational rules.  For what [Gödel] appears to have shown is that no such 
system of rules can ever be sufficient to prove even those propositions of 
                                                
2 Penrose’s theory is described in this separate section because I do not want to confuse the reader into 
believing that Penrose is actually part of Gödel’s Theorem, or that this theory is widely accepted.  
3 Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3, section I at 76.   
4 Ibid at 65.   
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arithmetic whose truth is accessible, in principle, to human intuition and 
insight – whence human intuition and insight cannot be reduced to any set of 
rules.”5 
 
Although this theorem is math-based, Penrose approaches the discussion from 
a broader perspective of artificial intelligence6 (AI), reasoning that “[i]f thinking is  
just carrying out a computation of some kind, then… we ought to be able to see [our 
thinking processes] most clearly in our mathematical thinking.”7 A more generalized 
corollary of Penrose’s conclusion is that “[a]ny set of rules whatever will be 
insufficient, if by a ‘set of rules’ we mean some system of formalized procedures for 
which it is possible to check entirely computationally, in any particular case, whether 
or not the rules have been correctly applied.”8  This last expression is more relevant to 
the topic of law because it would tend to prove, as Manderson states 9, that legal 
meaning could never entirely be reduced to a system of rules. 10 
                                                
5 Ibid at 65. 
6 Ibid at 179-190; also see Penrose, Roger, “Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow: A Reply to 
Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind”, (1996) Psyche Vol 2, No 23 at 8.  [Penrose, “Beyond the 
Doubting”] 
7 Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3, section I at 64. 
8 Ibid at 72.   
9 Manderson, supra note 1, section I at 194-5.   
10 For those experienced in these matters it might seem that this corollary sounds familiar to Allen 
Turing’s argument concerning a Turing Machine and they would not be disappointed to find that 
Penrose’s proof is formulated along these lines.   
Allen Turing, (1912-1954), was a contemporary of Gödel’s and a student of Alonzo Church.  
The “Turing Machine” was an imaginary machine that wrote computations on a strip of paper.  The 
Turing “Halting Problem” stated that an algorithm could never be created that could decide, if given a 
description of any computer program, whether that program will eventually halt or whether it will run 
for ever.   
See Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3, section I at 65-77, e.g. “the Gödel-Turing conclusion 
G”.  Also see Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 12, section I, at 121, “Instead of invoking the 
second incompleteness theorem, he applies Turing’s proof of the unsolvability of the halting problem.”  
There is the obvious reply that Penrose’s Conclusion should be attributed more to Turing than to 
Gödel, but that avoids the substance of the argument.  Gödel’s Theorem is sufficiently close to Turing 
so that there is some overlap; Gödel himself invokes Turing when discussing the implications of the 
Incompleteness Theorem.  See Kurt Gödel,  “Some Basic Theorems on the Foundations of 
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2.a. Franzén’s Criticism on Conclusion G 
 
There has been a mixed reaction to Penrose’s Conclusion G.  Franzén finds 
Penrose’s argument inconclusive, the major question revolving around whether it is 
possible to program a computer with all human ability to prove arithmetical 
theorems.11 As has been shown, the Incompleteness Theorem demonstrates that a 
formal system describing simple arithmetic, if it is consistent, cannot prove its own 
consistency, and so lacks completeness because it lacks this theorem.  The human 
mathematician in this situation might know that the system, for example PA, is 
consistent and so can say that he can prove something that the formal system cannot.    
It is possible to add to a system S, a statement of its own consistency, “S is 
consistent” (
! 
Cons), but then that new system, S’, would not be the same system as 
system S, and would similarly be lacking a statement of its consistency.12  Franzén 
                                                                                                                                      
Mathematics and Their Implications (1951)” in Solomon Feferman et al eds, Kurt Gödel: Collected 
Works Vol III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 309.  [Gödel, [1951]] 
Penrose’s proof, (Penrose, Shadows, supra note 3, section I at 73-5) is a fairly simple one that 
even lawyers can understand, and takes the following form: “Suppose…we have some computational 
procedure 
! 
A  which, when it terminates…provides us with a demonstration that a computation such as 
! 
C n( )  actually does ever stop…. All the possible computations C can in fact be listed, say as 
! 
C0 , 
! 
C1, 
! 
C2,C3,C4C5…, and we can refer to 
! 
Cq  as the qth computation. ….The procedure 
! 
A  can now be 
thought of as a particular computation that, when presented with the pair of numbers q, n, tries to 
ascertain that the computation 
! 
Cq n( )  will never ultimately halt.  Thus, when the computation 
! 
A  
terminates, we shall have a demonstration that 
! 
Cq n( )  does not halt….(H) If 
! 
A q,n( ) stops, then 
! 
Cq n( )  
does not stop….[Penrose assures us that it is perfectly legitimate to replace q with n as was done in 
Cantor’s theory.] With q equal to n, we now have: (I) If 
! 
A n,n( ) stops  then 
! 
Cn n( )  does not stop….Let 
us suppose that [the listing of all computations performed on the natural number n] is in fact 
! 
Ck , so we 
have: (J) 
! 
A n,n( ) =Ck n( ) . Now examine the particular value 
! 
n = k… [again from Cantor] We have, from 
(J), (K) 
! 
A k,k( ) =Ck k( )  and from (I), with 
! 
n = k : (L) If 
! 
A k,k( )  stops, then 
! 
Ck k( )  does not stop.  
Substituting (K) in (L), we find: (M) If 
! 
Ck k( )  stops, then
! 
Ck k( )  does not stop.”[!!] 
11 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 122.   
12 See Berto, supra note 1, section III at 109. See also Townsend, Mike, “Implications Of Foundational 
Crises In Mathematics: A Case Study In Interdisciplinary Legal Research” (1996) 71 Wash L Rev 51, 
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suggests the hypothetical situation of a robot that presses a button, which extends the 
robot’s inventory of axioms by the statement that its previous inventory was correct.13  
But as we formulate more involved principles for extending a correct theory to a 
stronger theory, we are confronted with questions: about what is mathematically 
acceptable; about which different mathematicians will give different answers; and 
perhaps, questions where there is no definite answer.14 If the robot were programmed 
to perfectly emulate the human ability to extend a correct theory to a stronger theory, 
and give a similar range of answers, we would have “no grounds for the claim that we 
as human mathematicians can prove anything not provable by the robot.”15  
 Franzén claims it is a mistaken conclusion to say that Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem shows that it is impossible to understand one’s own mind.16 Saying that a 
formal system does not “understand itself” understates the difficulty for a system to 
prove its own consistency.17  And though it may be that a system cannot postulate its 
own consistency, this can be proven by another system.  Franzén analogizes this 
                                                                                                                                      
at 111-112: “It is the case that the sentence is provable in the newly created system. However, this new 
system also is subject to Gödel’s First Theorem so that there now is a sentence undecidable with 
respect to this new system!”  
13 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 123.  
14 Ibid. Also see Townsend, supra note 12 at 112: “The reader may then wonder if one can’t iterate 
some type of addition process to avoid the syntactic incompleteness while at the same time keeping 
consistency…. This iterated addition, however comes at a price. As the statement of Gödel’s First 
Theorem indicates, to keep consistency one must have thrown in so much that the set of non-logical 
axioms is no longer recursive – roughly speaking, one must have thrown in so much that one can no 
longer tell by algorithmic means whether an arbitrary formula is a non-logical axiom!” [Italics added 
for emphasis!] 
15 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 123.   
16 Ibid  at 124.   
17 Ibid at 125.  [Italics in original.] 
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situation to the inability for a human to truly say that he never talks about himself: the 
very utterance of the statement “I never talk about myself” falsifies it.18  
A more appropriate comparison, according to Franzén, is to show how PA can 
prove the consistency of every finite subset of its own axioms.19 This ability of a 
formal system to shrewdly analyze these individual parts of itself, if applicable to the 
human mind in the spirit of metaphorical applications of the Incompleteness 
Theorem, would mean that we can expect to understand ourselves perfectly.20   
2.b. Conclusion G by Gödel and Berto  
  Berto finds that Penrose’s Conclusion G is very close to what Gödel himself 
claimed in a speech Gödel made in 1951.21  Gödel said that the [2nd] Incompleteness 
Theorem means that it would be impossible for someone to set up a certain well-
defined system of axioms and rules and consistently claim that they perceive (with 
mathematical certitude) all the rules to be correct, and that they contain all of 
mathematics.22  
 Looking once again at the system S, a person can see objectively that the 
consistency of the system, 
! 
Cons , is true.23 But the Incompleteness Theorem does not 
allow the system to prove its own consistency, so the system, in this subjective 
limitation cannot and will never be able to capture the totality of arithmetical truths.24   
Gödel surmised that no well-defined system of correct axioms could ever contain all 
                                                
18 Ibid at 125.   
19 Ibid at 125.   
20 Ibid at 125-6.   
21 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 185. Gödel, [1951] supra note 10, at 304.   
22 Gödel, [1951], supra note 10 at 309.   
23 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 186.   
24 Ibid at 187.   
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true mathematical propositions, but that it would be possible to create such a system 
of all demonstrable mathematical propositions.25   
Berto states that Penrose’s Conclusion G, i.e. that human mathematicians are 
not using a knowably sound algorithm in order to ascertain mathematical truth, is 
correct if it is understood in this sense.26 Understood in this sense, Conclusion G does 
not state that our minds are algorithmic, “but that a formal system embodying all of 
our mathematical knowledge could not be recognized as correct by us.”27  Reasoning 
to the converse, if we recognize a formal system S as a correct formalization 
containing a part of our mathematics, we know that it cannot represent the whole of 
mathematics because we could produce a sound extension of that system by adding to 
it a statement of its consistency, 
! 
Cons .28   
2.c. Relating Penrose to Law  
Penrose’s assertions concerning mathematics do not seem unreasonable, given 
that they closely resemble one of the possible conclusions asserted by Gödel.   It 
remains another matter, however, to interpret Penrose’s argument, as being applicable 
to the law.  To make the leap that Conclusion G applies to the law, it would seem that 
either: 1) Any theory of law necessarily involves the discussion of natural numbers; 
or 2) The inability to fully capture the concept of natural numbers within a formal 
                                                
25 Gödel, [1951] supra note 10 at 309: “[A]s to subjective mathematics, it is not precluded that there 
should exist a finite rule producing all its evident axioms.  However if such a rule exists, we with our 
human understanding could certainly never know it to be such, that is, we could never know with 
mathematical certainty that all propositions it produces are correct…” 
26 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 187.   
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. 
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axiomatic system is indicative of some human process of thought or perception that is 
not capable of being encoded within such a system.29   
  If we view Penrose’s Argument merely as an analogy, it is easy to relate 
these similar concepts, and to see how they resonate with Fuller’s natural law in the 
way Manderson described: that a legal system cannot consist merely of laws because 
it would never be possible to use only positive law to show that “the law” is being 
correctly applied; therefore the law is dependent upon norms external to the system of 
law.  But if Penrose’s claim as a proof is overstated as to other, non-Gödelian 
systems, then it is overstated as to law as well.   
I will not attempt to make any sort of argument relating legal matters directly 
to natural numbers. I shall leave it to the reader to decide whether Gödel 
Incompleteness has been proven to be applicable to systems outside of the narrow 
confines of its own definition. I have demonstrated that Penrose’s interpretation of 
Gödel is similar to what Gödel proposed. 
3. Philosophy Behind Gödel 
At this point it is important to discuss the philosophy behind Gödel’s 
Theorem, and to discover the implications of applying Incompleteness to the law.  I 
                                                
29 See Townsend, supra note 12 at 134: “[A] great controversy exists in the mathematical community 
about whether the limitations that Gödel’s Theorems places on certain types of formal systems apply to 
human reasoning as well.”  See also Howard DeLong, A Profile of Mathematical Logic (Mineola, New 
York: Dover Publications, 1971) at 273: [The thesis that Gödel’s Theorem proves that minds cannot be 
explained as machines] has generated more discussion than any other… on the philosophical import of 
Gödel’s theorem.”  Also recall the statement made by Augustine, Free Choice, supra note 1, section II 
at Bk II ch 16, section 171: “Whatever changeable thing you may look at, you could not grasp it at 
all…unless it had some form composed of numbers…”  
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will also give several examples of legal theorists who attempt to apply Gödel, but 
who wind up making conclusions that are contrary to Gödel’s philosophy.  
3.a. Positivism, Gödel and Platonism 
Gödel’s philosophy essentially contradicts logical positivism. Logical 
positivism is very similar to what is found in legal positivism, and defined as “the 
doctrine that all true knowledge is derived from observable phenomena, rather than 
speculation or reasoning.”30 The philosophy of positivism attempted to demarcate a 
class of “meaningful propositions in order to exclude those without cognitive 
content.” 31 Positivists felt that ethics, metaphysics, theology and aesthetics were 
senseless endeavors, and propositions concerning these topics were indistinguishable 
from nonsense jumbles.32  
 Logical positivism was a thriving philosophy in Vienna during the time Gödel 
studied at the University there.33  The various coffeehouses of Vienna were devoted to 
their own particular intellectual theme, and Gödel had been invited to attend weekly 
discussions of the "Vienna Circle", whose theme was logical positivism. The Vienna 
Circle initiates believed that metaphysical thinking was nothing more than confusion 
based on an inadequate understanding of language.34  
“The circle was devoted to the [positivist theme] that physical science, whose 
ultimate basis is sensory experience, exhausts what can be known, leaving 
philosophy the task primarily of policing the ever-present tendency of thought 
                                                
30 Black’s Law, 7th Ed.  
31 AC Grayling, An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1982) at 48.  
32 Ibid. “The principle [the positivits]  adopted for use in discriminating between cognitively senseful 
and senseless propositions was the…‘verifiability principle’, which states…that the meaning of a 
statement is the method of its verification…” 
33 Yourgrau, supra note 5, section I at 28.   
34 Ibid. 
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to pretend to more knowledge than can be delivered by science."35  
 
The positivists saw Hilbert's effort at formalization as an instrument "to assist in their 
policing".36 To the positivists, mathematics was not a realm of concepts and objects, 
but “rather a system of techniques for the manipulation of mathematical signs.37”  
In contrast to the positivists who say that knowledge must come from 
observation, Platonism is “the view that some at least of the objects of thought are 
apprehended by intellect independently of sense perception and sense data…”38 In 
Plato’s view, abstract entities such as numbers, really exist in their perfect form 
within some other realm.39 In stark contrast to positivistic thought, Platonism holds 
that Universal ideas alone have reality.40 
Although he is sometimes wrongly accused of being a positivist, Gödel was a 
Platonist.41 In his 1951 lecture to the American Mathematical Society, Gödel said,  
                                                
35 Ibid at 29. 
36 Ibid at 29-30.  
37 Ibid at 32. 
38 Peter Coffey, Epistemology; or the Theory of Knowledge (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1917) 
at 259.  
39 Grayling, supra note 31 at 26. See Plato, Republic, Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated 
by Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969) at 597c-d:  “Now God, whether 
because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him not to make more than one couch 
in nature, so wrought and created one only, the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more 
such were never created by God and never will come into being.”  
“How so?” he said.  
“Because,” said I, “if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both 
would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the 
other two.”  
“Right,” he said.  
“God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being 
and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique.”  
“So it seems.”  
“Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind?”  
“That would certainly be right,” he said, “since it is by and in nature that he has made this and all other 
things.” 
40 Heinz Guradze, “The Epistemological Background Of Natural Law” (1951-1952) 27 Notre Dame L 
Rev 360 at 363. 
41 Townsend, supra note 12 at 141-142. 
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“[I]t is correct that a mathematical proposition says nothing about the physical 
or psychical reality existing in space and time, because it is true already owing 
to the meaning of the terms occurring in it, irresepectively of the world of real 
things.  What is wrong, however, is that the meaning of terms (that is, the 
concepts they denote) is asserted to be something man-made and consisting 
merely in semantical conventions.  The truth, I believe, is that these concepts 
form an objective reality of their own, which we cannot create or change, but 
only perceive and describe. 
… 
“[M]athematics describes a non-sensual reality, which exists independently 
both of the acts and [of] the dispositions of the human mind and is only 
perceived, and probably perceived very incompletely, by the human mind.” 42  
 
Another interesting feature of Gödel’s 1951 lecture is his sketch of a proof 
that the nominalistic view of mathematics is false.43  Nominalism, as Gödel describes 
it, is the “view that there exists no such thing as a mathematical fact, that the truth of 
propositions which we believe express mathematical facts only means that an idle 
running of language occurs in these propositions….”44 Nominalism takes in the 
schools of empiricism and positivism, all of which deny the correlation between those 
universal logical terms (of language) and any thought-objects apprehended as “one-
common-to-many”.45  Gödel says that his proof stops short of completely evincing the 
Platonic view, since he only offers a limited refutation of psychologism and the other 
                                                
42 Gödel, [1951], supra note 10, at 320, 323. [Italicized for emphasis.]  
43 See ibid at 322. “The most I could assert would be to have disproved the nominalistic view…” 
Briefly, Gödel proposes: that if mathematics were the creation of the human mind, then ignorance of 
these objects is “only through a lack of clear realization as to what we have created”; that if 
mathematicians are restricted by theorems, which would not be the case if theorems were their own 
creation; that integers and sets are very different creations, but that these must be created first in order 
to understand the properties of the third creation: mathematics. See  ibid at 314-315.   
44 Ibid at 319.   
45 Coffey, supra note 38 at 312. 
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possibility, ‘Aristotilean realism’.46 But that is enough, as it shows that Gödel not 
only thought that mathematical nominalism is false, but provably so. 
 Perhaps an even more pointed proof of Gödel’s preference for Platonism over 
positivism is found in a paper Gödel wrote in 1972, where he makes the claim that 
“abstract concepts are needed for the proof of consistency of number theory”:47 
Platonism holds that numbers are forms in another realm, so it would be consistent 
with that view that those forms cannot be proven through concrete symbols.48   
The Platonic emphasis comes through clearly when we re-examine Gödel’s 
Theorem with this perspective. Think of when a person makes an argument that they 
consider to be very obvious, which is to say, the most concrete: ‘It’s as simple as 2 + 
2 = 4.’  But when Russell and Whitehead attempted to prove the number theory that 
supports this very basic argument using only concrete symbols, Gödel demonstrated 
                                                
46 Gödel, [1951], supra note 10 at 319-320. See Dale Jacquette, “Psychologism the Philosophical 
Shibboleth” (1997) 30 Philosophy & Rhetoric 312, at 312 – 313: “[P]sychologism includes any 
attempt to ground philosophical explanation in psychological phenomena. Psychologism is a family of 
proposals for invoking different aspects of psychological occurrences in different ways to develop 
different styles of philosophical theory.”  See James Franklin, “Aristotelian Realism”, in Philosophy Of 
Mathematics, Andrew Irvine Ed (Oxford: Elsivier, 2008) at 101: “Aristotelian, or non-Platonist, 
realism holds that mathematics is a science of the real world, just as much as biology or sociology are.” 
47 K Gödel,1972, “On an Extension of Finitary Mathematics Which Has Not Yet Been Used” in: K. 
Gödel Collected Works, vol. II, ed by S Feferman et al, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 
271.  [Gödel, (1972)]:  “By abstract concepts, in this context, are meant concepts which are essentially 
of the second or higher level, i.e., which do not have as their content properties or relations of 
concrete objects (such as combinations of symbols), but rather of thought structures or thought 
contents (e.g., proofs, meaningful propositions, and so on), where in the proofs of propositions about 
these mental objects insights are needed which are not derived from a reflection upon the 
combinatorial (space-time) properties of the symbols representing them, but rather from a reflection 
upon the meanings involved”. Ibid at 272-3. [Citations omitted; Italicized for emphasis.]  Also see 
Roman Murawski, “Truth Vs. Provability – Philosophical And Historical Remarks” (2002) 10 Logic 
and Logical Philosophy 93 at 110-111. 
48 Platonic or Extreme Realism abstract thought-objects are “as such necessarily, universally, eternally, 
immutably, and indivisibly as intellect conceives them… In this Platonic theory… the world of sense 
experience would be not only unexplained, inexplicable, unintelligible, unknowable, but would be 
even illusory and unreal.” Coffey, supra note 38, at 244 Note that ‘realism’ in philosophy is different 
from the realist school of thought in the philosophy of law. 
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that it was possible to make a statement that was true within the Russell/Whitehead 
system, but which that same system could not prove.  
Note that Gödel did not question whether 4 = 2 + 2, but rather pointed out that 
our method of proof is not based solely upon symbols representing space-time 
properties.  We ‘know’ that natural numbers are complete and consistent, but we 
cannot make a complete and consistent set of rules to prove them. Basic number 
theory, the paragon of concrete arguments, relies upon something intangible.  What 
better example can be made to demonstrate Plato’s view of reality as being mere 
shadows upon a wall, and which points to a higher, more substantive reality?      
And Gödel is not alone in his views.  Penrose agrees that the Incompleteness 
Theorem was a refutation of the nominalist view: “What Gödel showed was how to 
transcend any…system of [formalized] rules.”49 Penrose, who describes himself as a 
weak Platonist50 says “the very force of Gödel’s logic was sufficient to turn me from 
the computational standpoint with regard not only to human mentality, but also to the 
very workings of the physical universe.”51 The “close relationship between the notion 
of a formal system and Turing’s notion of effective computability” was sufficient to 
prove to Penrose that “human thought and human understanding must be something 
                                                
49 Penrose, “Beyond the Doubting”, supra note 6 at 9. 
50 Ibid at 20: “[A]t least my own form of Platonism does not demand that I need necessarily go to such 
extremes.” 
51 Ibid at 9.  Note: “Computationalism is the view that intelligent behavior is causally explained by 
computations performed by the agent’s cognitive system.”  Gualtiero Piccinini, “Computationalism in 
the Philosophy of Mind” (2009) 4(3) Philosophy Compass  at 215.   
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beyond computation.”52 And this conviction was due to the scientific method rather 
than any personal beliefs on the part of Penrose.53 
  And Penrose is not alone. “Platonism is alive and well in mathematics…”54 
Bertrand Russell was a Platonist.55 Among mathematicians, Platonism is more 
popular today than it was in Gödel’s time, in large part because of Gödel.56 
3.b. Misuse of Gödel to Question Foundationalist Thinking 
Given that Gödel’s Theorem espouses the Platonist philosophy, it stands to 
reason that any wider application of Gödel would take a similarly Platonist view.  
And yet we see scholars using Gödel’s Theorem to make anti-foundationalist attacks 
on mathematics: 
“It is claimed that the impossibility of proving the consistency of a consistent 
formal system within the system itself entails some unavoidable uncertainty 
for the working mathematician: we can never be sure that the formal systems 
we work with are consistent.”57   
 
Not only is this an incorrect summary of the theorem, but wrongly states that we 
should be skeptical of something that has already been proven; i.e. those formal 
systems in question have actually been proven consistent by the most rigorous 
                                                
52 Penrose, “Beyond the Doubting”, supra note 6 at 9. 
53 Ibid: “It was not a question of looking for support for a previously held “mystical” standpoint.  (You 
could not have asked for a more rationalistic atheistic anti-mystic than myself at that time!)” 
54 Townsend, supra note 12 at 145.  
55 See Russell, “Common Usage” supra note 87, section II at 305: “The word itself is no part of the 
sensible world; if it is anything, it is an eternal super-sensible entity in a Platonic heaven.” See also 
Russell, “Vagueness”, supra note 68, section II at 89: “This is one reason why logic takes us nearer to 
heaven than most other studies. On this point 1 agree with Plato. But those who dislike logic will, I 
fear, find my heaven disappointing.” 
56 See George Boolos, "Introductory note to 1951" in Solomon Feferman et al eds, Kurt Gödel, 
Collected Works, Vol III, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), at 303-304; Penrose, “Beyond 
the Doubting”, supra note 6 at 20; Townsend, supra note 12 at 145.    
57 Berto, citing misconceptions of Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 1, section III at 164. 
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methods.  This attempt to undercut the foundation of math ultimately proves itself to 
be overly skeptical.   
3.c. Mathematical Faith 
Two main misconceptions about the Gödel result on consistency are: 1) “that 
consistency of some or all formal systems…is doubtful”; and 2) “that the consistency 
of these systems cannot be proved in the same sense that other mathematical 
statements can be proved.”58   
But as concerns the formal systems PA or ZFC,  “there is no doubt 
whatsoever about the consistency of any of the formal math systems that we use in 
mathematics…. [W]e have absolute certain knowledge of the truth of the axioms of 
these systems, and therewith their consistency”.59 And this is not in conflict with 
Gödel.  As has been shown, the property of soundness, i.e. proving that all the 
theorems of a given system are true, is a stronger property than completeness.60 And 
though the Incompleteness Theorem says that a formal system may not prove its own 
consistency, we can show that such a system is consistent if all of its theorems can be 
proven true in another system.61 So while it is true that PA cannot prove its own 
consistency, the axioms of PA are proven true in another formal system, ZFC.62  
Moreover, in ordinary math contexts, no one questions the consistency of ZFC, and 
proving a theorem in ZFC is accepted as having proved that the theorem is true.63    
                                                
58 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 104.   
59 Ibid  at 105.   
60 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 166.   
61 Ibid.   
62 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 109. 
63 Ibid at 111.   
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The inability of PA to prove its own consistency does not constitute rational 
grounds for doubting its consistency.64 To believe in the consistency of a formal 
system S on the basis of its proving its consistency, 
! 
Cons, is like believing that 
someone is not crazy on the basis of her claiming that she isn’t…”65 “Gödel’s 
theorem tells us nothing about what is or is not doubtful in mathematics.  To speak of 
the consistency of arithmetic as something that cannot be proved makes sense only 
given a skeptical attitude towards ordinary mathematics in general.”66 
Francisco Berto speaks of the formal system ZFC as a background theory, and 
states that essentially all the proofs of ordinary mathematics can be formalized within 
it.67 Conversely, if a problem is proven not to be solvable in ZFC, then 
“mathematicians will have a strong tendency to quit taking it as a mathematical 
problem.”68 “[M]athematicians are perfectly right in relying on their background 
theory – for how could they carry out their work otherwise?…[T]his mathematical 
reliance might be nothing but faith, given a suitably restrictive definition of “faith”.”69 
Berto says that this overly skeptical view goes beyond Gödel, and becomes a 
trap: first we are asked to prove the consistency of a formal system, and then the 
skeptic raises doubts as to the principles of demonstration.70  
                                                
64 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 165.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 112.   
67 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 171.   
68 Ibid.   
69 Ibid at 172. 
70 Ibid at 172-173. See Aristotle’s answer to this endless skepticism: “[W]e have just assumed that it is 
impossible at once to be and not to be… Some, indeed, demand to have the law proved, but this is 
because they lack education; for it shows lack of education not to know of what we should require 
proof, and of what we should not. For it is quite impossible that everything should have a proof; the 
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4. Major Points Concerning Applications of Gödel to Fuller and the Law 
This capricious attitude carries over into much of the legal criticism 
concerning Gödel’s Theorem, but there are also many apt comparisons. Gödel’s 
Theorem is perhaps most closely analogized to the Is/Ought debate.  Gödelian 
concepts also resonate strongly within the framework of Fuller’s theories of natural 
law, where he finds fault with the philosophy of positivism.  
 I have made it very clear that Gödel’s Theorem concerns arithmetic, and 
therefore cannot be said to “prove” anything about law.71 Gödel created the scenario 
where a formal statement, ‘G’, is true, but not provable within the system. 72   
Interpreting this as analogy lends a wide variety of verbal expressions: e.g. “[T]ruth is 
not reducible to (formal or mechanical) proof.  Syntax cannot supplant semantics.”73  
 While Penrose and others might push for the wider application of Gödel, I 
need not rely on these associated theories, but rather rest on the strength of the 
analogy as Manderson has presented.74  It certainly would be more satisfying to our 
modernist empiricist penchant to have a mathematical ‘proof’ of a theory, but it is not 
necessary. Gödel and Fuller shared similar philosophies, and their similarity does not 
                                                                                                                                      
process would go on to infinity, so that even so there would be no proof.” (Translator’s Note: Every 
proof is based upon some hypothesis, to prove which another hypothesis must be assumed, and so on 
ad infinitum.)  Aristotle, Metaphysics, Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol 17, 18, trans Hugh Tredennick, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933, 1989) at 1006a. [Aristotle, Metaphysics] 
71 See Townsend, supra note 12 at 134: “[A] great controversy exists in the mathematical community 
about whether the limitations that Gödel’s Theorems places on certain types of formal systems apply to 
human reasoning as well.” 
72 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 50.  Remember that “Gödel sentence” – “
! 
Gs” says, about itself, 
that it is not “provable”: “
! 
Gs” says “
! 
Gs is not provable in S.”  See Gödel, “Formally Undecidable 
Propositions”, supra note 28, section III at 89: “We therefore have before us a proposition that says 
about itself that it is not provable [in PM]….” 
73 Yourgrau, supra note 5, section I at 57.   
74 Manderson, supra note 1, section I at 194.   
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depend on the Incompleteness theorem to prove anything about law.  Both Gödel and 
Fuller refuted positivism in their respective fields, which casts doubt on its validity as 
a philosophy.   
4.a. Gödel as Analogy for Fuller 
If we view Fuller from the perspective of Hart-Fuller debate, we find that he is 
very similar to Gödel in that he shows the need for extra-legal means of decision-
making.75  In the Hart-Fuller debate, Fuller represented the natural law view, and 
stated that the meaning of law is dependent upon external norms for its own 
interpretation.76 Before we determine what a law is, we need to know its purpose.77 
We need to know what the rule “ought to be” before we can state what the rule “is”.   
 The sense of the purpose of law can never be completely described by the 
words of positive law.78  If we limit ourselves only to positive law, the legal system 
lacks recourse to this understanding of purpose, and this renders a situation much like 
the undecidable true sentence in Gödel’s Theorem: Truth is not reducible to formal or 
mechanical proof.79  
 So the law is always dependent upon an external morality that is necessary for 
social ordering, and this morality is a necessary precondition for the realization of 
                                                
75 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20 section II at 645.  See D’Amato, “Pragmatic 
Indeterminacy”, supra note 70, section III at 26: “Fuller invented a Godelian application of Hart's 
exemplary statute, one that was undecidable even though by hypothesis it fell within the core.” 
76 Schauer, “Critical Guide”, supra note 44, section II at 1109.  
77 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20, section II at 665-6.  
78 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 150. 
79 This idea is similar to Fuller’s views on the law: Fuller felt that society could not have respect for 
law unless society had a respect for justice.  Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20, 
section II at 657.  Although this is insightful to the matters discussed here, I do not mean to show that 
Gödel meant that his Theorem proved this.  The analogy here is my own interpretation of Manderson’s 
comments. 
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justice.80 Thus, we can understand Manderson’s analogy of “justice” as a 
“supplement, something both utterly apart from and yet embodied in the operation of 
law.”81  
Manderson’s interpretation of the Incompleteness Theorem also conforms to a 
Gödelian Platonic interpretation: Manderson does not appeal to merely observable 
phenomena, but rather “justice”, which is “felt to be axiomatic”, but which escapes 
empirical proof: “something both utterly apart from, and yet embodied in the 
operation of the law.”82  
Manderson’s insight into Gödel is outdone by his careful wording concerning 
Fuller: 
“The most rigorous and analytic theory or system requires a supplement 
which is both necessary to its functioning and yet cannot be admitted by its 
structure.   
This supplement is an awareness of the “purposes” which motivate the 
system, an argument most closely associated with Lon Fuller.”83 
 
Although this argument is “associated with” Fuller, it does not accurately represent 
Fuller’s natural law theory.  Fuller’s legal philosophy was focused on the internal 
morality of law, but did not describe the form of the external morality.84 In this sense, 
the ‘close association’ with Fuller is perhaps due mostly to the Hart-Fuller debate, 
where Fuller strongly defended the need for “substantive aims of legal rules” of law 
with which his natural law theory was not “concerned”.85   
                                                
80 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 5-6, 168.  
81 Manderson, supra note 1, section I at 195.  
82 Ibid.   
83 Ibid at 192, 194. [Italics added for emphasis.]  
84 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 96. 
85 Ibid at 97.  
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4.b. Philosophy Behind Gödel and Fuller 
Examining the philosophy of Fuller reveals another, perhaps even more apt 
comparison of Fuller to Gödel. Gödel’s philosophy was Platonic, and his theory 
refuted the positivist view.  Gödel said that nominalism was provably false. It seems 
logical that a meaningful analogy of the Incompleteness Theorem to law should take 
a similar perspective; i.e. that positivism and nominalism were incorrect and/or 
harmful philosophies.  This is an accurate summary of Fuller’s legal theory because 
he is consistently antagonistic towards positivism.  Fuller said that positivists present 
a false view of logic and policy, imagining that they can “trace the patterns of judicial 
behavior just as they are”, stating the “pure, raw, unembellished fact of law”.86 In this 
process, positivists obscured the underlying policy in settled law.87 Fuller prophesied 
that positivism would ultimately destroy itself because it demands the impossible task 
of creating a “rigidly controlled and “scientifically” accurate statement of law.”88 
Lon Fuller also criticized legal realists for their nominalist beliefs, which 
Fuller described as a fear of conceptualism, and an inability to reconcile the polarity 
of law and society. 89 Legal realists demonstrate a “skepticism toward rules” which is 
expressed by two related fears: 1) Reality is too “complex…to be kept in a straight-
                                                
86 Lon Fuller, “Williston On Contracts” (1939-1940) 18 NC L Rev 1 at 13-14. 
87 Ibid at 10.   
88 Ibid at 14.   
89 Fuller, “Legal Realism”, supra note, 6, section II at 444. Fuller said that  legal realists were 
essentially engaging in nominalism, which he defined as the “belief that universals exist only in the 
mind of the individual”: “Nominalism starts with the assumption that in the mind of the individual 
universals have no place, that they are only a sort of social convention making language possible.” 
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jacket of rules”; and 2) Rules are essentially impotent because they are made up of 
shadowy concepts that are essentially the “figments of our own minds”.90 
 Because Incompleteness is limited to talking about formal systems of natural 
numbers, and because the Hart/Fuller debate doesn’t offer an accurate representation 
of Fuller’s natural law, it appears that the most relevant aspect of Gödel’s Theorem in 
this analogy is the philosophy behind it: Gödel meant his Theorem to be a refutation 
of positivism and nominalism,91 which were also the bugbears of Fuller’s 
philosophy.92 Like Fuller, Gödel felt that positivism represented philosophy poorly.93    
4.c. Gödel and Vagueness in Formal Systems 
 Another characteristic that is common to both the legal system and the formal 
system described by Gödel is that of vagueness.  Vagueness is common to all natural 
language systems, and it is unavoidable.94 Formal systems were created with the 
intention of removing vagueness from the discussions of mathematics.95 This very 
basic understanding should be enough to refute the idea that Gödel’s Incompleteness 
Theorem has any direct impact on the law: that theorem talks about formal systems, 
and the law is not a formal system.96  But Gödel’s Theorem shows that there is a type 
                                                
90 Ibid at 443.   
91 See Gödel, [1951], supra note 10 at 320, 323.   
92 See Fuller, “Legal Realism”, supra note, 6, section II at 444. 
93 Hao Wang, A Logical Journey: From Gödel to Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996) at 
308.   
94 Russell, “Vagueness”, supra note 68, section II at 87.  [Italics added for emphasis.] 
95 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 15-16. 
96 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 2, 16.  See D’Amato, “Pragmatic 
Indeterminacy”, supra note 70, section III at 176, FN 92: “Although Professor Kress is technically 
correct in saying that [Gödel’s Theorems were] designed to apply to formal systems, my position is 
that either they apply a fortiori to non-formal systems such as law, or if they don't apply because law is 
a non-formal system, then for that reason the Indeterminacy thesis is proven.” 
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of vagueness that creeps into formal systems that talk about natural numbers.97  Every 
formal system of that type is susceptible to a Gödel statement about which it cannot 
make a decision, rendering the system incomplete and incapable of evaluating its own 
consistency.98 
 I believe that formal systems cannot fully explain or “capture” the essence of 
natural numbers for a reason that is similar to what makes a legal system incomplete: 
there is a source of decision-making that is eternally located outside the system. Other 
formal systems, like those of rational numbers and Euclidean geometry, can be 
complete and consistent; while those involving natural numbers are incomplete and 
cannot prove their own consistency.99  This gets at the very nature and purpose of 
counting as opposed to that of measuring; i.e. numerosity as it differs from ratio:   
“For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, 
"number" refers to the species…whereby it is distinguished; For a thing…is 
distinct by its form…”100 
 
So in order to count things, it is necessary to discern their form, and to make a 
determination as to which species they are a part. Anytime I say: "There are X 
number of Ys", I am making a judgment as to what a Y is; I am defining a set. For 
example, let’s imagine there are three ladies in a room.  One of them is pregnant. 
 How many people are in the room?  The trouble in answering this question stems 
from the vagueness of the word “people”. 
                                                
97 Berto, supra note 1, section III at 50.  See Gödel, “Formal Undecidable Propositions”, supra note 28, 
section III at 89: “We therefore have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable 
[in PM]….” 
98 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 15, section III at 34.  
99 Ibid at 25, 127.   
100 Aquinas, St Thomas, Summa Theologica, trans Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (New 
York: Benzinger Bros, 1921) at I, Q 45 A 7. 
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 In order to have natural numbers, I need rules or principles to create 
boundaries to the set that I am counting.101 For this reason it is understandable that 
Gödelian incompleteness is limited to formal systems involving natural numbers.  
5. Conclusion 
  I started out by discussing Penrose’s Argument that systems of rules cannot 
govern themselves.  While Penrose’s theory didn’t necessarily prove anything about 
the law, it showed how Fuller’s natural law claim, that the legal system is dependent 
upon external norms, is analogous to Gödel.   
 I also showed that Gödel’s Theorem is essentially Platonist since it proves that 
number theory cannot be proven by concrete symbols and functions. In a fit of great 
irony, I left aside the proof that Gödel concretely proves anything about the law, and 
instead began to build a more abstract argument showing that the Platonist philosophy 
behind the Incompleteness Theorem is similar to the one behind Fuller’s natural law.     
I introduced the different philosophies of Platonism and positivism, and 
showed how they relate both to law and mathematics.  I also demonstrated that the 
Incompleteness Theorem is not an expression of positivism, but rather points to 
human reason being reliant upon abstract concepts that escape concrete expression.  
In this way, the Gödel Theorem disproves nominalism.  Even if the Gödel Theorem 
may not be strictly applicable to the law, it is this Platonic interpretation that makes a 
more appropriate analogy.  
                                                
101 And as is common with any system of rules or principles, “this principle will be found to fail the 
more, according as we descend further into detail…” Ibid at I, Q 94 A 4. 
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 In the next section I will discuss the shortcomings of Fuller’s theory of natural 
law. If Fuller’s statements concerning the external morality of law are to be analogous 
with the philosophy expressed by Gödel’s Theorem, it is vital that the natural law be 
objective and consistent.  I will show how the classical understanding of natural law 
is superior to Fuller’s because it is more consistent and therefore more useful in 
resolving the problem of legal vagueness.  
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“Who shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness 
to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one 
another…”        -- Romans 2:15 
 
Chapter IV: Natural Law & Legal Consistency 
1. Introduction  
This thesis set out to inquire whether Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is an 
analogous case of Lon Fuller’s statements concerning the natural law.  In order to answer 
this completely, it is necessary to understand what is meant by “natural law”.  I have 
already shown that Gödel’s Theorem rings true with arguments ‘associated with’ Fuller, 
most typically in those arguments presented in the Hart/Fuller debate. But when Fuller’s 
natural law system is closely examined, he presents a theory of law that is inconsistent 
with the goals of the natural law.  Generally, this section will show that Fuller’s natural 
law theory contradicts itself and is, in many respects, positivistic.  Fuller’s positivist view 
is in obvious contrast to Gödel’s determined efforts to prove the Platonic/realist view of 
mathematical concepts.1  I will show that he ‘classical natural law theory’, as it is 
explained by Aquinas, is more closely analogous to the philosophy of Gödel.2  
My working premise is that the analogy between Gödel and Fuller rings most true 
in their underlying philosophies.  Consistent with this premise, I submit that Gödel’s 
concept of natural numbers should be of a similar nature to the conceptualization of the 
natural law. With this in mind, I can use Gödel’s relevant beliefs concerning number 
theory to evaluate Fuller’s theory of natural law.  
                                                
1 Gödel, [1951] supra note 10, section IIIa at 314. 
2 “Among the most influential contributions to natural law jurisprudence is Aquinas Treatise 
on Law [in] Summa Theologiea…” Farago, supra note 98 section III at 195, FN1. Following Farago’s 
example, “I will most commonly refer to a model of natural law drawn from this source.” 
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Gödel said that proving the consistency of classical number theory was dependent 
upon the use of “abstract” concepts, meaning that they did not refer to sense objects.3 But 
although Fuller’s purely procedural natural law scheme points out the need for an 
external morality of law, he makes no effort to articulate any means for its discernment.4 
Fuller even goes so far as to question the legitimacy of a “higher law”.5  This is 
inconsistent with Gödel’s concept of proving number theory, and this is also a mistaken 
view of the natural law.  Classical natural law theory, consistent with Gödel, says that the 
natural law is necessary to provide consistency to the positive law. 
Along similar lines, Gödel said that the concepts referred to by mathematical 
terms formed “an objective reality of their own, which we cannot create or change, but 
only perceive and describe.”6 Fuller’s view of natural law ignores the classical law view 
that the goals of law are fixed antecedently, and instead takes an instrumentalist view, 
creating the purposes of natural law contingently.  This instrumentalist perspective is not 
in keeping with the proper purpose of natural law, and also contradicts Gödel’s view. 
Lastly, Gödel said that the implications of the psychologistic view, (i.e. that 
mathematics are governed by our own thoughts and convictions as they occur in us), 
would render all mathematical knowledge meaningless.7 But Fuller’s natural law is 
shown to be relativistic. If natural law is created by man, according to his own thoughts 
and convictions, then the natural law meaningless as a standard of objective reckoning.  
In contrast to Fuller’s natural law theory, the classical view of natural law is the 
most ideal external source of morality, and this is necessary to the proper interpretation of 
                                                
3 Gödel, [1951] supra note 10, section IIIa at 318. 
4 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 96. 
5 Lon Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 1 section I at 660.   
6 Gödel, [1951] supra note 10, section IIIa at 320. 
7 Ibid at 322. 
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law.  The overriding reason for this resonates very strongly with the most elemental proof 
in logic: that of non-contradiction. Non-contradiction is a quality of truth, and so all true 
statements are consistent with one another.  I argue that the classical view of natural law 
is superior because it is consistent with the stated purpose of law.  The law purports that 
consistency is the goal, so the law should be consistent with this claim: the procedures of 
law, as well as the external morality should all strive for consistency. Thus, when a court 
uses terms like “justice” and “truth”, it should be understood that these are not terms of 
art, but real concepts that the court is striving to accomplish.  This is the necessary 
understanding of natural law for this analogy to be consistent with Gödel’s concept of 
how formal systems talk about natural numbers. 
2. Natural Law & The Common Law 
 Before I discuss these matters further, I should be clear what I mean by “natural 
law”.  The classical theory of natural law shows how practical reason is used to discern 
the proper goals for law, and as a means for evaluating legal fitness.  This view comports 
with Gödel’s belief that abstract concepts are necessary to prove the consistency of 
number theory.8   
There are many misconceptions about natural law that are employed as arguments 
for its elimination as a source of reason and law; e.g. that natural law is based on the 
Bible or religious law.9 This misunderstanding of natural law has led to a positivist 
method of interpreting the law and human rights. But the common law was fashioned 
from the principles of the natural law; and the rights embodied in the US Constitution 
                                                
8 Gödel, [1951] supra note 10, section IIIa at 318. 
9 See e.g. Southern Pac Co v Jensen, 244 US 205, 222 (1917), J Holmes dissent: “The common law is not a 
brooding omnipresence in the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be 
identified…” 
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grew out of the common law.10  
2.a. Natural Law Telos 
The understanding of natural law dates back to the ancient Greeks:  
“Greek philosophers reasoned by analogy from the cosmic order, with its 
constantly recurring and universal phenomena of physical nature, to an idealized 
social regime actualized by law. Right and justice were based upon the harmony 
or fitness involved in the nature of things. These notions were universally valid. 
They were not a matter of human will.” 11 
 
 Aristotle provided a foundation of natural law, showing how the proper end of 
something was related to its ‘nature’.  Generally, all things exist by their ‘nature’ or by 
other causes.12 In answer to ‘why’ an object of a particular nature comes to be in its state, 
Aristotle listed four causes: 1) substance (e.g. the bronze of a statue); 2) form (e.g. 
number; this relates to the ‘forms’ of Plato); 3) primary or proximate cause (e.g. the 
father of the child); and 
“4) in the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done, e.g. health is 
the cause of walking about. (’Why is he walking about?’ we say. ‘To be healthy’, 
and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.)”13  
 
It is this last point which concerns us most, this ‘end’ which Aristotle calls ‘telos’, 
from which we derive our idea of means-end or teleological arguments.14 Notice that 
while there may be many causes that lead to a result, it is only this last one, the telos, 
                                                
10 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 11-13.  See Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 99: “It 
is [during the seventeenth century] that scholars trace the “natural law foundations” of the American 
Constitution.” 
11 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 9.  [Italics added.] See also Tamanaha, Brian Z, “How An 
Instrumental View Of Law Corrodes The Rule Of Law” (2006-2007) 56 DePaul L Rev 469 at 474-7. 
12 Aristotle, Physics, translator RP Hardie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930) [Aristotle, Physics] at 192b. 
Something of a given nature has an impulse to grow or change within itself; e.g. A tree might be cut down 
and fashioned into a bed by a craftsman, but it has no impulse to change into a bed by its own nature. 
“[N]ature is a source or cause of being moved and of being at rest in that to which it belongs primarily, in 
virtue of itself and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute.” The fact that nature exists is self-evident and 
Aristotle says is beyond demonstration; at 193a: “That nature exists, it would be absurd to try to prove; for 
it is obvious that there are many things of this kind, and to prove what is obvious by what is not is the mark 
of a man who is unable to distinguish what is self-evident from what is not.”  
13 Ibid at 194b. [Italicized for emphasis.] 
14 [Greek !"#"$%&, teleios, (adj) completed; !"#%&, telos, (n) end].  
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which is the “good” that gives meaning to those other causes: ‘that for the sake of which’ 
means what is best and the end of the things that lead up to it.”15 
Aristotle defined “nature” as happening for a purpose rather than by 
coincidence.16 Although some things may appear to be random, this is merely because we 
do not see or understand all of the causes at work: “It is absurd to suppose that purpose is 
not present because we do not observe the agent deliberating.”17  
As to necessity, Aristotle wrote that some things must happen to bring about the 
result, e.g. that the foundation must go below the wall, and the wall below the roof.18 But 
the wall of this building goes towards the end or good of making a house, and not the 
other way around. Aristotle does allow that there are some necessaries that are so 
intrinsic to the process of becoming that they become part of its definition.19 
Thomas Aquinas built on this understanding, stating that the goal of practical 
reason was the accomplishment of the human telos.20 Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that 
the law must make account for the ordering of goods, and its implications of how the 
individual relates to this ideal community: just laws promoting and preserving virtue and 
happiness.21  
Roman jurists also employed these same principles of universal ideals, using them 
as a basis for law-making and,  
                                                
15 Aristotle, Physics, supra note 12 at 195a. 
16 Ibid at 198b - 199a.  There are, of course, aberrations, such as man-faced ox progeny, but to say that 
these prove that all nature is coincidence is to argue the exception, and to deny the idea of nature all 
together: “But the person who asserts this entirely does away with ‘nature’ and what exists ‘by nature’. For 
those things are natural which, by a continuous movement originated from an internal principle, arrive at 
some completion…”Ibid at 199b.   
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid at 199b – 200a. 
19 Ibid at 200a – 200b. 
20 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 90 A 2.  “Now the first principle in 
practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end…” 
21 Ibid Q 90 A 2; (citing Aristotle, Ethics at 1129a-b.)   
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“as a norm with which to criticize the positive law….This jus naturale was an 
objective pattern unaffected by what individual men might think concerning its 
existence or content.”22   
  
Despite its history through diverse societies from Greece, through Roman law and 
on through Christian Europe, natural law is commonly confused with rules from the Bible 
or religious laws.  But this is a misunderstanding: all people are subject to the natural law, 
not because it is written in the Bible, but because people are rational creatures and 
endowed with reason. Aquinas described the universal natural law as separate from the 
Bible, which he termed “divine law”.23 He argued that natural law is imprinted on all 
people, and residing within each person’s ability to reason.24  
2.b. Natural Law Foundation of Common Law 
 It was with this understanding of natural law that the common law developed.25 
Although it has been the fashion more recently to anathematize the natural law, English 
and American jurists have a long history of using the natural law as a second set of 
principles, apart from the positive law, as both a means of judging the reasonableness of 
laws, and as a means of reining in the law.26 Sir William Blackstone echoed the 
sentiments of Aquinas from centuries before: 
“This law of nature… is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding 
over all the globe in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any 
                                                
22 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 9.   
23 Aquinas describes four types of law: “eternal law”, “natural law”, “human law”, and “divine law”. See 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 91 A 1 – 4. The Divine law of the Bible 
is divided into the New and Old Testaments: At A 5: “Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the 
Apostle (Gal. 3:24, 25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child "under a 
pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer under a 
pedagogue.” 
24 Ibid at I-II, Q 91 A 2, and Q 93 A 1. 
25 Tamanaha, supra note 10 at 469. 
26 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 11. Tamanaha, supra note 10 at 474. 
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validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force, and 
all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.”27 
 
This influence of natural law justice upon the common law can be seen as the 
authority of a judge to invalidate an unjust law. This procedure is most acutely 
demonstrated in the Courts of Chancery, or Equity, which, in pursuit of justice, could 
overrule the common law courts.28 Equity, properly understood, is just another name for 
natural law.29    
  Leading up to the American Revolution and the era following, courts commonly 
disregarded statutes that were seen to violate the principles of natural justice.30 The 
natural law was specifically invoked when the US Declaration of Independence was 
written; and the rights enshrined in the US Constitution were essentially those natural 
rights discovered by the operation of the common law.31 Natural law concepts are seen in 
the language of the 5th and the 14th Amendments, and in the due process and equal 
protection clauses.32  
While this explicit wording of rights in the Constitution serves the same function 
of keeping a check upon the positive law, there is one important difference: the natural 
law rights were understood to exist entirely separate from any written document, and 
                                                
27 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, (Philidelphia: Rees Welsh & Co, 1902) Vol 
1 at 41.  [Italicized for emphasis.] 
28 Henry James Sumner Maine, Ancient Law, (London: John Murray, 1906) at 72.  Thus the old doctrine 
that “Equity flowed from the king’s conscience.”  
29 Ibid at 72: “The theories found in modern manuals of Equity are very various, but all are alike in their 
untenability. Most of them are modifications of the Roman doctrine of a natural law, which is indeed 
adopted in terms by those writers who begin a discussion of the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery by 
laying down a distinction between natural justice and civil.” See Steve Wexler, “Aristotle, Anomaly and 
Legal Theory”, (2011) 7 Int'l Zeitschrift 79 at 86. 
30 Tamanaha, supra note 10 at 475. 
31 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 11-13.  See US Declaration of Independence: “When in the Course of 
human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected 
them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which 
the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them…” [Italics added.] 
32 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 11 – 12.  
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were not created by that writing.33 This sentiment can be seen in the 9th Amendment: 
“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”34 
2.c. Formalism as Proto-Positivism 
 The enshrinement of natural law rights on paper led to a change in their operation 
and a general confusion of law and morals. Judges and legislators began to confuse the 
common law with the natural law: rather than create laws that conformed to an outside 
ideal, legislators sought to preserve a specific legal order.35 But this view of positive law 
being identical with natural law is incompatible with the Thomistic-Aristotelian 
tradition.36 The essential notion of natural law was that a perfect ideal of positive law was 
impossible, and that a separate and distinct law of reason was necessary to subjugate the 
former:37  
“Constitutional restrictions provide a new form of limitation that accomplishes 
some of the work done by the older understandings, but it does so in a reduced 
sense. It is law limiting itself, a step higher, but still a contingent body of law that 
can be changed through amendment or reinterpretation, if so desired. Lost in this 
transformation was the time-honored understanding that there are certain things 
the government and legal officials absolutely cannot do with and through law that 
the law possesses integrity unto itself and must comport with standards of good 
and right.38 
 
This confusion of natural law with those written rights is essentially what has 
come to be known as formalism: 
“Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to 
                                                
33 Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 476.  
34 Ibid at 476; US Const, 9th Am.   
35 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 13. Justice Holmes famous quotation about the “brooding 
omnipresence” concerning the common law (Southern Pac Co v Jensen, supra note 9), is an example of 
this confusion. 
36 Brown, supra note 10, section II at 13. 
37 Ibid at 13 – 14.   
38 Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 477. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
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foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given 
circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.39 
 
This is known as a “"formal" understanding of the rule of law because it focuses only on 
the formal characteristics of law rather than on its content. The core idea is that the 
government must abide by legal rules declared publicly in advance.”40  
 “As belief in natural law waned, the Supreme Court came to characterize rights 
and restraints on legislative powers in positivist terms tied to the language of the 
Constitution.”41 I say that formalism is a sort of ‘proto-positivism’ because both try to 
deny any operation outside of their own formal content: positivism denies the moral basis 
of law; formalism operates similarly when it denies the unwritten natural law basis of 
rights.  Unlike the natural law, which has always existed, the power of the Constitution 
was perceived as being rooted in the popular will of the people: essentially all of its 
provisions could be changed by amendment.42   
3. Law, Logic and Practical Reason 
Another significant distinction from positivism, and which I mentioned earlier, is 
the central role that logic takes in natural law.43 Practical reason is the very hallmark of 
natural law.44 I have already shown how Gödel and Fuller are analogous in their 
                                                
39 FA Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007) at 112. [Hayek, Road to 
Serfdom] 
40 Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 485.   
41 Ibid, at 477. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Positivists present a very limited application of logic: “[L]ogic does not prescribe interpretation of terms; 
it dictates neither the stupid nor intelligent interpretation of any expression. Logic only tells you 
hypothetically that if you give a certain term a certain interpretation then a certain conclusion follows. 
Logic is silent on how to classify particulars - and this is the heart of a judicial decision.” Hart, “Separation 
of Law and Morals”, supra note 45, section II at 610 
44 Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14, section II at 18.  cf J Wild, supra note 78, section II at 83: Practical 
reason attempts to determine the proper norms for conduct—not merely what is, but also what ought to be. 
[Italics added for emphasis.]  See also Wilde at 81: Natural law theory “is the result of a disciplined effort 
to clarify the meaning of ethical concepts in terms of the ultimate ontological structures which they 
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condemnation of positivism.  But on this topic of practical reason, Fuller’s theory of 
natural law is not analogous to Gödel, and reveals its positivistic influence. 
Fuller acknowledges the importance of logic as ‘reason’, but he is inconsistent on 
this point. For example, Fuller says that the opportunity for reasoned argument is the 
“distinguishing characteristic” of adjudication.45 Fuller also fairly states that the 
“quintessence of the natural law point of view” is to adjudge an act against common right 
or reason to be void.46 Professor Fuller even supports my major assertion in this section 
when he states that his “procedural” natural law theory is primarily concerned that the 
law be “efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be.”47 
Yet in his stubborn refusal to admit any substantive theory of natural law,48 Fuller 
claims that logic, as the formal principle of the “law of identity” has no value in dealing 
with contradictory laws:  
“But is there any violation of logic in making a man do something and then 
punishing him for it?  We may certainly say of this procedure that it makes no 
sense, but in passing this judgment we are tacitly assuming the objective of giving 
a meaningful direction to human effort.”49 
 
It might be possible to forgive Fuller for attempting to trade off the difference 
                                                                                                                                            
exemplify…In light of such analysis, universal moral principles may be rationally justified as founded on 
real facts…” 
45 Lon L Fuller and Kenneth I Winston, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication", 92 Harvard Law Review 
353, (1978), at 364. [Fuller, “Forms and Limits”]. Fuller believed that a logical system also has the effect of 
causing actors within this system to pull their actions toward “goodness” when they are forced to explain 
their decisions rationally. Fuller, “Fidelity to Law” at 636.  Finnis says this is a relevant claim: “A tyranny 
devoted to pernicious ends has no self-sufficient reason to submit itself to the discipline of operating 
consistently through the demanding processes of law, granted that the rational point of such self-discipline 
is the very value of reciprocity, fairness, and respect for persons which the tyrant, ex hypothesi, holds in 
contempt.” Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14 at 273. 
46 Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 100.   
47 Ibid at 97. 
48 Ibid: “[W]e are concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a 
system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and administered…” 
49 Ibid at 95-6. 
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between “formal logic” and “practical reason”, 50 except that it contradicts his own 
statements regarding “logic” and “policy” in law, moving along together:  
“[O]ne may … speak of a decision being primarily determined by "logic" or 
primarily determined by "policy", meaning, in the second case, to refer to the 
situation where policy and logic are working together, and where the assistance of 
logic is more or less taken for granted. But this is a dangerous way of speaking 
and easily leads to such absurdities as the notion that legal logic can function in 
vacuo without premises shaped by considerations of policy (a belief which legal 
realists have sometimes been willing to attribute to their, opponents), or the 
notion that in the determination of policy, logic is not involved, and one must here 
depend wholly upon intuition and hunch....51 
 
It is absurd to suggest that a lawmaker is using something other than logic in 
determining that it would be better not to punish someone for following the law, but this 
is the labored result of Fuller’s attempt to disconnect natural law theory from discerning 
anything substantive.  Fuller needs to show that all of natural law is based on procedure, 
and so he attempts to show that logic can be severed from policy before anyone 
concludes that logic or reason could deduce those substantive truths about human 
morality.52  In carrying on this pretence, Fuller tries to control this obvious deficit by 
nominalist measures: “[I]nstead of speaking of “contradictions” in legal and moral 
argument we ought to speak of “incompatibilities.”53  Or we should say these laws are 
“repugnant” or “inconvenient”, or that there is a “clash of ... two provisions” in the law.54  
But if someone did not understand what a judge meant by a law being “repugnant”, the 
                                                
50 See Wilson Huhn, “The Use and Limits of Syllogistic Reasoning in Briefing Cases” (2002) 42 Santa 
Clara L Rev 813 at 818. In general, we can say that legal reasoning is syllogistic in form and evaluative in 
substance; or more simply, legal logic follows paths that are reasonable, but are often based on policy, 
societal norms or other factors that do not entail the judge’s conclusion in the same manner as in a formal 
logic argument.  
51 Fuller, “Williston on Contracts”, supra note 86, section IIIa at 9. [Italicized for emphasis.] 
52 Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 96 betrays a certain naïveté in his discussion when he 
distinguishes his procedural version of natural law as being entirely “terrestrial” and having nothing to do 
with the “brooding omnipresence”. [Have any others pointed out this naïveté?] 
53 Ibid at 69. 
54 Ibid at 68-9. 
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obvious answer would be that the law contradicted the stated goals of the Constitution, or 
some other source of law.  Clearly Fuller is using nominalist wordplay, (or political 
correctness, or Newspeak), to hide the pervasive influence of reason in the law.  
4. Fuller’s Positivist Denial of Absolutism 
 While Fuller is presented as a champion of natural law, his denial of substantive 
natural law is based on an unwillingness to accept the concept of absolutes. The denial of 
absolutes, or the ability to know about them, stems from positivist thought.55 Fuller’s 
natural law theory stands in contrast to the analogous view of Gödel: mathematical 
concepts that we can neither create nor change.56   
 Fuller acknowledges that there may be “some constancy in the nature of man 
himself”, but he is unwilling to assert any particulars, as those might prevent some from 
accepting his particular theory of ‘eunomics’:  
“In stating the case for eunomics I have tried to keep it distinct from the natural 
law problem first discussed, that is, whether "the nature of man" can furnish a 
meaningful standard for ethical judgments. One may emphatically reject this 
standard and yet accept eunomics.”57 
 
 Fuller admits knowing of “no “absolute”: “Human life is in this sense as close to 
an absolute as anything we have, yet it furnishes little guidance to [rationing scarce 
                                                
55 Fuller’s reluctance to embrace moral absolutes does not prevent me from defining them: “Let us mean by 
an absolute moral principle a judgment or precept as to what it is good for us to do that always has force or 
a judgment as to what we must not do that admits of no exceptions.” Ralph McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, 
(Washington: Catholic Univ Press, 1982, 1997) at 47.   For a review of eunomics, discussed earlier, see 
Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 477: “Because of the confusions invited 
by the term "natural law," I believe we need a new name for the field of study I am here recommending. I 
suggest the term "eunomics," which may be defined as the science, theory or study of good order and 
workable arrangements. Eunomics involves no commitment to "ultimate ends."” 
56 Gödel, [1951], supra note 10, section IIIa at 320. 
57 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 480-1. 
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resources].”58 It is obvious from this that Fuller’s evaluation that he is not consciously 
committed to either the “relativist” view or the “absolute” view:  
“The expressions "absolute" and "relative" …are simply unanalyzed terms of 
censure and praise… Neither term seems to me to present anything like a 
justiciable issue.”59  
 
But Fuller’s refusal to acknowledge the existence or absolutes, or even the difference 
between absolute and relative, ultimately places him in the relativist camp. 
I think I am safe in declaring that Fuller’s view is agnostic.  Agnosticism is the 
denial of the "validity of metaphysical knowledge, i.e. knowledge of any domain of 
reality beyond that of sense experience."60 Through reason it is possible to see that those 
things known only by sense are limited to the relative.61 The idea that the human mind 
cannot know absolutes, and that it is limited only to the relative, is a positivist dogma that 
is the natural result of limiting knowledge to only sensual data.62 Therefore, by denying 
any knowledge of the absolute, Fuller has limited himself only to sensualist knowledge, 
and this type of thinking is indicative of positivism. 
 While Fuller does not say that extra-sensory knowledge is not possible, he 
achieves the same result by admitting no knowledge of any absolute.  It is difficult to 
understand Fuller’s comment that “absolute” and “relative” not presenting “a justiciable 
issue” in anything but a nominalist sense.  Fuller’s intent is shown by his omission of a 
substantive theory of natural law and the universal telos to support it, and this is a denial 
                                                
58 Ibid at 480. 
59 Ibid at 480. 
60 Coffey, supra note 38, section IIIa at 18. 
61 Ibid at 328.  
62 Ibid. Coffey says that this positivist dogma "derives any plausibility it has from its ambiguity.” See also 
at 329, where Coffey (citing Maher, Psychology, (NY: Longmans,1902) says that our sense of reason 
should recognize the absolute by the fact that we can recognize the relative to be relative. 
 88 
of the natural law described by Aquinas, and Aristotle before him.63  As I shall show, 
Fuller’s denial of absolutes has the expected result: his natural law morality is relativistic.  
4.a. Moral Relativism 
 Fuller’s idea of a popularly conceived morality, rather than one based in the 
natural law, confuses the idea of “morality” and leads to moral relativism.64 Also, Fuller’s 
disregard of the traditional conception of the law as an immanent order leads to doubts of 
judicial objectivity and tends to undermine the notion of the rule of law.65 It is fitting, 
then, that D’Amato accounts Fuller’s as a positivistic theory of natural law.66 
 Fuller rejects the traditional notion of substantive natural law, which finds a 
different result not only in what morals may be selected, but also in their temporal 
quality.  Traditional natural law,  
“holds that some things are right for all times and all places, other things are 
always wrong, and two reasonable people could not differ about which was which 
because if they differed then one of them would not be reasonable.”67 
 
 Professor Anthony D’Amato demonstrates how “morality” could be discussed as 
being universally valid, or as being relative.68  Universally valid laws, e.g. condemning 
the torture of an innocent child, or as we saw in Riggs, the killing of a person for the 
killer’s personal profit, are labeled ‘M-1’; but relative “morality”, M-2, is used to 
describe something that is ‘immoral’ in some societies, and ‘moral’ in others. D’Amato 
                                                
63 Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 96-98. At 96: “[W]e are concerned, not with the 
substantive aims of legal rules…” At 98: “[T]hinkers associated with the natural law tradition….[were 
chiefly concerned] with…substantive natural law, with the proper ends to be sought though legal 
rules….Aquinas is probably typical in this respect.” 
64 D’Amato, “Substantive Natural Law”, supra note 27, section II at 202-204.  
65 Brian Z Tamanaha, supra note 10 at 469-70. 
66 D’Amato, “Substantive Natural Law”, supra note 27, section II at 202. 
67 Ibid at 204.   
68 Ibid, at 205.  D’Amato uses the example of extramarital sexual intercourse between consenting adults. 
This practice may not be frowned upon today, but one hundred years ago the opposite opinion was quite 
commonly held.  
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says that whatever a person uses as the latter example of “morality”, M-2, is for that 
person, not really ‘morality’ at all, but is rather ‘custom’.69  In contrast, a person referring 
to M-1 morality is talking about something that this person would feel is wrong or right, 
no matter where it occurred.70 A reasonable person would feel an inner compulsion to 
stop a child from being tortured.  So M-2, or “moral relativism” is really a misleading 
term because it doesn’t really describe morality.71  
 Practical reason shows that this method of determining human good is illogical: 
“[C]ontemporary [skepticism] about the basic human goods …[is] based on a 
logically illicit slide…from “is” to “ought”.  For example: …  
• X is not universally /commonly regarded as good/obligatory, so X is 
not good/obligatory. 
Explicit natural law theory was launched by Plato and Aristotle, precisely as a 
critique of non sequiturs such as these.”72 
 
 There is a similar misconception in the modern account of natural law, which 
confuses the human good as identified by the  “requirements of practical reasonableness”, 
with the perceived benefits bestowed on a large number of persons: 
“[O]utside the contexts established by simple goals … there is, in situations of 
morally or political significant choice, no net greatest good or lesser evil to be 
identified by aggregative calculations or assessments. The belief that there is is 
not merely practically chimerical, but incompatible with free choice, and 
incoherent.”73 
 
And yet Fuller is guilty of both of these errors.  In his essay, “Reason and Fiat in 
Case Law”, Fuller uses the example of people shipwrecked on a desert island to show 
how natural law principles are developed.74 The man chosen to be the judge would 
discover the natural law by making sure, 
                                                
69 Ibid, at 205.  
70 Ibid, at 205-6.  
71 Ibid, at 207.  
72 Finnis, “Natural Law Tradition”, supra note 43, section II at 493. [Italics added for emphasis.]    
73 Ibid, at 494. 
74 Fuller, “Reason and Fiat”, supra note 4, section II at 377-81.   
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“that his decisions were right - right for the group, right in the light of the group's 
purposes and the things that its members sought to achieve through common 
effort. Such a judge would find himself driven into an attempt to discover the 
natural principles underlying group life, so that his decisions might conform to 
them. He would properly feel that he, no less than the engineers and carpenters 
and cooks of the company, was faced with the task of mastering a segment of 
reality and of discovering and utilizing its regularities for the benefit of the 
group.”75  
 
Fuller’s natural law, as the desert island judge discovers, is good because it is 
universally regarded as good.  The requirements of practical reasonableness in Fuller’s 
view are identified by aggregative calculations.  Fuller’s natural law is arbitrary, as it is 
relative to the shipwrecked group, arrived at by an informal consensus.  This philosophy 
of shared purposes is not enough to prevent the group from committing an immoral act: 
the morality arrived at in this scheme is the M-2 moral relativity.76 “[Fuller] seems to 
want a philosophy that is based on morality but he also wants one that is neutral.”77 
5. Naturalist Fallacy 
A theory of natural law that is analogous to Gödel’s Theory should be logically 
consistent, and this is what we find in the classical theory as presented by Aquinas.  
Fuller’s theory, once again, falls short of the mark.  
One of the chief complaints about natural law is the so-called ‘naturalist fallacy’, 
which asserts that there is a logical error involved in “deducing conclusions about what 
ought to be from premises that state only what is the case; or the other way about.”78 The 
“naturalist fallacy” refers to reasoning that, upon close inspection, involves tautology.  
The term might best pertain to the work of philosophers and natural law theorists who 
have not studied Aquinas.    
                                                
75 Ibid, at 378. [Italics added for emphasis.] See also D’Amato, supra note 26, at 210-11. 
76 D’Amato, “Substantive Natural Law”, supra note 27, section II at 213.   
77 Ibid at 218. 
78 Anthony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy, (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1984) at 240.   
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The discovery of this alleged fallacy is credited to David Hume, but the term was 
invented, and the logical error more fully described by G. E. Moore.79 Taking them in 
order, Hume noted that in “every system of morality” he had ever encountered, there was 
always a leap in reasoning from the “is” to the “ought” without ever establishing how the 
latter was proven.80 
 Moore’s explanation is perhaps just a more generalized statement of Hume’s 
discovery, but his work is widely considered the most influential on this topic.81 Moore 
says that the problem with natural law theory comes about when an illogical equivalence 
is made between some “natural” quality and its goodness; i.e. there is a non-necessary 
deduction of a normative aspect from a descriptive one:  
“For whatever we may have proved to exist, and whatever two existents we may 
have proved to be necessarily connected with one another, it still remains a 
distinct and different question whether what thus exists is good; whether either or 
both of the two existents is so; and whether it is good that they should exist 
together. To assert the one is plainly and obviously not the same thing as to assert 
the other. We understand what we mean by asking: Is this, which exists, or 
necessarily exists, after all, good? In the face of this direct perception that the two 
questions are distinct, no proof that they must be identical can have the slightest 
value.”82  
 
Here is an example of the type of reasoning Moore is describing: Suppose that I 
am defending the United States to a Canadian, explaining that the United States is ‘good’ 
                                                
79 GE Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, 1959).  
80 Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, L Selby-Bigge, ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888) at 469. 
“[T]he author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, 
or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of 
the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an 
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this 
ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd 
and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.” [Italics added 
for emphasis.] 
81 McInerny, supra note 55 at 49. 
82 Moore, supra note 80 at 10-15 (§10-§12). 
 92 
because it kills all the terrorists.83 In other words, my point that the “United States is 
good” is tantamount to saying that “The United States kills all the terrorists.”  But if 
‘good’ = ‘killing all the terrorists’, then saying that the United States is good because it 
kills all the terrorists is equivalent to saying that the United States is good because it is 
good.  This is, of course, a tautology. 
Basically, Moore is saying there is a “gap between fact and value that cannot be 
closed by citing facts about the valued thing”: The relation between the properties of the 
thing in question and our calling it ‘good’ are wholly contingent.84 Moore reasons that if 
the properties of the thing are not related to its ‘goodness’, “so far as the meaning of good 
goes, anything whatever may be good”.85 
Moore’s and Hume’s critique might well apply to those confused theories of 
natural law, which were not founded upon Aristotle or Aquinas, and which owed more to 
the bias of the authors than to logical consistency. For example, Moore criticizes Herbert 
Spencer’s positivistic, Darwinian explanation of natural law, which supposed that 
Europeans were more highly evolved than American Indians, thus enabling them to 
survive better.  As Moore put it: “We can kill them more easily than they can kill us.”86 In 
this example, Moore says that Spencer is using the theory of evolution unreasonably; 
making the leap that “more evolved” is the same as “good”.87   
                                                
83 I have reworked McInerny’s example of why a Yugo was a good car, in McInerny, supra note 55, at 49-
50.  Note: I am both a US and a Canadian Citizen, so I could very well be talking to myself. 
84 Ibid at 50.  
85 Moore, supra note 80, at 20 (§14). 
86 Ibid at 47 (§30). Moore is referring to Herbert Spencer’s “The Data of Ethics”, in The Principles of 
Ethics, Vol I (New York: Appleton, 1898). 
87 Moore, supra note 78, at 48 (§30). “The survival of the fittest does not mean … the survival of what is 
fittest to fulfil [sic] a good purpose best adapted to a good end: at the last, it means merely the survival of 
the fittest to survive; and the value of the scientific theory…just consists in shewing [sic] what are the 
causes which produce certain biological effects. Whether these effects are good or bad, it cannot pretend to 
judge.”  In addition to misunderstanding logic, Moore accuses Spencer of basing his ‘social Darwinist’ 
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5.a. Refutation of Hume 
 The simple answer to Hume’s supposition that the ‘ought’ cannot be derived from 
the ‘is’, is to suppose the contrary.  Instead of human beings sharing a common nature, 
“such that certain things are true of any of them insofar as they are human”; we should 
assume that human beings are just random products of natural selection, with “no built in 
purpose that we might discover.”88 Very simply, Hume is asking us to suppose that “[t]he 
way things are gives us no clue as to what we ought to do”.89 Besides being ridiculous on 
its face, this makes a mockery of the entirety of law: for if this is the case, how should 
people be held to account for anything?    
5.b.  Criticism of Moore 
 Fifty years had passed before anyone noticed that Moore’s ‘naturalist fallacy’ 
was, itself, largely based on a logical fallacy that ignored the difference between 
predicative and attributive adjectives:90  
“[I]n a phrase 'an A B' ('A' being an adjective and 'B' being a noun) 'A' is a 
(logically) predicative adjective if the predication 'is an A B' splits up logically 
into a pair of predications 'is a B' and 'is A'; otherwise … 'A' is a (logically) 
attributive adjective.”91  
 
Thus, I can take the sentence “She is a tall lawyer”, and divide that into “she is 
tall” and “she is a lawyer.” But if I say that “She is a good lawyer”, it would not be the 
same thing as saying that “she is good”, and “she is a lawyer”.92 This is because ‘good’ 
                                                                                                                                            
theory upon a misunderstanding of Darwin: “But it is to be noted that this forms no part of Darwin’s 
scientific theory.” Ibid at 47.  But the title of the book explaining Darwin’s theory about evolution seems to 
lend itself very easily to this sort of fantasy. See Charles Dawin, On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, (New York: Appleton, 
1875).   
88 McInerny, supra note 55 at 48.   
89 Ibid. 
90 PT Geach, “Good and Evil” (1956) 17 Analysis 33.   
91 Ibid, at 33. McInerny, supra note 55 at 50.  
92 See McInerny, supra note 55 at 50. 
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and ‘evil’ are attributive adjectives, not predicative.93 Therefore, this relation between 
‘good’ and ‘lawyer’ can only be figured out by looking into what it means to be a 
lawyer.94 Apparently several generations of positivists had been fooled by a simple 
grammatical error.95 
5.c. Aquinas’ Superior Logical Foundation 
 All of these confused ideas about the natural law, and logical fallacies might have 
been avoided if philosophers had studied Aquinas more closely. Aquinas firmly 
establishes the groundwork for natural law that leaves no room for a logical attack via 
naturalistic or any other fallacy. 
As I noted in the earlier discussion regarding the law of non-contradiction, there 
are always certain self-evident premises that must be admitted into any proof.  Aquinas 
plainly states that “the first principles of natural law, which specify the basic forms of 
good and evil and which can be adequately grasped by anyone of the age of reason (and 
not just by metaphysicians), are per se nota (self-evident) and indemonstrable.”96 It is 
oddly inconsistent that skeptics will willingly accept self-evident principles that the 
natural sciences and all theoretical disciplines rest upon, but then object to the use of 
                                                
93 Geach, supra note 91 at 33. Note: Geach says that there are exceptions, but they prove the rule, at 34.    
94 McInerny, supra note 55 at 51. The idea that Moore uses about describing things with ‘natural’ and ‘non-
natural’ attributes also fails because “nobody has ever given a coherent and understandable account of what 
it is for an attribute to be non-natural.” Geach, supra note 91 at 35. 
95 See McInerny, supra note 55, at 51: “Fifty-three years had intervened between Moore’s egregious 
mistake and Geach’s grammatical correction.” 
96 Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14, section II at 31.  See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, 
section IIIa at I-II, Q 91 A 3: “Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical 
and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above ... 
Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable 
principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us 
by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from 
general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular 
determination of certain matters.” 
 95 
these same principles, or at least strongly analogous versions of such, when they are used 
to establish the principles of practical reason.97 
 Aquinas’ discussion of the first principles includes, notably, an explanation of 
what it means to be self-evident: “Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its 
predicate is contained in the notion of the subject”.98 There is no middle term required to 
explain the conjunction between the subject and predicate because it is immediately 
apparent from the meaning of the terms that the proposition is either true or false.99 In this 
can be seen the difference between apprehension and judgment, because it is necessary to 
understand the meanings of the terms of a proposition before we can create a meaningful 
proposition from those terms.100 
 Aquinas establishes his first principles in a specific order, and calls our attention 
to the logical relation being demonstrated between them.101 The first universal notion that 
must be apprehended, says Aquinas, is being itself, “the notion of which is included in all 
things whatsoever a man apprehends.”102 It is upon this first notion, Aquinas adds the 
principle of non-contradiction, citing Aristotle’s Metaphysics: "It is impossible for the 
same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same 
                                                
97 Finnis, Natural Law, supra note 14, section II at 31-2.  
98 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2. 
99 See McInerny, supra note 55 at 41. 
100 Ibid at 41.  Note that it is possible for a person not to understand the essence of the terms being 
discussed, in which case such a proposition would still be self-evident, but not to that particular reader. 
Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2. cf Summa at I, Q2 A1: “If, 
however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will 
be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the 
proposition.” Thus, “A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in 
itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us.” (This has often been my own 
experience in reading papers on philosophy.)   
101 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2: “Now a certain order is to be 
found in those things that are apprehended universally.” 
102 Ibid at I-II, Q 94 A 2.  
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relation".103 Essentially Aquinas is saying that first of all, we know, “and then secondarily 
and reflectively know the way we know”.104 Thus, as beings, we first grasp our own being, 
and then “the good is the first thing grasped by [the] mind in its practical function of 
directing some operation.”105  
 It may seem to some that mentioning the “good” at this point is merely begging 
the question, but that notion does not apprehend the essence of being, and what this 
entails: “We desire to do what we are actually doing.”106 This would seem self-evident 
enough. The other half of this step is provided by the maxim: “whatever is desired is 
desired in the form of good”:107  
“We shall…find ourselves talking nonsense if we try to describe a people whose 
custom it was, when they wanted A’s, to choose A’s they thought bad and reject 
A’s they thought good.”108  
 
Certainly, it may be said that a person might be mistaken in desiring something that he 
only thinks is perfective and fulfilling.109 But this mistake does not refute the fact that our 
actions are based on the assumption that the object of our desire deserves the “formality 
under which it is desired”; i.e. that it is “perfective and fulfilling.”110 
                                                
103 Ibid at I-II, Q 94 A 2. [Italics added] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol 17, 18, trans 
Hugh Tredennick, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933, 1989) at 1005b “Clearly, then, it is a 
principle of this kind that is the most certain of all principles. Let us next state what this principle is. "It is 
impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same thing and in the same 
relation"; and we must add any further qualifications that may be necessary to meet logical objections. This 
is the most certain of all principles, since it possesses the required definition;” cf Aquinas, Summa 
Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I, Q 2 A3: “Now it is not possible that the same thing should be 
at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different  respects.” 
104 McInerny, supra note 55, at 42. [Italics added] 
105 Ibid at 42. See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2: “Now as 
being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so good is the first thing that falls under the 
apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the 
aspect of good.” 
106 McInerny, supra note 55, at 37.  [Italicized for emphasis.] 
107 Geach, supra note 91, at 38: “quidquid appetitur, appetitur sub specie boni.” 
108 Ibid at 39.   
109 McInerny, supra note 55, at 37.   
110 Ibid. 
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 It is the very nature of the ‘good’ that fills this two-fold role of being both desired 
and normative:  
“The first principle of practical reason is grounded in the knowledge of the notion 
of goodness…. The good is that which all things seek. This is what ‘good’ is 
taken to mean, just as ‘being’ means that which exists. But something is sought 
insofar as it is completive or perfective of the seeker. Thus ‘good’ does not simply 
designate an object of pursuit; it gives the formality under which the object is 
sought or pursued: as completive, as perfective.”111 
 
 Reviewing these in order, I can derive Aquinas’ next principle:  
1. I exist; it is the nature of existence that a thing cannot both exist and not exist 
in the same way and at the same time;  
2. Therefore, the rule of non-contradiction.  
3. It is also in the nature of being that I seek after the ‘good’;  
4. Therefore, “this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and 
pursued, and evil is to be avoided."”112 
 
 It is easy to see that “[t]he first principle of practical reasoning [is] analogous to the first 
principle of reasoning”.113  
 The remaining precepts of natural law follow from this, and are ordered according 
to their natural inclination: 114   
1. Preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles; 
2. Sexual Intercourse (Marriage/procreation);115  
3. Education of offspring; 
4. To know the truth about God; and  
5. To live in society. 
 
 “If the human good is the good that is peculiar and proportionate to the kind of 
agent he is”, then it is perfective of man as a rational agent.116 Therefore man’s 
                                                
111 Ibid at 42. 
112 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2. 
113 McInerny, supra note 55, at 42. 
114 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2. Note that the order of these 
precepts lists first those things that man shares with all creatures, then those that are shared with animals, 
and finally, those which are particular to man. McInerny, supra note 55 at 45. 
115 Aquinas uses the latin phrase, “coniunctio maris et feminae”, or literally, “the union of the male and the 
female”.   
116 McInerny, supra note 55 at 45. 
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perfection is the perfection also of his rational activity. So, while mankind shares with 
other creatures the survival instinct, the inclination to reproduce is more particularized 
because it is only a part of the human good “insofar as [it is] humanized, that is insofar as 
[it is] pursued, not just instinctively, but as the aim or goal of conscious action.”117 
 This is only a summary of Aquinas’ first principles of natural law, found in the 
Summa Theologica.  There is much more to be found on this topic, but this is sufficient to 
show how Aquinas’ reasoning was far superior to those more modern theorists in 
resolving the problems of how good is, at once, sought after and also used to evaluate 
other things.  Note also that the natural law is not understood to be an invention of 
Aquinas, or of Aristotle, but is the ordered property of existence.  Therefore it is more 
proper to say that principles of natural law were ‘discovered’ by these scholars. 
5.d. Fuller’s Criticism of Naturalistic Fallacy 
 Fuller’s view was in agreement with some concepts of the classical theory of 
natural law, i.e. that fact and value were inseparable when interpreting events. But Fuller 
did not presuppose universal human goods that were discoverable by rational inquiry.  
Instead he viewed fact and value as two necessary aspects for showing the efficacy of 
rules, and thus Fuller proved their inseparability from an instrumental perspective.  This 
instrumentalist understanding of law is not consistent with Gödel’s concept of math terms 
forming an objective reality, and is subject to the naturalist fallacy.  
 Fuller’s instrumentalist view is shown in his example of the boy on the beach, 
whose actions were inexplicable to an observer, until it was understood that the boy was 
trying to open a clam.118 Once we knew the boy’s purpose, we were better able to judge 
                                                
117 Ibid. 
118 Fuller, Lon, “Human Purpose and Natural Law” (1956) 53 Jour of Phil 697 at 697-8. 
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whether his actions were ‘good’.  Fuller’s other example was to compare the role of a 
judge to that of the mechanic, who was more capable than the English professor in 
deciphering the instructions on how to assemble a machine.119     
 In these examples Fuller showed the limitations of both language and the 
positivistic theory to make out the meanings of law. But both of these examples were 
limited to the instrumental view of the law; i.e. that the legal system was more functional 
when it was understood that fact and value were inseparable.  But Fuller does not explain 
how these are discoverable goods with inherent value, apart from their usefulness to 
judges in understanding law.   
5.e. Contingent/Antecedently Fixed Telos 
Fuller’s refusal to promote any substantive component in his natural law theory120 
is incompatible with one of the traditional core beliefs of natural law: that positive laws 
must have a moral content or a person would not be obligated to obey.121 Again Fuller is 
more in keeping with the traditional positivist view, that law is as it is, and not as it ought 
to be.122 If a legal system functioned well procedurally, it is hard to imagine that Fuller’s 
natural law would declare void any iniquitous law.   
As I have already noted, Fuller’s natural law theory does not describe the external 
morality, but rather promotes eunomics, which is not premised on any telos, and is 
                                                
119 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 469-70.   
120 Fuller does include a vaguely worded admonition to open channels of communication.  See Fuller, 
Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 186.  
121 See SB Drury, “HLA Hart’s Minimum Content Theory of Natural Law” (1981) 9 Political Theory 533 at 
534: “A morally iniquitous law cannot be valid.” Also see Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, 
section IIIa at I-II, Q 96 Art 4, (citing Augustine): "[A] law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.” See 
also Cicero, Laws, trans CD Yonge, (London: George Bell & Sons, 1878) Book II, V: “[W]e cannot call 
that the true law of a people, of whatever kind it may be, if it enjoins what is injurious, let the people 
receive it as they will. For law is the just distinction between right and wrong, made conformable to that 
most ancient nature of all, the original and principal regulator of all things, by which the laws of men 
should be measured, whether they punish the guilty or protect and preserve the innocent.” 
122 Drury, supra note 122 at 534. 
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necessarily contingent.123 A proper telos is not contingent, but is antecedently fixed.124 
A human telos is supposed to serve as a moral agent.  Moral conduct might 
promote some seemingly worthwhile achievement, but all actions premised on eunomics, 
or “the success of the community”, are not necessarily moral.125 Fuller denies that there 
can be any use of practical reason to discern these values antecedently because the 
“morality of duty … is essentially a morality of the in-group.”126 Fuller admits that he 
presents an unresolved dilemma, because the moral code he describes is “essentially 
arbitrary”.127 Any choice that contradicts the antecedently fixed basic premises of natural 
law, fails within a teleological framework, and tends to confound the very idea of a 
natural law. 
6. Abandoning the Natural Law Causes a Confusion Over Rights  
As with Gödel’s statement that proving the consistency of classical number theory 
was dependent upon the use of abstract concepts, the abstract concepts of natural law 
provides direction for both the substance of the law and its procedure. The moral order of 
law is based on practical reason.  I will give a brief demonstration of how abandoning the 
natural law understanding of rights has resulted in confusion of the meaning and proper 
boundaries of rights.  
                                                
123 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy” supra note 27, section II at 477. 
124 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at II-II, Q 47, A 6. “[J]ust as, in the 
speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is understanding, and certain 
things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is science, so in the 
practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral 
virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters.” “[T]he ends of 
moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason.” 
125 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 182.  “Within a functioning community, held together 
by bonds of mutual interest, the task of drafting a moral code is not difficult. It is comparatively easy to 
discern in this situation certain rules of restraint and cooperation that are essential for satisfactory life 
within the community and for the success of the community as a whole.” 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. 
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“Inalienable” means that the right cannot be lost: it cannot be taken by a 
legislature, nor can a person give it away.128 To be clear, saying that a right is 
“inalienable” means that it is impossible to alienate the right, but not the object of that 
right.129 For example, a convict may lose his life because he has committed a capital 
offense, but he must be executed according to law.130  If the sheriff acts on his own 
authority, and exchanges the proscribed means of death for another, the sheriff has 
committed a homicide.  This is because the murderer must surrender his life, but not his 
right to life. 
The only complete and consistent theories of inalienable rights come from the 
natural law.131 It is obvious and tautological to assert that inalienable rights come from a 
system of law that exists prior to the positive law.132 If the positive law established rights, 
then they could hardly be inalienable because the positive law could be changed. “The 
natural inalienable right to life presupposes law that determines when the taking of life is 
lawless.”133  
 
 
 
                                                
128 Blackstone, supra note 27, at Bk I, p 54. Craig Stern & Gregory Jones, The Coherence Of Natural 
Inalienable Rights, (2007-2008) 76 UMKC L Rev 939 at 951.   
129 Ibid at 952.   
130 Blackstone, supra note 26,  Book IVat 178-9.   
131 Rommen, Hemnch Albert, The Natural Law: A Study in Legal and Social History and Philosophy, 
translated by Thomas R. Hanley, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998, 1946), at 216, FN 50, citing Thomas P 
Neill, Weapons for Peace, (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co, 1945), p 155: "It is from natural law, and 
from it alone, that man obtains those rights we refer to as inalienable and inviolable. Man's only right, in 
the last analysis, is the right to be a man, to live as a human person. Specific human rights, then, are all 
based on man's right to live a human life….Human rights can have no foundation other than natural law. 
Legally, of course, they come from the state, but if a legal 'right' is truly to be a right it must be based on 
natural law--which is only another way of saying that it must be based on man's very nature. And since they 
are based in human nature they are really inalienable and morally inviolable. Only the Creator of human 
nature can take them away, and God could do that without contradicting Himself only by changing human 
nature itself. Thus the soundest, the only foundation of those human rights so flagrantly violated today is 
natural law. The only foundation for a sound structure of government and of all social institutions is natural 
law.” 
132 Stern, supra note 129 at 955, 970-1.   
133 Ibid at 981. 
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6.a. Consistency in Natural Law Theories of Inalienable Rights 
The consistent theories of inalienable rights rely on the truth of a moral order that 
imposes natural limits on those rights.134 These can be seen in a number of ways. For 
example, inalienable rights can be viewed as coming from the shared nature of human 
beings.135  If human beings cannot alter these rights, then they are beyond human will.136 
Therefore, if we say that autonomy means limitless self-rule, then a theory of inalienable 
rights based on human nature would not allow autonomy over those rights. 
 Similarly, one can conceive of inalienable rights as being “endowed by their 
Creator” as it is claimed in the Declaration of Independence.137 As described by this 
theory, God is the grantor and only He can determine whether they may be alienated.138   
 Another theory posits that inalienable rights are derived from a natural duty that is 
imposed upon human beings: if the duty is absolute, then there must be an inalienable 
right to fulfill that duty.139 One example of this can be found in the freedom of worship:  
“It is inalienable also, because what is here a right towards men, is a duty towards 
the Creator. It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and 
such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.”140 
 
 It is easy to see the operation of reason in these various theories because they are 
consistent, and can be made consistent with one another. They also enjoy the benefit of 
describing their own natural and reasonable limit: “All of these presuppositions embrace 
commitments to some moral order that forbids the exercise of complete autonomy.”141 
 
 
                                                
134 Ibid at 971. 
135 Ibid at 957.  
136 Ibid at 958.  
137 The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (US 1776). 
138 Stern, supra note 129 at 960. 
139 Ibid at 964.  
140 James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments” (1785) in John J 
Patrick, ed, Founding the Republic: A Documentary History (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995) at 90. 
141 Stern, supra note 129, at 971.   
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6.b. Incomplete Positivist Theories of Inalienable Rights 
 In contrast to those consistent natural law theories are the positivist views of 
rights, which have “a broad commitment to personal autonomy that is contrary to the 
existence of such a law of nature.”142  Hobbes’ view of inalienable rights abandoned the 
classical natural law theory of justice, and instead focused on the power of politics.143 
Hobbes’ theory of rights is premised on the belief that a natural state of war exists 
between all men.144 In Hobbes’ view, the inalienable rights of human beings are not self-
limited, but rather everyone has a right to everything: 
“[E]very one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing that he can 
make use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his 
enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right to every 
thing; even to anothers body.”145 
 
In order to get “themselves out from that miserable condition of “Warre”,” the people 
must surrender their power to a government “to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare 
of punishment to the performance of their Covenants”.146 But this view is far from 
complete. It suggests total autonomy within each person, and a sovereign with powers 
that do not stop “much short of absolutism”.147   
 This war-based theory is left in a perpetual state of tension, between a government 
of absolute power and a citizen’s inalienable right to everything, that Hobbes could not 
                                                
142 Ibid at 956.  
143 Gary Glenn, “Inalienable Rights And Positive Government In The Modern World” (1979) 41 J Politics 
1057 at 1062-3.  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Cambridge University Press, 1904, 1651) Ch XIV at 
86.  [Hobbes, Leviathan] 
144 Hobbes, Leviathan, ibid at 87: “And because the condition of Man…is a condition of Warre of every 
one against every one…” 
145 Ibid. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
146 Ibid, Ch XVII at 115. 
147 Glenn, supra note 144, at 1066.  At 1072: “Despite immense effort, Hobbes never succeeded in fully 
overcoming this tension between natural rights and justice.  His doctrine moves from one horn of the 
dilemma to the other: from one intention to preserve individual rights against the attacks of other 
individuals, which necessitates a politically absolute sovereign, to the adamant insistence on the inalienable 
right of individuals not to give up the right to determine the means to their preservation, which makes 
absolutism impossible.” 
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resolve: the “government may justly order the citizen to certain death, but the citizen 
cannot be morally obliged to obey.”148 “But the price of … disobedience is 
acknowledging that the individual and government are in a state of war.”149 
 Certainly the classical theories of natural law were more noble minded and more 
consistent than what Hobbes proposed.  “Whereas the classics taught men the more noble 
morality that it is better to suffer injustice than to do injustice,” Hobbes theory of rights 
teaches that “when push comes to shove, it is better to be a tyrant than to be a slave.”150   
The “low morality” of Hobbes’ theory “is rooted in its appeal to the merely selfish which 
abolishes the grounds for nobility. Its morality consists in showing that selfishness rightly 
understood requires certain low but solid virtues.”151  And Hobbes did not even attempt to 
justify his theory of rights in law, but rather proposed that rights and law are inconsistent 
with one another.152 
 I have already shown that the United States was founded upon a theory of 
inalienable rights that are based upon the natural law.  But it is easy to see that the 
creeping presence of positivism has upset the proper understanding of the origin and 
limits of natural human rights. 
6.c. Fuller’s Substitution of Materialism for Natural Law 
 Fuller displays a positivist streak by replacing antecedently fixed telos with those 
more materially centered and arbitrary norms of freedom and eunomics.  I have just 
demonstrated that the positivistic notion of “freedom” is not a proper telos as it does not 
                                                
148 Ibid at 1067.   
149 Ibid at 1066.   
150 Ibid at 1075. 
151 Ibid at 1062 FN 8. 
152 Hobbes, supra note 144, at 86-7:  “For though they that speak of this subject, use to confound Jus, and 
Lex, Right and Law; yet they ought to be distinguished; because Right, consisteth in liberty to do, or to 
forbeare; Whereas Law, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that Law, and Right, differ as much, as 
Obligation, and Liberty; which in one and the same matter are inconsistent.” 
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permit a workable theory of conflicting rights. Yet Fuller defended positivist JS Mill’s 
statement on the preeminence of freedom over any government action that is not 
preventing harm to others.153 Fuller’s natural law theory assumes this bias toward the 
positivist fundamental premise of “freedom” axiomatically, rather than discovering goods 
through reasoned judgment.154  
 This is similar to Fuller’s derivation of his aforementioned “eunomics”.  Fuller 
justifies “arranging the forms of [Mankind’s] social life” according to eunomics on the 
premise that we are limited “by scarcity” and are “compelled to order the resources 
                                                
153 Mill stated that, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.  His own good, either physical or moral, 
is not a sufficient warrant.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Boston: Ticknor & Fields, 1863) at 23. 
     James Fitzjames Stephen refuted Mill on this point, offering the example of taxes which are used for a 
public museum, and which are not fundamentally different from using taxes to support a church. James 
Fitzjames Stephen, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, (New York: Holt & Williams, 1873) at 16.  
     Fuller came to Mill’s defense:  “Certainly [Mill] did not intend to assert that the government should 
never use funds raised through taxes – enforced, if necessary, by coercive measures—to provide facilities 
that will enable the citizen to improve himself.” Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 169. 
     Fuller was not channeling the deceased positivist philosopher, but rather claiming that Stephen had 
confused the issue by identifying law “with every conceivable government act.” Fuller, Morality of Law 
supra note 3, section I at 169. But this is another inconsistency in Fuller’s philosophy.  Stephen’s example 
gives: 1) An involuntary tax; 2) For the betterment of the citizens. Fuller says that, “law is the enterprise of 
subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.” Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 
106. It is hard to see how a coercive tax scheme escapes Fuller’s definition of law.  
     It is true that Stephen’s example does not compel a man to visit the museum, but neither would that case 
compel a man to appreciate what he sees. Fuller should have defined “law” differently if he did not intend 
to have such a broad interpretation. 
154 See Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 168. Stephen’s criticism of Mill seems to apply to 
Fuller’s conjecture as well: “I find no proof and no attempt to give the proper and appropriate proof of it.” 
Stephen, supra note 154 at 15.  “His doctrine could have been proved if it had been true. It was not proved 
because it was not true.”  Stephen’s thoughts on Mills over indulgence in freedom are shown by his 
introductory quote from Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound: “Sweet it is to pass all the length of life amid 
confident hopes, feeding the heart in glad festivities. But I shudder as I look on you, racked by infinite 
tortures. You have no fear of Zeus, Prometheus, but in self-will you reverence mortals too much.” 
Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, translated by Herbert Weir Smyth, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 1926) at 535-542. [Italics added for emphasis.] 
 It would be easy enough to refute Mill by providing the example of police officers finding a drunk or drug 
addict lying in the snow, and locking him up in rehab.  But instead, Fuller discusses Mill’s axiomatic 
statement in the context of, “The Problem of the Limits of Effective Legal Action”. Fuller, Morality of Law 
supra note 3, section I at 168. One could argue that Fuller meant only for Stephen’s refutation to serve as 
an example of over-reaching in the description of “legal action”. But Mill’s example is more likely being 
presented as a suitable premise; to argue otherwise would imply that Mill’s proposed limit of legal action 
appear in that section by happenstance. Fuller is killing two birds with one stone: promoting the premise of 
freedom, as he argues that the counterexample of “law” that goes beyond Mill’s arbitrary guideline is not 
“law”. 
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available … with skill and prudence.”155 Of course these types of considerations make 
sense generally, considered in those appropriate times, as policy in the process of 
practical judgment.  But eunomics makes no sense as a replacement of the telos of natural 
law. How can “scarcity” be considered before the subject matter has even been 
discerned?   
It becomes clear that when the positivists try to remove the natural law as the 
system of external norms, there is left a void that needs to be filled by some orderly 
system.  Fuller’s positivistic view has latched onto these ‘morality substitutes’: freedom 
and materialism.  Positivists seem to like “freedom” because it has a pleasant sound, and 
apparently everyone considers “freedom” to be outside of “morality”, and so this won’t 
be offensive to people who don’t believe in “absolutes”.  Likewise, Fuller’s materialist 
philosophy of “eunomics” is promoted as a suitable replacement for Aquinas’ natural law 
premises because it is entirely “terrestrial”,156 and avoids the danger of a substantive 
natural law leading to a legal system based on religious orthodoxy.157   But of course 
these substitutes fail because they do not withstand those pitfalls of arbitrariness, 
relativism and naturalist fallacy.   
7. Consistency In Natural Law 
 In this last section I will make a brief argument that the traditional concept of 
natural law is the best solution to the inherent vagueness of positive law. Complying with 
the natural law is the only way to ensure justice, and justice should always be the goal of 
                                                
155 Fuller, Morality of Law supra note 3, section I at 178.  
156 Ibid at 96. 
157 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 462-3. 
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the law.  It is axiomatic to assert this goal of justice, but to contradict it puts one in the 
awkward position of arguing that courts should not be just.158  
 Similar to Gödel’s methodology, I will use consistency as the determining factor.  
The main point is that the natural law provides consistency to positive law.  A corollary 
to this is that we should do what we purport to be doing; i.e. we should be consistent. The 
law aspires to consistency, and “it is built into the very nature of the way we think about 
the law.”159  The courts present that truth and justice are the ultimate goals of the law:160 
The purpose of the rules of evidence is to ascertain truth and secure justice.161 And legal 
holdings quite often formulate policy towards “the ends of justice”.162  
 The whole system of law is premised upon the natural law, and the foundational 
documents even make explicit reference to the natural law, so I find it very interesting 
that I should need to defend either the validity or the existence of natural law.  This is 
further evidence that the people of our age believe “that no appeal to man’s nature, or to 
the nature of things, can ever be more than a cover for subjective preference…”163 But if I 
am making an appeal to positivists, they should at least allow proper procedure to be 
granted: Because the natural law shaped the history and provided the foundation of our 
legal system, this should, at least, establish the presumption for natural law to exist, and 
shift the burden onto positivists to disprove this fact.   
                                                
158 Or a variation on this theme would be to say that ‘justice’, and its cousin ‘truth’, do not exist.  The 
person who says this admits to nominalism.  But even if one can bear that shame, one must admit further 
that the legal system purports to deal in justice and truth. 
159 Rogers and Molzon supra note 88, section III at 1000. At 1016: “[T]he very word “law” implies a 
requirement of consistency.” 
160 Maine, supra note 28 at 72. See Wexler, supra note 28 at 86, (citing Aristotle’s Rhetoric) “For that 
which is equitable seems to be just, and equity is justice that goes beyond the written law.” 
161 US Fed R Evid 102: “Purpose: These rules should be construed so as to administer every proceeding 
fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end 
of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.” [Italics added for emphasis.] 
162  See for example, Malloy v Hogan, 378 US 1(1964) at 29. 
163 Fuller, Morality Law, supra note 3, section I at 101. 
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 Another related, though perhaps more esoteric point, is that my argument might 
appear to be tautologous.  I am arguing in support of natural law by showing how it is 
consistent with the procedures and policies of the common law, which were crafted by 
people who believed that natural law existed.  Skeptics might allow this history, but 
persist in their belief that this doesn’t prove anything beyond the ardent desires of our 
forebears.  I would answer that: this skeptical case would lead to the conclusion that the 
law is nothing more than an elaborate pretence; and that nothing can convince a solipsist 
of anything.164  
7.a. Natural Law is not Relativist; Truth and Justice are Consistent 
 Perhaps the most obvious statement that can be made is that a relativist legal 
system is not consistent.  This is self-evident. Looking back to the argument concerning 
morality, M-2 is the relativist morality, which I said was not suitable for natural law 
because it is inconsistent.  Note that this is not a circular argument: I am using a standard 
of consistency.  Natural law is not relativist because natural law is consistent. 165 If the 
natural law is used to cure the vagueness of language inherent in the positive law, how 
could a relativist version of natural law provide a solution?  By its own terms, the 
relativist version of natural law would provide one solution on a given occasion, and 
another solution at a different time.  How would that external morality be useful? 
                                                
164 See Russell, “Vagueness” supra note 68, section II at 92: “If you are willing to believe that nothing 
exists except what you directly experience, no other person can prove that you are wrong, and probably no 
valid arguments exist against your view.” 
165 George W. Constable, “Who Can Determine What The Natural Law Is?” (1962) 7 Nat LF 54 at 59: “All 
understand that traditionally natural law, as the antithesis of ethical relativism, claims to lay down certain 
general rules of conduct that supposedly apply to all men, at all times, in all places.”  This statement is 
slightly erroneous because it gives the mistaken impression that natural law is a “code of rules”, which is 
not the case because the natural law is unwritten.  See Crabb, “Airing A Couple Of Myths About Natural 
Law” (1963-1964) 39 Notre Dame L Rev 137 at 144.  
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 In a similar sense, the concepts of truth and justice are founded on consistency.  
For example, US Federal Rules of Evidence permit a witness’ prior out-of-court 
statements, to show either that the witness’ current testimony is inconsistent, or to rebut 
charges of the former.166 The obvious reason for this is the basic logical premise of non-
contradiction: true statements do not contradict one another. A witness who contradicts 
himself has uttered a falsehood at some juncture.  
Similarly, the law on perjury shows that the positive law presents reality as being 
objectively true, and provably so.167 If all truth were relative, then how could the law say 
that a person knew the truth and testified to its opposite?  The accused could always offer 
a defense that he understood the truth differently. Moreover, the objectivity of truth is not 
limited to the court’s pronouncement on what is true, because if that were the case, a 
person could never perjure himself until after the court had ruled on the truth of a 
statement; i.e. a person would only be guilty of perjury retroactively. 
 We also conceive of justice as being consistent.168 The historical practice of stare 
decisis, or following precedent, is premised on the idea that consistent judgments are just, 
or at least have a greater certainty of justice.169 This idea of consistency in legal holdings 
                                                
166 US Fed R Evid 801 d(1).   
167 California Penal Code § 118.  (a) Every person who … willfully and contrary to the oath, states as true 
any material matter which he or she knows to be false … is guilty of perjury. 
168 See Lon Fuller, Legal Fictions, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967) at 128: “All theories of law 
have this in common, that they attribute “law” to one source … and thus introduce a unity into our 
conception of law.  But even when one does not does not subscribe to any particular theory of the “nature 
of law”, one is apt, consciously or unconsciously, to embrace what Ehrlich calls the “fiction of the unity of 
the law.””  Manderson, supra note 1, section I at 249, note 25, says that “Fuller finds the idea, even as 
fiction, a useful means of describing reality.” 
169 Christopher Peters, “Foolish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis”(1996) 
105 Yale LJ 2031, 2037. “[S]tare decisis is justified because, and only to the extent that, it serves the 
interests of justice in a general sense. Consequentialist theories acknowledge that stare decisis must 
always be tested for how well it serves the ultimate end of justice to determine whether it has value in 
any given case.” [Italics added for emphasis] I do not wish to debate the particulars of this point, but only 
offer it to show that the law presents itself as being consistent. 
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is very similar to the correspondence theory of truth, which “has it that a proposition is 
true when it corresponds to the facts; the relation here is between propositions and the 
way things are in the world.”170    
7.b. Legal Procedure to Ensure Consistency 
Of Fuller’s eight procedural properties of law, three of them speak about some 
form of consistency:171 “the duties imposed by the rules must not conflict”; “laws should 
not be changed too frequently”; and, “there must be a congruence between the rules as 
formulated and their implementation”.  I have already shown how conflicts in law are 
resolved by the logical principle of non-contradiction, which is inherent in legal thinking. 
The inner morality of law “demands that laws should not be changed too 
frequently”, but this principle is probably the least suited to formalization.172 Fuller says 
that “there is a close affinity between the harms” resulting from laws that are changed too 
frequently and ex post facto laws; although the latter are probably more universally 
recognized as being unjust.173  James Madison, in his defense of the Constitutional 
prohibition of ex post facto laws, “used language more apt for describing the evil of 
frequent change.”174  
                                                                                                                                            
 See also Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, “Monkeys reject unequal pay” (2003) 425 Nature 297: 
“Although there exists substantial cultural variation in its particulars, this ‘sense of fairness’ is probably a 
human universal ….  Many highly cooperative nonhuman species seem guided by a set of expectations 
about the outcome of cooperation and the division of resources. Here we demonstrate that a nonhuman 
primate, the brown capuchin monkey…, responds negatively to unequal reward distribution in exchanges 
with a human experimenter.”  
170 Grayling, supra note 31, section IIIa at 126.  
171 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 63-4, 79-91. 
172 Ibid at 79. 
173 Ibid at 80. 
174 Ibid citing The Federalist, No 44.  
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 Consistency between official action and the declared rule follows as a corollary of 
the law’s consistency, so it is understandable that there are a variety of procedural 
devices to ensure this consistency: 
“We may count here most of the elements of “procedural due process,” such as 
the right to representation by counsel and the right of cross-examining adverse 
witnesses.  We may also include ... habeas corpus, and the right to appeal an 
adverse decision to a higher tribunal. Even the question of “standing” to raise 
constitutional issues is relevant in this connection; haphazard and fluctuating 
principles concerning this matter can produce a broken and arbitrary pattern of 
correspondence between the Constitution and its realization in practice.”175 
 
Certainly Fuller does not object to upholding the pre-eminence of the Constitution 
and its power to declare void any acts that are contradictory, or repugnant, to its articles 
and amendments.  But as I explained above, this is only a formalized understanding of 
the operation of natural law. In this respect, the natural law functions as a process rather 
than a substantive code, and the importance of the philosophy behind the natural law is 
revealed.  Although it is unwritten, “a true application of natural law principles”, on 
occasion, will “result in a destruction of the positive law.”176 Fuller says that his view of 
natural law is procedural, but one is left to wonder whether Fuller’s natural law system 
would “destroy” any rule in a like manner.  This difference lies in Fuller’s omission of 
the Thomistic derivation of the fundamental principles, and the process by which the 
natural human telos can help “discern the acts which are really useful to our species and 
which fall within the order of the ends, from irrational deviations…”177 
 
                                                
175 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 81. 
176 Crabb, supra note 166 at 148.   
177 Villey, Michel, “Epitome Of Classical Natural Law” Translated by Guillaume Voilley (2000) 9 Griffith 
L Rev 74 at 95. “It belongs to us to discern the acts which are really useful to our species and which fall 
within the order of the ends, from irrational deviations, the pursuit of illusory goals, lost acts, doomed 
impasses. This is how we frame our moral science: for, acts without final causes, acts which we cannot 
make reasonable by relating them to ultimate ends, are faults for us, whereas there is virtue in following the 
reasonable order of which nature spontaneously offers us examples.”   
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7.c. Substantive Natural Law and Purpose  
 The philosophy underlying the law is an essential ingredient towards meeting the 
goals of the legal system.178 Our legal philosophy helps us discover the substantive aims 
of law: the external morality of law that is not captured by the positive law, and which 
give the law its purpose.179 I have already demonstrated the goal of consistency in law.  It 
stands to reason that the most consistent philosophy would be most effective in 
engendering those same qualities to the law. I submit that most consistent philosophy is 
Aquinas’ Philosophy Summa Theologica: “No other construct of natural law approaches 
the scholastics in terms of age, tradition, discipline, consistency, or sheer quantity of 
adherents.”180  
The consistency of natural law comes from its source and subject matter.  Using 
“man’s innate rationality” as the source of natural law adds to the law’s consistency 
because it is an objective measure of the positive law’s validity.181 The subject matter of 
the natural law is man’s nature, and this adds to the law’s consistency inasmuch as man 
himself is immutable.182 
                                                
178 “Everyone has a "god," an ultimate whose word is final. This entity declares various "truths", which 
become the foundation, the premises, of one's legal philosophy. Hence, all legal systems have a common 
structure. At the apex are the assumptions and basic values, which are, as it were, accepted on faith. From 
these are derived moral norms -and ethical principles, and the law reflects this morality. For all law 
involves the imposition of someone's morality upon others. This, I submit, is how it works in every legal 
system and why it is absolutely crucial that the presuppositions of a legal order be identified.” Edward J 
Murphy, “The Sign of the Cross and Jurisprudence” (1993-1994) 69 Notre Dame L Rev 1285 at 1289. 
179 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 96-7. 
180 Crabb, supra note 166 at 141.  
181 Ibid: “At this stage, the explanation will also offer the basic linkage conferring a unity on all the natural 
law concepts as opposed to positivism. This unity derives from the metaphysical element which they 
ascribe to the essential nature of law. This element is something outside of man's control or creation, 
inhering in his nature, which functions both as a generator of the system of positive law and as a measure of 
its validity. On such a premise, it is immaterial where this element itself derives. If, for example, natural 
law is to be explained as a function of man's innate rationality, it matters not whether one chooses to 
ascribe this rationality to the deliberate design of a divine creator, or to some kind of a mindless operation 
of the chemistry of the body, or to any other extra-human cause.”  
182 Ibid at 145. 
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Fuller’s limited view of natural law as mere procedure renders it inconsistent. If 
the meaning of the rule is bound up in its purpose, how can the purpose of the rule be 
discerned from a procedural view of natural law?183 Ultimately, those substantive aims 
that are imparted to the law from its underlying philosophy are either based in man’s 
immutable nature; or they are theories that can be altered to suit present circumstances, as 
long as internal procedures are followed.184 But it is only the former view that is 
consistent with what the law purports to be.     
  The rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution are also perceived to be 
unchangeable, and citizens are encouraged to believe this by the document and the 
history of its interpretation.185 But as I have already shown: a right that is given by the 
positive law can also be taken by the same means. It is only a substantive natural law that 
will withstand any intrusion.  
8. Conclusion 
 I have shown that the classical natural law theory is analogous to Gödel’s 
philosophical view because both law and natural numbers depend upon abstract concepts 
to prove their own consistency. Fuller showed that positive law vagueness necessitates an 
external morality in order for judges to make decisions about the meanings of laws.  But 
Fuller’s natural law theory does not account for how this external morality was 
discovered, and doesn’t even acknowledge a higher order.   
                                                
183 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 470. “[T]he meaning of a legal rule 
lies in a purpose, or more commonly, in a congeries of purposes.” 
184 Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 3, section I at 114-5.  
185 See, e.g. US Constitution, 9th Amendment: “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” See Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 
137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803): "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws 
furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right". 
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 Fuller’s natural law is also quite different from Gödel’s philosophy because 
Fuller’s morality is relativist, whereas those analogous terms in Gödel’s are immutable.  
On this point the classical natural law view comports more closely with Gödel.   
 Without proving that the psychological view was untrue, Gödel reasoned that this 
understanding of mathematical knowledge is meaningless.  In a similar way, Fuller’s 
instrumentalist understanding of natural law rendered it meaningless as a means of 
critique.  Once again, the classical natural law view conforms with Gödel’s 
understanding, and I showed how practical reason could objectively determine whether a 
law was iniquitous.   
Different theories of natural law suffer from a number of logical flaws, including 
the naturalist fallacy, relativism or arbitrariness.  Aquinas’ theory of natural law avoids 
these problems, but Fuller’s theory does not.  
 Finally, I talked about how consistency is a basic premise of Gödel’s formal logic 
systems and also in the law. I showed the many ways that the law presents itself as being 
consistent, and I proposed that the law should do what it purports to do.  I then showed 
that the natural law was necessary to provide this consistency. 
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"Till at last the child's mind is these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions is the 
child's mind. And not the child's mind only. The adult's mind too--all his life long. The 
mind that judges and desires and decides--made up of these suggestions. But all these 
suggestions are our suggestions!… Suggestions from the State."   
          --Aldous Huxley, Brave New World1 
 
If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face -- for 
ever.        --George Orwell, 19842 
 
Chapter V:  Conclusion 
 My main conclusions are that Gödel’s Theorem, (by its own terms), is not 
applicable to the legal system, but that the Incompleteness Theorem and Fuller’s 
natural law theory both showed that positivism was not a useful philosophy.  Fuller’s 
natural law showed that the positive law is not separable from morals. I gave 
examples of how positivism distorts the understanding of law, and also how it 
eliminates the necessary structure and restraint provided by substantive natural law. 
1. Gödel as Analogy 
Writing this paper has given me a clearer understanding of the meaning of 
positivism and the natural law, and has reshaped my own philosophical view. 
Initially, I approached this topic from the positivist angle.  My thoughts were that 
lawyers could create some sort of metalanguage, like that of a formal system, and that 
this symbolic language could be incorporated into legal procedure. I imagined that all 
of law could be fixed by eliminating the errors of language.  
While there may be some usefulness to mapping ratio decidendi in formal 
language, Fuller’s writings convinced me that systems of judgment are dependent 
upon moral values to assess the law. Judges must always know the moral purpose of a 
                                                
1 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, (New York: Haper Collins, 1932, 2010) at 33. 
2 Orwell, George, 1984, (New York: Penguin, 1961, 1949) at 267. 
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rule.  A case is only easy for a judge to decide when the moral purpose of the law is 
obvious.3 The opposite conclusion, that the law has no need for morals, is an illusion.  
I began my work on this thesis with the assumption that Gödel was applicable 
to legal systems, but the wide variety of differing legal opinions on the subject made 
it difficult to reach any conclusions.  It was only after I read a short essay by Franzén, 
that I realized why so many lawyers had such radically different conclusions: because 
“the theorem doesn’t really apply in these contexts.”4 As I have shown, Gödel’s work 
is useful as an analogy, but this requires an understanding of the philosophy that 
underlies the Theorem.  Saying that ‘truth is greater than proof’ implies that 
positivism cannot make a complete account for what we know or how we reason.   
This limit of a system’s ability to prove truth can be seen in analogy to law by 
the philosophical example of substance and accidents. The goal of law is the 
substance of justice. Positive laws can be seen as mere accidents of justice.  
I showed that there is a source of decision-making that is eternally located outside the 
system. while those involving natural numbers are incomplete and cannot prove their 
                                                
3 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20, section II at 663. “If a statute seems to have a 
kind of "core meaning" that we can apply without a too precise inquiry into its exact purpose, this is 
because we can see that, however one might formulate the precise objective of the statute, this case 
would still come within it.” 
4 “Many nonmathematicians at once find [Gödel’s incompleteness theorem] fascinating and are ready 
to apply what they take to be the incompleteness theorem in many different contexts. The task of the 
expositor becomes, rather, to dampen their spirits by explaining that the theorem doesn’t really apply 
in these contexts. But as experience shows, even the most determined wet blanket cannot prevent 
people from appealing to the incompleteness theorem in contexts where its relevance is at best a matter 
of analogy or metaphor.” Torkel Franzén, “The Popular Impact of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem” 
(2006) 53 Notices of the American Math Society 440. [Franzén , “Popular Impact”] 
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own consistency.5  This gets at the very nature and purpose of counting as opposed to 
that of measuring; i.e. numerosity as it differs from ratio:   
“For "measure" refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, 
"number" refers to the species…whereby it is distinguished; For a thing…is 
distinct by its form…”6 
 
So in order to count things, it is necessary to discern their form, and to make a 
determination as to which species they are a part. Anytime I say: "There are X 
number of Ys", I am making a judgment as to what a Y is; I am defining a set. For 
example, let’s imagine there are three ladies in a room.  One of them is pregnant. 
 How many people are in the room?  The trouble in answering this question stems 
from the vagueness of the word “people”. 
This of course resonated very strongly with Fuller’s criticism of positivism, 
and my thesis began to take shape.   
2. Natural Law & Positivism 
 Looking deeply into the Hart/Fuller debate, I began to see positivism’s 
harmful influence on the law, and how it affected my own thinking. I was quite 
startled to find that even Fuller’s philosophy had been distorted by positivism, most 
notably in his refusal to include any substantive portion to his theory of natural law.  
If Fuller is correct that morality is inseparable from law, then the question 
becomes: what morals are going to be imposed?  To my mind, it seems most 
appropriate and fair that the morality of law should be determined from practical 
                                                
5 Franzén, Gödel’s Theorem, supra note 12, section I at 25, 127.   
6 Aquinas, Summa, supra note 95, section II at I, Q 45 A 7. 
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reason, but the positivists have eliminated the natural law theory from legal 
reasoning.  I believe that this has had disastrous effects.   
I would like to spend the remainder of this conclusion pointing out some of 
the harmful effects that positivism has had upon the law, most notably: a default 
morality that is contemptuous towards traditional morality; the state has become the 
source of morality; and a society that is spiraling down into slavery and war.  
3. Default Morality 
I have written that it is the ‘proto-formalist’ nature of positivism to deny the 
morality of law outside of the formal content.7 This formalism tends to operate 
against traditional notions of morality.  The attempt to separate “organized religions” 
from law results in a ‘default morality’ that is not based in practical reason, and which 
renders the system agnostic or atheistic.   
Fuller said that the positivists were motivated to keep law separate from 
morality because they believed that a purposeful interpretation of law would lead to 
an oppressive religious regime.8 Positivists felt that identifying the law with force 
would preserve its neutrality.9  Fuller himself feared this “all embracing orthodoxy”, 
and I think it is this fear of being perceived as a moral dogmatist that kept Fuller from 
providing a more rational model of natural law.10  
The most obvious application of separating “morality” from law is the 
familiar slogan of “separation of church and state”, but upon close examination, this 
                                                
7 See Tamanaha, supra note 10, section IV, at 477, 485. 
8 Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” supra note 20, section II at 670-1. 
9 Fuller, “American Legal Philosophy”, supra note 27, section II at 462-3. 
10 Ibid.  
 119 
idea is also philosophically incomplete. Within the positivist framework, it is very 
easy to recognize a formally professed belief, while the opposite passes without 
notice. Traditional morality has been encoded into religious books and preached for 
centuries, and so it stands out: traditional morality is cited by “chapter and verse”.  
But what about messages that stand in opposition to traditional morality?  Those 
messages are not from organized religions, and so they are not recognized as 
“morality”. Thus, there is no legal framework within “separating church and state” 
wherein one can object to ideas that work in opposition to traditional morals.  Under 
this paradigm, the law has seemingly nothing to say about them.  And yet, a person 
with a firm conviction that there is no God can be just as zealous and dogmatic as one 
who professes the belief of an organized religion.   
The philosophical framework separating church and state is incomplete. It is 
an illusion to use the law to prevent people from invoking God in public and claim 
that it is a separation of morals from the law.  What has really happened is that there 
is a new moral value, which is that “God is not to be invoked”. It is not the separation 
of church and state, but only the separation of God and state.  The “church” that is 
allowed to proliferate in this positivist system is the church of atheism.  Any morality 
may be preached as long as it is not recognized as “morality”. But the result is the 
default morality: It is not the product of practical reason, but either chance, or subtle 
subversion.  
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4. Popular Morality    
Without natural law, the state has become the source of morality.  Even 
though modern states may not rely on the traditional natural law as a means of 
objective reckoning, there is nothing preventing lawmakers from pretending that they 
are working towards common ends, which are beneficial to all.11 But removing the 
traditional notion that proper ends can be decided through practical reason has also 
eliminated restraint on the law, and replaced objective reason with the arbitrary 
whims of the state. The rationally derived principles of Aquinas placed the 
preservation of human life as its highest precept12, but the modern state distorts this 
view: using men as a means of achieving what the state pretends to be “the good of 
all”, rather than regarding each person as an “end-in-himself”.13  
We can examine the philosophical bankruptcy of this positivist attempt to 
separate church and state through the lens of the Lemon Test, where the court said 
that government action must have a “secular legislative purpose”14; or the similar 
pronouncement in Employment Division v Smith, which upheld “neutral laws of 
general applicability”.15 In Smith the court upheld a state decision to deny 
                                                
11 See Fuller Forms and Limits, note 44, section IV at 361-2: “In an organization dominated by the 
principle of common ends, nothing is easier than to slip into the assumption that the other fellow wants 
what we want, or that he will want the same thing when his perception has developed to the level of 
our own.” 
12 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, supra note 100, section IIIa at I-II, Q 94 A 2 
13 See Fuller Forms and limits at 362. 
14 Lemon v Kurtzman, [1971] 403 US 602, 91 S Ct 2105, 29 L Ed 2d 745, [Lemon] established the 
“Lemon Test” for determining whether a government action had violated the 1st Amendment protection 
against Congressional action respecting an establishment: 1. That government action must have a 
secular purpose; 2. That government action must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion; 3. That the government action must not result in excessive government entanglement.   
15 Employment Division v Smith, [1990] 494 US 872, 110 S Ct 1595, 108 L Ed 2d 876.  [Employment 
Division] 
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unemployment benefits to a drug counselor who had been fired for eating peyote, as 
part of a Native American religious ceremony.  But the court of City Of Hialeah, 
using the same test, struck down a law that forbid the Santaria practice of sacrificing 
animals.16 Why is sacrificing an animal worthy of religious protection while ingesting 
peyote is not?17 A positivist can dance all day with that question, but he will never be 
able to extract a rule free of moral presumption.   
Positivists would have us believe that we can only reason as far as that which 
can be empirically proven, but Fuller showed that there is always going to be morality 
infused into the law. The framework of legal logic proves this out: “Though law is 
logical and rational in form, in substance it is evaluative, the result of intentional 
value choices.”18 Judgment, as value choices, is incorporated into every aspect of the 
law, from the choice of individual words, like “marriage”, on up to the selection of 
the docket for the Supreme Court.  
We may claim to have a separation of church and state, but those morals that 
are chosen by the state are, de facto, the morals of the state religion.19 Speech is 
limited when it encroaches upon those things held holy by the state. The authority of 
                                                
16 Church Of Lukumi Babalu Aye v City Of Hialeah, [1993] 508 US 520, 113 S Ct 2217, 124 L Ed 2d 
472.  [Hialeah] 
17 “[I]f we peruse the most recent 1,000 cases on free exercise of religion under the first 
amendment, for example, I would not be surprised if at the very least 999 of them are Godelian 
undecidables.” D’Amato, “Pragmatic Indeterminacy”, supra note 70, section III at 173, FN 80. 
18 Wilson, supra note 50, section IV at 834.  [Italicized for emphasis.] 
19 It is reasonable to believe that these societal revisions are not happening by chance, but are part of a 
purposeful subversion of the traditional order. For the past 150 years, there has been a Marxist revision 
of the Western intellectual tradition. Townshend, supra note 12, section IIIa at 64-5  In keeping with 
the positivist replacement of abstract concepts with materialist philosophy, the Marxist critique is an 
organized effort to supplant existing institutions, that promote the idea of life after death, with a more 
worldly and nihilist philosophy. Randall Kelso, “Godel, Escher, Bach: More Darkness, Or Day For 
Night”, Book Review of Gödel, Escher, Bach by Douglas E. Hofstadter, (1981) 1981 Wis L Rev 822. 
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the state does not come down from God, but rather from those in power. And the state 
religion makes their secrets holy. This is the religion of positivism. 
5. Sliding Into Nothingness 
 The harm of the materialistic religion of positivism does not have to be 
imagined, and its effects can be witnessed everywhere. St Augustine’s book, City of 
God, showed how a society that rejected the natural law would spiral down into 
slavery and war.20 Augustine was writing about the fall of Rome, but a similar spiral 
can be seen in our own present society. Mankind was not meant to rule over rational 
creatures, and so it is through the loss of reason that our society is falling into 
decline.21 
The past decade has seen a rapid decline of freedom in the United States, and 
the country has entered into a state of virtually constant war.  Beginning with the so-
called “PATRIOT Act”, there has been a steady encroachment upon civil liberties.22  
The PATRIOT Act authorizes searches without any showing of probable cause and is 
an illegal intrusion upon the right to be secure in our persons.23 More recently, the 
Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act, (NDAA), which authorizes 
the army to arrest and indefinitely detain any citizen, without a right to trial.24  
                                                
20 Augustine, City of God, Trans Marcus Dods, in A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers of the Christian Church, Ed Philip Schaff, First Series, vol 2: St. Augustine's City of God and 
Christian Doctrine, (New York: Christian Literature Company, 1890-1900), [Augustine, City of God]. 
21 Augustine, City of God,  Bk 19, Ch 15. 
22 “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”, [2001] 115 Stat 272.  
23 Ibid at § 215.   
24 See “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012”; HR 1540, (2012); § 1021, 1022.   
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A decision issued in January 2013 from a federal district court upheld the 
federal government’s refusal to offer any justification for their extrajudicial killing of 
a US Citizen by a targeted drone strike.25 The “Justice” Department refused to release 
documents that might explain why the government should be allowed to kill US 
citizens, apart from any battlefield, and without any right to trial.  Judge Colleen 
McMahon upheld this refusal, and compared the recently grown thicket of conflicting 
legislation to a “Catch-22”: 
“I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a 
problem because of contradictory constraints and rules – a veritable Catch-22.  
I can find no way around the ticket of laws and precedents that effectively 
allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly 
lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our 
Constitution and laws…”26 
 
 It might help Justice McMahon to understand what a “Catch-22” actually is.  
The term comes from a book by Joseph Heller, and refers to a labyrinthine military 
code that prevented a pilot from avoiding further combat missions.27 The hero of the 
book, Yossarian, goes to Doc Daneeka and pleads with the doctor to ground him for a 
psychiatric illness.  Daneeka admits that there is a rule, which says that he has to 
‘ground’ anyone who is crazy, but he can’t rely upon a crazy person’s assessment of 
their own craziness. If a pilot asks for an assessment, then Daneeka can’t ground him:  
  “‘You mean there’s a catch?’ 
‘Sure there’s a catch,’ Doc Daneeka replied. ‘Catch-22. Anyone who 
wants to get out of combat duty isn’t really crazy.’ 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that 
a concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and 
                                                
25 New York Times Co et al v US Dept Just, [2013] 11 Civ 9336, FDSNY.  [New York Times] 
26 Ibid at page 3.   
27 Joseph Heller, Catch-22 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961, 2011). 
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immediate was the process of a rational mind… All he had to do was ask; and 
as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more 
missions… If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t 
want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the 
absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle. 
‘That’s some catch, that Catch-22,’ he observed.”28  
 
 A Catch-22 is an inescapable paradox, but in the case regarding the NDAA 
there is no countervailing principle preventing Judge McMahon from following the 
Constitution.  McMahon even acknowledges the NDAA to be “incompatible with our 
Constitution...”29 The United States has a hierarchy of laws, and laws that conflict 
with the Constitution are not laws. Judge McMahon lacks a basic understanding of 
logic and of Constitutional law.  Her mind is under the fog of positivism. 30  
Illegal spying and the targeted killing of US citizens is bound to increase now 
that the US Congress has voted to put 30,000 drones over the United States.31 Not 
only does the United States make war upon its own citizens, but upon the world. 
Since 2001, the United States has attacked Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and 
Syria.32 All of these wars are illegal, and made under false pretenses.33 The 
                                                
28 Ibid at 56-57.   
29 [New York Times] at 3. 
30 This opinion has recently been reversed on appeal. See New York Times Co v US, [2014] 13-422, 2d 
Cir.  The appellate court cited a DOJ white paper, (the name and number of which was redacted), and 
claimed that this document “explains why targeted killings do not violate … the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments to the Constitution…” The appellate decision itself is redacted, including part 3 of its 
conclusion. The DOJ white paper must be disclosed, but redacted to show only its legal reasoning. 
31 H.R. 658 (112th): FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.  See Washington Times, February 
7, 2012: “Drones over U.S. get OK by Congress”. 
32 The United States continues to make drone strikes upon Pakistan without any declaration of war. See 
e.g. NY Times March 22, 2013: “Four people have been killed in northwestern Pakistan in an 
American drone attack on a vehicle…”  
It is also known that the US Central Intelligence Agency is aiding rebels in Syria; See NY 
Times June 21, 2012: “A small number of C.I.A. officers are operating secretly in southern Turkey, 
helping allies decide which Syrian opposition fighters across the border will receive arms to fight the 
Syrian government…” The Wall Street Journal (March 23, 2012) has also reported that the CIA is 
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government no longer follows the Constitutional dictate that Congress shall have the 
power to declare war.34 Instead, the President exercises this authority upon his own 
judgment.35 
We still have elections, but we are given the false choice between the chosen 
parties of the state, promoted by the six corporations that control 90% of the media.36 
Elections are a choice between Brave New World and 1984, voting on machines that 
are easily rigged, and don’t even create paper ballots that can be recounted.37  
                                                                                                                                      
helping the Syrian rebels with military intelligence.  The US has threatened to begin bombing Syria 
because that country’s leadership supposedly used poison gas on its own citizens. That threat comes 
before any conclusive findings by UN inspectors, and despite a prior the statements by a UN 
commission leader that the Syrian rebels, had used Sarin nerve gas.  BBC News (6 May 2013) 
33 “[A] senior general relayed some disturbing news: “We’re going to attack Iraq…” 
“But why?” I asked…. “Did they discover a linkage [to 9/11]?” 
“No, nothing like that…” … 
When I returned to the Pentagon six weeks later,… I asked the same general if there was still a plan to 
go after Iraq. 
“Oh, it’s worse than that,” he said, and held up a memo on his desk. “Here’s the paper from the office 
of the Secretary of Defense outlining the strategy. We’re going to take out seven countries in five 
years!” And he named them, starting with Iraq and Syria and ending with Iran.  It was straight out of 
Paul Wolfowitz’s 1991 playbook, dressed up as the search for weapons of mass destruction and the 
global war on terror.”  Wesley Clark, A Time to Lead (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007) 
As a signatory to the UN Charter, the United States is forbidden to use military force unless it 
is in self-defense, (Article 51); or it is authorized by the UN Security Council (Article 42). Afghanistan 
did not attack the United States and UN Resolutions 1368 and 1373 did not authorize the use of 
military force. The United States invaded Iraq under the false claim that Iraq had “weapons of mass 
destruction”; and neither would mere possession of such weapons permit the use of military force. In 
2011, the United States bombed Libya without any provocation, and without any declaration of war. 
This is a violation of the “War Powers Resolution”, 50 USC, Chapter 1541.   
34 United States Constitution, Article I, Sec 8.  
35 “It's long been established that Obama failed to secure a congressional declaration of war, as the 
constitution and Senator Obama's understanding of it dictated…” See: “How Obama Ignored 
Congress, and Misled America, on War in Libya” The Atlantic, September 13, 2012,  
36 “These 6 Corporations Control 90% Of The Media In America”, Business Insider, June 14, 2012. 
37 “[T]housands of votes instantly disappearing from the electronic count of one candidate, or being 
added to the count of another, with no paper trail left behind…electronic voting machines whose 
programs can be breached and hacked … from thousands of miles away… new voting technology 
controlled largely by corporations with strong partisan ties? Not only can it all happen … there is a 
viable case to be made that it's already happened -- in both the decade before and the decade since 
Bush v. Gore.” From: “Think the Florida Recount Was Bad? Just Wait Until November 6”, The 
Atlantic, October 22, 2012.   See also "How To Rig An Election", Harper’s, November 2012.   
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The voting public gets its information from a media that now legally 
disseminates government propaganda.38 This means that the public consciousness is 
shaped by what the average citizen believes to be real news events, but these “news 
events” can be fables that were crafted for the purposes of mobilizing public support 
for legislation or war.39 The federal government could foment public support against 
private gun ownership by inventing the drama of a mass shooting of school children.40  
Or the government could gather public support for a more intrusive security state by 
creating videos of a “terrorist bomb attack”.41 And this would all be entirely “legal”. 
                                                                                                                                      
Brave New World, supra, note 1, foretold a of dystopian future where people are literally 
created by the State, in test-tubes, and genetically modified to perform specific tasks. The children in 
that book are conditioned to desire the job and social life that the government has chosen for them. 
1984, supra note 2, tells about a dark future where the government uses propaganda, lies and torture to 
maintain its power over the population. The people are spied on by the State though their televisions.  
The State has created a language, Newspeak, that is designed to limit a person’s ability to think.  
People daily participate in the “Two Minute Hate”, where the television screen shows the face of a 
famous terrorist, and everyone is encouraged to express loathing for him. 
38 The 2013 NDAA (HR 4310, 112th ) included Amendment 114 (Thornberry, TX), which amended the 
“United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (known as the Smith-Mundt Act) 
and the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987 to clarify the authorities of 
the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors to prepare, disseminate and use 
public diplomacy information”. [Italicized for emphasis]  Amendment 114 was previously known as 
HR 5736 (112th).  The Smith-Mundt Act prevented the United States government from disseminating 
propaganda to US citizens.  
39 See Orwell, 1984, supra note 2, at 34: “At this moment, for example, in 1984 (if it was 1984), 
Oceania was at war with Eurasia and in alliance with Eastasia. In no public or private utterance was it 
ever admitted that the three powers had at any time been grouped along different lines. Actually, as 
Winston well knew, it was only four years since Oceania had been at war with Eastasia and in alliance 
with Eurasia. But that was merely a piece of furtive knowledge which he happened to possess because 
his memory was not satisfactorily under control. Officially the change of partners had never happened. 
Oceania was at war with Eurasia: therefore Oceania had always been at war with Eurasia. The enemy 
of the moment always represented absolute evil, and it followed that any past or future agreement with 
him was impossible…” 
40 cf Fuller, Forms and Limits, note 44, section IV, at 362: “It is true that, like Tom Sawyer when he 
got himself out of a fence-painting job, we may persuade the other fellow he wants something that he 
really does not, or like the modern advertiser we may elevate this persuasion to the level of a skillful 
manipulation of mass opinion.” [Italicized for emphasis] 
41 See e.g. “Terrorist Plots, Hatched by the F.B.I.”, David K Shipler, NY Times, April 28, 2012: “But 
all these dramas were facilitated by the F.B.I., whose undercover agents and informers posed as 
terrorists offering a dummy missile, fake C-4 explosives, a disarmed suicide vest and rudimentary 
training. Suspects naïvely played their parts until they were arrested.” 
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 Amidst this brazen lawlessness, endless war, indefinite detention and extra-
judicial killing of its own citizens, the silence of the media is deafening. When I 
inform people of the NDAA, and the elimination of the right of habeas corpus, they 
respond with blank stares.42 Most of the population of the United States seems to be 
entirely ignorant of this fact.  
The people have abandoned the natural law, and they have lost their sense of 
reason. The Republic of the United States is dying.  
“[A] republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there 
is no true justice there can be no right… For the unjust inventions of men are 
neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights… Thus, where there is not 
true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common 
acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people …; and if no 
people, then no [good] of the people, but only of some promiscuous multitude 
unworthy of the name of people…”43      
 
6. Future Research 
I have two useful endeavors in mind that might give a greater understanding to this 
topic. The first is to track the progression a given law by mapping out ratio decidendi 
in formal logic.  I believe that would be helpful not only to demonstrate the weakness 
of the positivist philosophy, but I predict that the results of this sort of demonstration 
would only be understood or appreciated by a very small percentage of lawyers. 
                                                
42 Ex Parte Tobias Watkins, [1830] 28 US 193, 3 Pet 193, 7 L Ed 650, at 201-2: “No law of the United 
States prescribes the cases in which this great writ shall be issued, nor the power of the court over the 
party brought up by it. The term is used in the Constitution as one which was well understood, and the 
Judicial Act authorizes this Court and all the courts of the United States and the judges thereof to issue 
the writ "for the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment." This general reference to a 
power which we are required to exercise, without any precise definition of that power, imposes on us 
the necessity of making some inquiries into its use, according to that law which is in a considerable 
degree incorporated into our own. The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the 
common law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without 
sufficient cause.” 
43 Augustine, City of God, supra note 11 at Bk 19, Ch 21. 
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Another relevant topic would be an exploration of the logical basis of our 
natural rights. I feel that arguments concerning human rights are too often focused on 
policy, rather than being grounded in the more substantive realm of natural law. By 
refocusing the debate, I predict that courts could avoid major blunders, such as 
declaring that corporations are constitutionally protected persons.      
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